'there was sent off to Lord Dufferin a personal telegram to say that Baker was to be sent to fight in the Soudan, and that another Englishman must be chosen for his post, that Arabi was to be interned on some island on parole.
'I received letters at this time from Lord Dufferin on his arrival at Cairo, asking me to keep him informed of my views on the Egyptian situation.
'On December 4th there was a Cabinet which decided to send Arabi to Ceylon, but after a consultation with Lord Ripon, whose advice was not to be followed if it was hostile; and on the next day Lord Ripon protested, as had been foreseen.
'Evelyn Wood, who was to command the Egyptian Army, asked the Cabinet for such large figures as to startle them.'
'I heard from Dufferin also in December from Cairo, in reply to Chamberlain's memorandum. He thought that Egyptian Members of Parliament would many of them be tools in the hands of the Sultan or of foreign Powers, but added that he would sooner run any risk than wholly abandon representative institutions. "But I think we should make a mistake if we forced upon this country premature arrangements which we dare not apply to India, where the strength of our own position and other circumstances afford not only better guarantees for success, but the power of retreating if the experiment should prove a failure."
'In a further letter Lord Dufferin confirmed a story which I had heard as to Halim having bribed Arabi and the other Egyptian Colonels, but most of the money stuck to the hands of the agent who was employed.'
"Two days after I had left the Foreign Office, Hartington wrote to me
to ask whether his soldiers might pay military honours to the holy
carpet on its return from Mecca—an amusing example of the kind of
question with which British Ministers are sometimes called on to
deal."
After Dilke's promotion to the Cabinet,
'On Thursday, February 15th, 1883, Parliament met, and I was very hard worked, and on February 17th had heavy business in the House with regard to Egypt, as revealed in the division of the previous night, in which we only had a majority of thirty-five, although I had been permitted distinctly to announce our intention to withdraw our troops, and not to stay permanently in the country. This, after all, was a mere expansion of the promise given to the Powers by Lord Granville in his circular despatch of January 3rd, in which he said that we were desirous of withdrawing British force as soon as the state of the country would permit.
'In the meantime the Soudan was in a disturbed condition. On January 1st, 1883, we had heard from Cairo: "Second false prophet appeared, hung by first;" or, as the despatch by post expanding the telegram put it, "A second Mahdi has lately appeared, but was hung by order of the first." The Mahdi, however, was making progress. The Foreign Office were inclined to adopt some responsibility for the Egyptian attempt to defeat the Mahdi, and reconquer the Soudan; but I invariably insisted on striking out all such words from their despatches, and, so far as I know, no dangerous language was allowed to pass. In consequence of my observations a despatch was sent by Lord Granville to our consulate in Egypt, pointing out that telegrams had been received from General Hicks in relation to his military operations in the Soudan, and that Lord Granville understood that these were messages intended for General Baker, and only addressed to the consulate because Hicks found it convenient to make use of the cipher which had been entrusted to Colonel Stewart, who was acting as our Consul at Khartoum; but we repeated that "H. M. G. are in no way responsible for the operations in the Soudan, which have been undertaken under the authority of the Egyptian Government, or for the appointment or actions of General Hicks." At this time the Turkish Government were supplying the Mahdi with money and officers in the hope that the troubles in the Soudan would afford them an excuse for sending troops to "assist the Khedive." As we continued to get telegrams from Hicks Pasha, Sir Edward Malet informed the Egyptian Government by letter that we must repeat that we had no responsibility for the operations in the Soudan. We foresaw the failure of the Hicks expedition, and should perhaps have done better had we more distinctly told the Egyptian Government that they must stop it and give up the Soudan, holding Khartoum only; but to say this is to be wise after the event. What we did was to "offer no advice, but" point out that the Egyptian Government should make up their minds what their policy was to be, and carefully consider whether they could afford the cost of putting down the Mahdi. In other words, we discouraged the expedition without forbidding it. I fear, however, that Malet, against our wish, was a party to the sending of reinforcements "to follow up successes already obtained"; for after his conversation with the Egyptian Prime Minister he added: "This view seems reasonable."'