'What we should have done, if I may be allowed to be wise after the event, was to have distinctly ordered the Egyptians to abandon Khartoum and to fall back to Wady Halfa. At the end of the year Baring forwarded to us a memorandum from the Egyptian Government. They pointed out that the Khedive was forbidden by Turkey to cede territory; that we were asking them to abandon enormous provinces, with Berber and Dongola, and great tribes who had remained loyal. They thought that if they fell back Egypt would have to continually resist the attacks of great numbers of fanatics, and that the Bedouin themselves would rise. They were wrong, but they put their case so well that they converted Baring; and he told us that he doubted if any native Ministers could be found willing to carry out the policy of retirement, and he thought that it would be necessary to appoint English Ministers if we decided to force it on them.
'In the last lines of Baring's despatch of December 22nd there occur words which afterwards became of great importance: "If the abandonment policy is carried out … it will be necessary to send an English officer of high authority to Khartoum, with full powers to withdraw the garrisons and to make the best arrangements he can for the future government of the country." It was on those words that we acted in sending for Gordon, and asking him whether he would go to the Soudan for this purpose, which he agreed to do, and when we sent him there was no question of his going for any other purpose than this.'