'It was now too late. Turkey had been encouraged by us into mobilization. Russia had been thwarted by us into mobilization. The time was past when we might have averted war, might have pacified the East, protected alike the Eastern Christians and "British interests" by a signature.'

Replying to a common argument, he said: 'Want of money will not cause Russia to terminate the war. Machiavelli has truly said that nothing is more false than the common belief that money is the sinews of war.'

The conference failing, all Ambassadors were withdrawn from the Porte, and Russia continued to parley with the other Powers. 'Early in March, 1877, a draft Protocol regarding the expectation of the Powers with regard to Turkish reforms was handed to Lord Derby, who promised to sign if Russia would promise to disarm.' Russia specified the conditions on which she would 'disarm,' and Lord Derby then signed the Protocol, but added a declaration that his signature should be null unless disarmament followed both in Russia and Turkey. This, in Sir Charles's judgment, was tantamount to a refusal to sign, because Lord Derby must have known that Turkey would never grant, except under coercion, the conditions on which Russia had consented to disarm. "All Turkish promises are of one material— paper," he said, and in severely criticizing the action of the Government added: "The unreformed state of Turkey is, and will continue to be, the greatest standing menace to the peace of Europe."

Further, at the same moment England again separated herself from the other Powers by sending an Ambassador—Mr. Layard—to Constantinople, 'to which the Turks replied: "The Porte is very sensible of this delicate mark of attention."'

The effect was to encourage Turkey to count on English support, and
Russia, unable to secure concerted action, declared war single-handed.

Thus, not only was the result missed which Sir Charles desired and thought possible—namely, the restoration of order by joint action of Europe—but the way was paved for another result which he deplored—the extension of Russia's influence, and even of her territorial sway.

As his speeches gave the story of the European position, so his diary provides a commentary on that story from within:

'Things generally were in a disturbed condition at this moment. The Eastern Question, which was to be so prominent for the next four years, had grown critical, and Bourke, the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs (afterwards Lord Connemara and Governor of Madras), said to me at the House of Commons: "The one thing that astonishes me is the confidence of people in Lord Derby." Now, Lord Derby was his chief. This proved pretty clearly that Mr. Disraeli was, in fact, his own Foreign Secretary, and had made up his mind that Lord Derby should "go." [Footnote: Lord Derby did not "go" till the spring of 1878.]

'June 28th, 1876, is the date of the first of my letters mentioning the Eastern Question. It is from Auberon Herbert: "We are sure to get into some frightful trouble if Dizzy is to be allowed uninterruptedly to offer what sacrifices he will on the altar of his vanity. You all seem to me to be living in Drowsy Hollow, while Dizzy is consulting his imagination, and Hartington politely bowing. What can you all be doing? Is it the hot weather? Or are all of you secretly pleased at England's 'determined attitude'? Please, dear Neros, cease fiddling for a short time, and let us poor, harmless, innocent-minded country- folk have some assurance that you are not going to fight all Europe…. You sleepy and unfaithful guardians." …

'Although I was the first politician to make a speech upon the Bulgarian massacres, [Footnote: See reference to Eugene Schuyler's letter in speech of August, 1876, p. 207.] I afterwards refused to follow Mr. Gladstone into what was called the "atrocity agitation," because I feared that we should find ourselves plunged into a war with Turkey in alliance with Russia, of which I should have disapproved.'