'Russia at Constantinople,' he wrote, 'would mean the destruction of Austria and the Russification of a large portion of her Slavs. When Austria had disappeared or had been transformed out of all knowledge, Germany, placed between France and Russia, would be still weaker in her military position than she is at present. It is no doubt impossible that Germany can really contemplate that contingency with complete satisfaction. And if she cannot get other people to help Austria to keep Russia away from Constantinople, it is probable that she would be forced to interfere to help to do so, however stoutly her rulers may make the opposite declaration. One of my most valued correspondents, whose criticisms have been of the highest use to me, admits that to place Turkey at the head of a Balkan Confederation would be "adding a badger to your three unfriendly cats and altogether hostile dog"; but, nevertheless, he thinks that such a combination would be possible on account of the overwhelming dread of the danger of absorption by Russia; and I think it right to state his view, although I am unable to modify that which I have said as to the difficulties which the dispute for Macedonia causes.' [Footnote: The Present Position of European Politics, pp. 372, 373.]
In the autumn of 1891 this note occurs in the Memoir: 'John Morley having made a speech in favour of the cessation of the Egyptian occupation, I wrote to tell him how pleased I was, and in his reply he asked why we should go on mechanically applauding Lord Salisbury's foreign policy, which left this danger standing.'
Mr. Morley's satisfaction was, however, not shared by Mr. Chamberlain, who wrote in January, 1892, 'to implore me to have regard to the opinion of society about Egypt.'
'I do not mean fashionable society,' he added, 'but political society, and the great majority of cultivated politicians. I think you do go out of your way to offend them when you advocate evacuation of Egypt, and I ask you to consider if it is worth your while. It is not necessary for your constituents, and with regard to the others, there is no need to add to their causes of anger against you. My advice is, "Be as Radical as you like, be Home Ruler if you must, but be a little Jingo if you can."'
The correspondence had begun in the autumn of 1891, when Sir Charles wrote the following letter:
'Pyrford by Maybury, 'Near Woking, 'October 19_th_, 1891.
'My Dear Chamberlain,
'I have never said that there are not conceivable circumstances in which it would be better for us to be in Egypt. I'm going to try and discuss them in the book I am at work on. Re command of the sea against France. We have not quite a sufficient force to blockade Brest and Toulon. Lefevre and most of our sailors contemplate only "masking" Toulon by a fleet at Gibraltar, and using the Cape route. In this case we could not reinforce Egypt except from India, and not, of course, from India if we were at war with Russia too.
'I am in favour of a stronger navy, and attempting blockade, though it is not certain that it can be made for certain successful. Still Colomb is a better authority than Beresford, etc. I mean "Admiral Colomb," not Sir John. The difficulty, even if blockades are possible, is that France keeps building after us so as always to be without the limits which would make it possible. Lefevre will support Mr. G. in cutting down the navy on this ground—i.e., will prove by figures that every time we lay down nine ships the French lay down six or seven.
'I think that in the long-run France will beat Germany. She will fight her some day single-handed on a point in which Austria and Italy will not move, nor Russia either. Then, if Germany gets the best of it, the others will "mediate."