On April 22nd Mr. Gladstone alluded 'to a letter to the Queen, but he did not read it to us,' and Sir Charles again insisted 'upon inquiry before the proposal of any provision for which there was no direct precedent.'
'At the Cabinet of Monday, April 28th, we found that the Queen was indignant with us for our refusal to make further provision for the Duchess of Albany…. None of the precedents of the century warranted provision for children in infancy. It was agreed that Mr. Gladstone was to write to the Queen again, but "our negative answer is only applicable to the case where the children are in infancy." In other words, we did not wish to bind those who might come after us, but the phrase was not to commit us as to what we would do in five years' time.'
CHAPTER XXXV
EGYPT
1884
I.
At the close of 1883 the destruction of Hicks's army had made clear to all that the Soudan was, for the time at least, lost to Egypt; and close upon this disaster in the central region had followed defeats on the Red Sea coast. But Egyptian garrisons were holding out at Sinkat, some fifty miles from the port of Suakim, and at Tokar, only twenty miles from the coast. In October, 1883, a small force sent to relieve Sinkat was cut up by the Dervishes under Osman Digna; in November, a larger column of 500, accompanied by the British Consul, was utterly routed in an attempt to reach Tokar. General Baker, with his newly formed gendarmerie, was then ordered to Suakim. He desired to enlist the services of Zebehr Pasha, a famous leader of men, but a former dealer in slaves. To this the British authorities objected, and Zebehr was not sent. Baker went, attempted with 3,500 troops to reach Tokar, and on February 2nd, 1884, lost 2,000 of them near the wells of El Teb. Both Tokar and Sinkat soon after fell into the hands of the Dervishes.
Long before this event, the evacuation of the Soudan had been decreed. A peremptory mandate from the British Government was sent to Cherif Pasha, the Egyptian Prime Minister, who, as he had intimated that he would do, resigned rather than be responsible for giving up so vast a possession. On January 8th, Nubar took office to carry out the prescribed policy. But the problem was how to get away the garrisons, and, since England had ordered evacuation, the Egyptian Government looked to England for assistance.
'On January 16th I noted: "Baring wants to make us send a British officer to conduct the retreat from Khartoum. I have written to Lord Granville to protest." Baring had been pressing for an answer to his suggestion named above. I had all along fought against the "Hicks Expedition," and this seemed a consequence. The Egyptian Government had resigned, and the sole supporter of the abandonment policy among the Egyptians in Egypt was the Khedive himself; but Nubar was sent for, and accepted office (with a number of cyphers) to carry it into effect. On January 10th Lord Granville had telegraphed to Baring, without my knowledge, "Would Gordon or Wilson be of use?" [Footnote: Colonel Sir Charles Wilson. See his Life, by Sir Charles Watson, p. 244.] On the 11th Baring replied, "I do not think that the services of Gordon or Wilson can be utilized at present"; and after a reply had been received I saw the telegrams. The earlier Gordon suggestions by Granville, now revealed by E. Fitzmaurice from the Granville Papers, and expounded in Cromer's (1908) book, were never before the Cabinet. [Footnote: Life of Lord Granville, vol. ii., pp. 381, 382.]
'On the 14th Lord Granville telegraphed to Baring: "Can you give further information as to prospects of retreat from (? for) army and residents at Khartoum, and measures taken? Can anything more be done?" Power, our Consular Agent at Khartoum, had also been told that he might leave. On January 16th Baring telegraphed: "The Egyptian Government would feel obliged if Her Majesty's Government would send out at once a qualified British officer to go to Khartoum with full powers, civil and military, to conduct the retreat." Lord Granville then telegraphed for Gordon, and on the 18th I was summoned suddenly to a meeting at the War Office in Hartington's room, at which were present, before I arrived, Hartington, Lord Granville and Lord Northbrook, and Colonel Gordon. Gordon said that he believed that the danger at Khartoum had been "grossly exaggerated," and that the two Englishmen there had "lost their heads"; he would be able to bring away the garrisons without difficulty. We decided that he should go to Suakim to collect information and report on the situation in the Soudan. This was the sole decision taken, but it was understood that if he found he could get across he should go on to Berber. Gordon started at night on the same day.