In the days of these petty collisions in West Africa and all the world over—the "policy of pin-pricks" to which at this time Mr. Chamberlain made fierce allusion in a public speech—Sir Charles arranged to publish a dialogue between himself and M. Lavisse of the French Academy discussing the international situation. "I shall be answering the Temps article which replies to you," he wrote to Chamberlain on December 26th, 1898. "Lavisse, being of the Academy, wants a month to polish his style. The dialogue will not appear till February 1st or 15th. There will be nothing in it new to you. What is new and important is that the French, impressed by the fleet, and pressed by their men of business, such as Henri Germain, the Director of the Credit Lyonnais, and Pallain, now Governor of the Bank of France, want to be friends. I've told these two and others that it is useless to try and settle things unless they will settle Newfoundland. These two came back after seeing Ministers, including the Foreign Minister and the Minister for War, Freycinet, and independently said that they want to settle Newfoundland. They've quite made up their minds that Germany does not want them and will not buy their friendship. I have not seen Monson (the British Ambassador) since my second interview with them, but I told Austin Lee last night to tell him the terms on which I thought that Newfoundland could be settled if you want to settle it. I do not put them on paper as I am sending this by post."

The Newfoundland dispute as to rights of fishing under the Treaties of Utrecht and Paris was one to which Dilke always attached special importance, and immediately after this letter to Chamberlain he wrote upon it in the Pall Mall Magazine (February, 1899), describing it as "the most dangerous of all international questions, as it is also one of the most difficult." [Footnote: This dispute was mainly concerned with the question whether the French fishermen possessed an "exclusive" or only a concurrent right in the so-called French shore, under the above- mentioned treaties (see Fitzmaurice, Life of Shelburne, 2nd ed., ii. 218). It was finally settled in the Lansdowne-Delcassé agreement of 1904, with other then pending questions. Sir Charles Dilke gave a useful summary of the history of the question and its numerous developments after 1783, in a small volume entitled The British Empire, published in 1899.] Great Britain appeared to him to "have gone infinitely beyond the strict terms of the treaty in the concessions to France made for the sake of peace," and to have made proposals which "would not be tolerated for an instant if any of the other ten self-governing colonies were in question," and were only considered because of the "poverty and feebleness of Newfoundland." Lord Salisbury was, in his eyes, no worse a sinner in this respect than the Liberal Government of 1893, except that Lord Salisbury had also made concessions in giving up the existing situation secured by treaty in Madagascar, in Tunis, and in Siam, against which there might have been set off a settlement of this "really dangerous question." He said that in Newfoundland the British navy was being used to coerce British colonists into submission to the French demands; and he foresaw peril to the colonial relation, as well as peril in the international field.

Whether it was possible during the period now under consideration to make an alliance, or even to establish friendly relations with Germany on a solid and permanent basis, is a question which will never fail to be the subject of discussion and controversy: for on it hinged the future of Europe. With an unfriendly France and a German Chancellor— Prince Hohenlohe—aiming, and for a time with some partial success, at re-establishing friendly relations with Russia, the advantages of a good understanding between Great Britain and Germany were obvious; for hardly had the difficulties on the North-West frontiers of India been for the time quieted by the "Pamir" Treaty of 1895, [Footnote: This Treaty was made while Lord Kimberley was Foreign Secretary.] when the war between Japan and China opened up the long series of events in the Far East which culminated later on in the Russo-Japanese War. In those events all or nearly all the European Great Powers were taking a hand; Germany was aspiring to take a leading part, and had to a certain extent obtained it by the command-in-chief of the Allied Forces being given to Count Waldersee, and by the expedition to relieve the Legations in Pekin. But the Jameson Raid and the congratulatory telegram of the Emperor to President Kruger in January, 1896, showed that Germany might intend also to have a South African policy, which in the hands of a less skilful or a less friendly Foreign Secretary than Baron Marschall might open, notwithstanding all the previous treaties, a new chapter of diplomacy. Meanwhile Baron Marschall, with the hand of a skilful jurist, softened down the meaning of the famous telegram, by a close and minimizing interpretation of the words, and, as a practised diplomatist, went out of his way to meet the wishes of Lord Salisbury, who had proposed that the cost of the recent British Expedition to Dongola should be a charge on the funds of the Egyptian Caisse.

But Baron Marschall's tenure of his post was becoming precarious, and Sir Charles did not believe in the possibility of any alliance or permanent understanding with Germany. He feared, on the contrary, that one result of the policy of concession might be ultimately to tempt France, Germany, and Russia, to form a practical and informal union against Great Britain, similar to that which had proved so great a cause of anxiety in 1884-85. This, though not a formal alliance, had been almost as dangerous as one more specific and avowed, and it was now, he thought, likely to be found to exist with reference to events in China.

After the defeat of China by Japan in 1895, every year brought some new and dangerous development, and the break-up of the Chinese Empire seemed near. Any understanding on the part of Great Britain with Russia, in regard to China, Sir Charles believed to be unreliable, and probably impossible, and Lord Salisbury's policy, which seemed to have gone out of its way to let Russia into Port Arthur, showed in his opinion deplorable weakness.

Mr. Chamberlain in a speech in the winter of 1898—which was followed by others in the same strain—had seemed almost to propose an alliance with Germany. Following him at Birmingham, Sir Charles pointed out that the Secretary of State for the Colonies had said: "If the policy of isolation which has hitherto been the policy of this country is to be maintained in the future, then the fate of the Chinese Empire may be—probably will be—hereafter decided without reference to our wishes and in defiance of our interests;" and went on to say: "If, on the other hand, we are determined to enforce the policy of the open door, to preserve an equal opportunity for trade with all our rivals, then we must not allow jingoes to drive us into a quarrel with all the world at the same time, and we must not reject the idea of an alliance with those Powers whose interests most closely approximate to our own." No doubt, Sir Charles replied, the Government were pledged to pursue the policy of "equal opportunity for trade," but they had not successfully maintained that policy in action. What were the Powers, he asked, which Mr. Chamberlain had in view when he went on to say: "Unless we are allied to some great military Power, as we were in the Crimean War, when we had France and Turkey as our allies, we cannot seriously injure Russia"? Mr. Chamberlain must have referred to an alliance with Germany. Personally, Dilke said that he "was entirely opposed to a policy of standing and permanent alliances; but was there any prospect that Germany would ever agree to bear in Europe the brunt of defending for us—for that was what it would come to—the most dangerous of our responsibilities? Prince Bismarck's policy on the subject had been avowed over and over again; he had foreseen these suggestions, and had rejected them in advance. Speaking in 1887, Prince Bismarck said: 'Our friendship for Russia suffered no interruption during the time of our wars, and stands to-day beyond all doubt…. We shall not … let anyone throw his lasso round our neck in order to embroil us with Russia.' And again in 1888: 'No Great Power can, in the long-run, cling to the wording of any treaty in contradiction to the interests of its own people. It is sooner or later compelled to say, "We cannot keep to that," and must justify this announcement as well as it can.' [Footnote: See, too, Bismarck Memoirs, ii., pp. 258, 259.] In 1890 the present German Emperor renewed the Triple Alliance, and the relations also of Germany and Russia had never, he believed, been closer than they were at the present time. Any notion of a permanent or standing alliance with Germany against Russia was, in short, a Will-o'-the-wisp. Opposed as he was to the whole policy of alliances as contrary to the true interests of this country, he was specially opposed to this particular proposal, because it was calculated to lead our people to think that they could rely on the strong arm of another Power instead of only on their own strong arm." [Footnote: The speech of Mr. Chamberlain referred to above was made at Birmingham. It was followed by speeches at Wakefield on December 8th, 1898, and at Leicester on November 20th, 1899.]

Yet a strong action in the Near East, Sir Charles thought, might have compensated for a feebler policy on the Pacific Coast. In Armenia, Christians for whom Great Britain was answerable under the Treaty of Berlin were being massacred, but Lord Salisbury did nothing to help them. In November, 1896, there was a faint stir of public opinion, but many of the suggestions made in regard to what ought to be done were unwise. [Footnote: November 4th, 1896.—'Morley told me that in order to force the hand of the Turks, before July, 1895, Kimberley had proposed to force the Dardanelles, and that Harcourt had stopped it. Mr. Gladstone had written to Morley to insist on his speaking about Armenia and to complain of his lukewarmness. I said: "But Mr. G. in 1880, when something could have been done, confined himself to what he called 'friendly' words to the Sultan.'" See on the whole subject Crispi Memoirs, vol. ii., chap. ix.]

"No one," Sir Charles had said in 1896, "would protest more emphatically than he did against some of the advice which had been given. One of the ablest journalists and highest of financial authorities, Mr. Wilson, had suggested the landing of a few troops and the deportation of the Sultan to Cyprus. The defences of the Dardanelles were not such as could be very easily forced even by the British fleet…. No British Admiral, even if he succeeded in forcing the Dardanelles, would have troops to land who could overcome the Turkish guard, an army corps, and the excited Turkish population." Elsewhere, with prophetic foresight, he showed that the forcing of the Dardanelles could not be carried out without "heavy loss, possibly tremendous loss, and that the loss of a first-class British ironclad is equivalent to the loss of an army corps with all its guns." [Footnote: Letter to the Macclesfield Chronicle, September 19th, 1896.]

Crete was now again in a state of chronic rebellion against Turkish rule; and Turkish methods of repression only stimulated the popular demand to be joined to Greece. Sir Charles Dilke thought that, if the Powers really wished to coerce Turkey to bring about better government within its dominions, coercion could most safely begin in the Greek islands, where European fleets could absolutely control the issue and no question of Continental partition need arise. In Crete the Sultan could, Sir Charles believed, have been compelled to accept a nominal sovereignty, such as he retained over Cyprus; and the aspiration towards Hellenic unity, the need for Hellenic expansion, might thus have been satisfied.

If England had taken "instant and even isolated action," France would, he thought, not have thwarted British policy. "The effect would ultimately have been the addition of Crete to the Greek kingdom under the auspices, perhaps, of all the Powers, perhaps of the Powers less Germany, perhaps of only three or four of them." [Footnote: Ibid.]