Mississippi Squadron,

Flagship Black Hawk, off Red River,

March 2, 1864.

SIR: I came down here anticipating a move on the part of the army up toward Shreveport, but as the river is lower than it has been known to be for years, I much fear that the combined movement can not come off, without interfering with plans formed by General Grant....

The Mississippi River is very quiet, and the rebels retreated into the interior on hearing of the advance of the gunboats.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, David D. Porter Rear-Admiral. (Porter 1914:7)

With this communication to the Secretary of the Navy, Rear Admiral David D. Porter foretold the crisis that would come close to destroying his squadron of gunboats two months later. Low water on the Red River in early March was an unexpected sight. Since 1855 the annual spring rise had appeared without fail. But now in 1864, while Porter waited at the mouth of the Red River for his fleet to assemble and for Major General Nathaniel P. Banks’s army to begin its march north from Franklin, Louisiana, the Red River’s water level was causing Porter to have doubts about the upcoming campaign.

Doubts concerning the Red River Campaign were shared by other Federal officers, but for different reasons. The necessity of a thrust up the Red River in 1864 had been debated since the fall of Vicksburg the previous year. Generals Grant and Sherman, and even the Red River expedition’s commander, General Banks, believed that the North’s next logical military objective was to capture Mobile, Alabama. But Commanding General of the Army Henry W. Halleck and President Lincoln felt that control of Texas was urgently needed to keep Mexico from joining the Southern cause. The Red River presented the best route to Texas.

Map of the Red River campaign, showing the routes of the Union army and navy.

RED RIVER CAMPAIGN Army Route Navy Route SHREVEPORT Loggy Bayou Mansfield Grand Ecore Pleasant Hill Sabine River Red River Bailey’s Dam ALEXANDRIA Ft. De Russy Mississippi River Porter’s Assembly Area

There was another underlying reason for the expedition, which may have changed Banks’s mind. The Red River area was rumored to contain large stores of cotton critically needed by the North. Some historians feel that Banks’s desire to secure this cotton influenced his decision to promote the campaign, and that the capture of cotton became all important to him. After the campaign, the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War charged that the expedition failed because Banks and Porter were overly concerned about capturing cotton. How much their attention strayed is unknown, but it is true that competition between the army and navy for cotton caused great tension during the campaign. At Alexandria soldiers were angered “to see the navy seizing the cotton for prize on land, while they did not get any” (J.C.C.W. n.d.:18,74).

Whatever the real motivation for the campaign, the official military objective was Shreveport. Once Shreveport was in Union control, Texas would lay open to invasion. To capture Shreveport, Banks’s army, supported by Porter’s flotilla, would drive up the Red River while another force under Major General Frederic Steele would move south from Arkansas.

Opposing the Federal attack in Louisiana was Confederate Major General Richard Taylor, who had only around 6,000 troops scattered throughout Louisiana in Monroe, Alexandria, Marksville, and on Bayou Teche. Badly outnumbered, Taylor worked to gather his forces and then waited for reinforcements from Texas so he could eventually make a stand.

On March 12, 1864, Porter began his move up the Red River. Within three days, he captured Fort De Russy, near Marksville, with the help of a detachment of infantry. Meanwhile, Banks’s main army began its march north from Franklin, Louisiana, fighting rain and muck.