Unquestionably there was a difference in interest between different parts of the Southern Pacific system, particularly between the Central Pacific or Ogden route, and the Southern Pacific or El Paso route. When the Southern Pacific was first completed to El Paso, the question was raised as to whether it would be the policy of the management of the whole system to divert all transcontinental freight via the southern route. In a letter to a bureau of the United States Treasury Department, Mr. Huntington observed that it would be necessary to continue to do a large part of the through business over the Central Pacific in order that that road might be enabled to meet its interest charges and the requirements of the government indebtedness. The point was evidently regarded as one which called for a decision as to policy. Mr. Huntington further pointed out that it would be injudicious for the Southern Pacific to push any advantage too strongly which it might have, lest it provoke retaliatory action by other lines.[500]
The early practice of the Southern Pacific did not, however, altogether accord with this counsel of moderation, and the company seems not only to have been very active, but actually to have succeeded in capturing as much as 90 per cent of the New York-San Francisco business; also, while it did not permanently retain so large a share of the through freight which moved by rail, it continued to carry the major portion of the westbound traffic from the Atlantic seaboard to California until perhaps the year 1887.[501] Some of the freight which the Southern Pacific handled during this period was new business, but a considerable portion of it was taken from the Central Pacific.
There is more or less evidence that it was the practice of the Southern Pacific management to lay special emphasis upon the advantages of the southern route, in the attempt to divert as much business as possible to what was known as a 100 per cent line. That shippers believed such a policy was being followed, is evident from statements which appeared in the public press. It was currently asserted, for instance, that ticket and traveling agents of the Southern Pacific all over the state of California were instructed to use their best endeavors to induce passengers to move by way of the southern line instead of by way of Ogden.[502] It was claimed that better time was made over the Southern Pacific than over the Central Pacific, and that freight shipments were more easily traced.
Speaking of westbound freight, a San Francisco merchant was quoted in 1896 as stating that the Southern Pacific delivered freight from New York to San Francisco in from twelve to twenty days. Should the freight not come to hand promptly, officials of the company were said to be exceedingly careful to discover the causes of the delay and to see that the goods were pushed forward as rapidly as possible. On the other hand, if freight came via Chicago and Ogden, all the way from 18 to 28 days might be spent upon the journey, while information as to the causes of delay was difficult to obtain.[503]
Testimony of Employees and Officials
One may readily concede that complaints of the character referred to are to be accepted only with reservations; yet there is later information which bears out the substance of the charges in convincing fashion. When the Southern Pacific system was attacked in 1914 as a combination in restraint of trade, a great many railroad employees were put upon the stand, and testimony was secured which related not only to current policy, but also to practices which had been followed by members of the Southern Pacific staff for a number of years in the past.
It appears without substantial contradiction from the testimony in this case, that Southern Pacific, and even Central Pacific employees, solicited for the Sunset route before its combination with the Union Pacific in preference to the route via Ogden in order to obtain the long haul, even when the Sunset route was very roundabout. Mr. Connor, commercial agent of the Southern Pacific at Cincinnati from 1889 to 1901, testified that his office had directed its exclusive time and attention to securing traffic from California points for the New Orleans gateway. Shipments moving via Ogden he regarded as lost and reported them accordingly.[504] Mr. Sproule said that the same was true of the whole Central Freight Association territory, from Buffalo and Pittsburgh on the east, to Chicago and St. Louis on the west.[505]
Mr. Spence, director of traffic of the Southern Pacific Company, admitted that effort was made to send business to California via New Orleans when the point of origin was in territory east of a line drawn from Toledo through Indianapolis and Terre Haute to St. Louis.[506] Mr. Lovett thought that Southern Pacific solicitors even in Chicago did not work against the solicitation of lines leading to New Orleans, though acting independently they would solicit business via Ogden.[507] It is in the record, also, that Southern Pacific solicitors in 1914 sought freight from the Atlantic seaboard to Oregon and Nevada through the New Orleans gateway,[508] and that the great bulk of wool from western and central Nevada destined to the Atlantic seaboard actually moved west to Sacramento and then south and east over the Sunset line, instead of taking the direct route via Ogden.[509]
Complaints of Others