| January | 16, | 1895 | $ 2,362,000 |
| ” | 1, | 1896 | 1,600,000 |
| ” | 1, | 1897 | 2,432,000 |
| ” | 1, | 1898 | 10,614,120 |
| ” | 1, | 1899 | 10,847,560 |
About $2,000,000 of these bonds were held in the sinking fund established by the Thurman Act. These had naturally been canceled as they fell due. On December 21, 1896, moreover, most of the remaining bonds held by the government in the Central Pacific sinking fund had been sold and the proceeds applied to maturing indebtedness.[579]
These resources, together with the credits in the Central Pacific bond and interest account, had covered the demands upon the company up to January 1, 1898. Meanwhile coupons on the first mortgage bonds had been regularly paid, and arrangements had been made with first mortgage bondholders to extend the maturity of each instalment until January 1, 1898, at which date first mortgage bonds of the Central Pacific Railroad Company to the amount of $25,883,000 were to mature. First mortgage bonds of the Western Pacific Railroad, aggregating $1,970,000, matured on July 1, 1899. It was evident that all available Central Pacific resources would be exhausted by the 1st of January, 1898.
Negotiations Initiated
In the face of what amounted to a real crisis, involving not only the possibility of loss to the government, but also that of serious financial injury to private interests connected with the Pacific railroads, the initiative in seeking a compromise was now taken by the banking firm of James Speyer and Company, of New York, through which a large amount of Central Pacific securities had been marketed. Mr. Speyer felt responsibility in the matter because so many of his clients were involved. He later testified:
I think it naturally suggested itself to us as bankers, having sold such a large amount of securities and the company being threatened with bankruptcy, we naturally sat up nights thinking how we could save it, because these bonds were all out, all over Europe, and stock too; and we tried to find some means to work it out so that these people would not lose their money. So that I think that originally when this debt came nearer and nearer, when it got so that it became a threatening thing to the Central Pacific security holders, we naturally began to look around to see how we could stave off receivership and bankruptcy.[580]
There were also certain strategic considerations which had weight at this time. These affected the dominant interests in the Southern Pacific particularly. In spite of the apparently indifferent attitude of the Stanford-Huntington group, these gentlemen could not have been, and were not, blind to the fact that a receivership for the Central Pacific opened possibilities of disaster, not only for the Central Pacific itself, but also for the Southern Pacific, in which their main interest then lay. Such a receivership, if followed by a foreclosure sale, would have wiped out the last vestiges of the Stanford-Huntington stock holdings in the Central Pacific Railroad and would in all probability have eliminated also the lease of the Central Pacific to the Southern Pacific. This suggested the possibility of a severe competition for Pacific Coast business, from which the Southern Pacific could scarcely have escaped unscathed. The whole future control of the railroad systems of the South West was clearly at stake.
It appears that Mr. Speyer took the matter up with Mr. Huntington,[581] probably early in 1898. Mr. Huntington was receptive and the subject was then discussed with representatives of the government. At an early stage in the negotiations President McKinley was consulted. The matter was one deemed of great importance to the government; in fact, in January, 1898, the President directed the Attorney-General to give immediate attention to the Pacific railroad debts, to take every means necessary, and to spend as much money as should be needed in order to enforce the government’s lien.[582] In later proceedings Mr. Griggs, the Attorney-General, and Mr. Gage, Secretary of the Treasury, took an active part. Mr. McKinley continued to follow the negotiations, and was about as well informed as any of the others as to how matters were getting on. Elihu Root was employed by the Attorney-General as special counsel.[583] In short, the administration responded cordially to the initiative of the railroad and banking group.