A History of Indian Philosophy, Volume 1

by Surendranath Dasgupta

which are without size and eternal. Matter may exist in two states, gross (such as things we see around us), and subtle (such as the karma matter which sullies the soul). All material things are ultimately produced by the combination of atoms. The smallest indivisible particle of matter is called an atom (a@nu). The atoms are all eternal and they all have touch, taste, smell, and colour. The formation of different substances is due to the different geometrical, spherical or cubical modes of the combination of the atoms, to the diverse modes of their inner arrangement and to the existence of different degrees of inter-atomic space (ghanapratarabhedena). Some combinations take place by simple mutual contact at two points (yugmaprades'a) whereas in others the atoms are only held together by the points of attractive force (oja@hprades'a) (Prajñâpanopâ@ngasûtra, pp. 10-12). Two atoms form a compound (skandha), when the one is viscous and the other dry or both are of different degrees of viscosity or dryness. It must be noted that while the Buddhists thought that there was no actual contact between the atoms the Jains regarded the contact as essential and as testified by experience. These compounds combine with other compounds and thus produce the gross things of the world. There are, however, liable to constant change (pari@nâma) by which they lose some of their old qualities (gu@nas) and acquire new ones. There are four elements, earth, water, air, and fire, and the atoms of all these are alike in character. The perception of grossness however is not an error which is imposed upon the perception of the atoms by our mind (as the Buddhists think) nor is it due to the perception of atoms scattered spatially lengthwise and breadthwise (as the Sâ@mkhya-Yoga supposes), but it is due to the accession of a similar property of grossness, blueness or hardness in the combined atoms, so that such knowledge is generated in us as is given in the perception of a gross, blue, or a hard thing. When a thing appears as blue, what happens is this, that the atoms there have all acquired the property of blueness and on the removal of the dars'anavara@nîya and jñânavara@nîya veil, there arises in the soul the perception and knowledge of that blue thing. This sameness (samâna-rûpatâ) of the accession of a quality in an aggregate of atoms by virtue of which it appears as one object (e.g. a cow) is technically called tiryaksâmânya. This sâmânya or generality is thus neither an imposition of the mind nor an abstract entity

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(as maintained by the Naiyâyikas) but represents only the accession of similar qualities by a similar development of qualities of atoms forming an aggregate. So long as this similarity of qualities continues we perceive the thing to be the same and to continue for some length of time. When we think of a thing to be permanent, we do so by referring to this sameness in the developing tendencies of an aggregate of atoms resulting in the relative permanence of similar qualities in them. According to the Jains things are not momentary and in spite of the loss of some old qualities and the accession of other ones, the thing as a whole may remain more or less the same for some time. This sameness of qualities in time is technically called ûrdhvasâmânya [Footnote ref 1]. If the atoms are looked at from the point of view of the change and accession of new qualities, they may be regarded as liable to destruction, but if they are looked at from the point of view of substance (dravya) they are eternal.

Dharma, Adharma, Âkâs'a.

The conception of dharma and adharma in Jainism is absolutely different from what they mean in other systems of Indian philosophy. Dharma is devoid of taste, touch, smell, sound and colour; it is conterminous with the mundane universe (lokâkâs'a) and pervades every part of it. The term astikâya is therefore applied to it. It is the principle of motion, the accompanying circumstance or cause which makes motion possible, like water to a moving fish. The water is a passive condition or circumstance of the movement of a fish, i.e. it is indifferent or passive (udâsîna) and not an active or solicitous (preraka) cause. The water cannot compel a fish at rest to move; but if the fish wants to move, water is then the necessary help to its motion. Dharma cannot make the soul or matter move; but if they are to move, they cannot do so without the presence of dharma. Hence at the extremity of the mundane world (loka) in the region of the liberated souls, there being no dharma, the liberated souls attain perfect rest. They cannot move there because there is not the necessary motion-element, dharma [Footnote ref 2]. Adharma is also regarded as a similar pervasive entity which

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[Footnote 1: See Prameyakamalamârta@n@da, pp. 136-143; Jainatarkavârttika, p. 106.]

[Footnote 2: Dravyasa@mgrahav@rtti, 17-20.]

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helps jîvas and pudgalas to keep themselves at rest. No substance could move if there were no dharma, or could remain at rest if there were no adharma. The necessity of admitting these two categories seems probably to have been felt by the Jains on account of their notion that the inner activity of the jîva or the atoms required for its exterior realization the help of some other extraneous entity, without which this could not have been transformed into actual exterior motion. Moreover since the jîvas were regarded as having activity inherent in them they would be found to be moving even at the time of liberation (moksa), which was undesirable; thus it was conceived that actual motion required for its fulfilment the help of an extraneous entity which was absent in the region of the liberated souls.