[Footnote 3: The sutra "Tadvacanâd âmnâyasya prâmâ@nyam (I.i.3 and X.ii.9) has been explained by Upaskâra as meaning "The Veda being the word of Îs'vara (God) must be regarded as valid," but since there is no mention of Îs'vara anywhere in the text this is simply reading the later Nyâya ideas into the Vais'e@sika. Sûtra X.ii.8 is only a repetition of VI.ii.1.]
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description of the categories of substance is not irrelevant, but is the means of proving that our ordinary experience of these cannot explain many facts which are only to be explained on the supposition of ad@r@s@ta proceeding out of the performance of Vedic deeds. In V.i. 15 the movement of needles towards magnets, in V. ii. 7 the circulation of water in plant bodies, V. ii. 13 and IV. ii. 7 the upward motion of fire, the side motion of air, the combining movement of atoms (by which all combinations have taken place), and the original movement of the mind are said to be due to ad@r@s@ta. In V. ii. 17 the movement of the soul after death, its taking hold of other bodies, the assimilation of food and drink and other kinds of contact (the movement and development of the foetus as enumerated in Upaskara) are said to be due to ad@r@s@ta. Salvation (moksa) is said to be produced by the annihilation of ad@r@s@ta leading to the annihilation of all contacts and non production of rebirths Vais'esika marks the distinction between the drsta (experienced) and the ad@r@s@ta. All the categories that he describes are founded on drsta (experience) and those unexplained by known experience are due to ad@r@s@ta These are the acts on which depend all life-process of animals and plants, the continuation of atoms or the construction of the worlds, natural motion of fire and air, death and rebirth (VI. ii. 15) and even the physical phenomena by which our fortunes are affected in some way or other (V. ii. 2), in fact all with which we are vitally interested in philosophy. Ka@nâda's philosophy gives only some facts of experience regarding substances, qualities and actions, leaving all the graver issues of metaphysics to ad@r@s@ta But what leads to ad@r@s@ta? In answer to this, Ka@nâda does not speak of good or bad or virtuous or sinful deeds, but of Vedic works, such as holy ablutions (snana), fasting, holy student life (brahmacarya), remaining at the house of the teacher (gurukulavasa), retired forest life (vanaprastha), sacrifice (yajña), gifts (dana), certain kinds of sacrificial sprinkling and rules of performing sacrificial works according to the prescribed time of the stars, the prescribed hymns (mantras) (VI. ii. 2).
He described what is pure and what is impure food, pure food being that which is sacrificially purified (VI. ii. 5) the contrary being impure, and he says that the taking of pure food leads to prosperity through ad@r@s@ta. He also described how
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feelings of attachment to things are also generated by ad@r@s@ta. Throughout almost the whole of VI. i Ka@nâda is busy in showing the special conditions of making gifts and receiving them. A reference to our chapter on Mîmâ@msâ will show that the later Mîmâ@msâ writers agreed with the Nyâya-Vais`e@sika doctrines in most of their views regarding substance, qualities, etc. Some of the main points in which Mîmâ@msâ differs from Nyâya-Vais`e@sika are (1) self-validity of the Vedas, (2) the eternality of the Vedas, (3) disbelief in any creator or god, (4) eternality of sound (s'abda), (5) (according to Kumârila) direct perception of self in the notion of the ego. Of these the first and the second points do not form any subject of discussion in the Vais'e@sika. But as no Îs'vara is mentioned, and as all ad@r@s@ta depends upon the authority of the Vedas, we may assume that Vais'e@sika had no dispute with Mîmâ@msâ. The fact that there is no reference to any dissension is probably due to the fact that really none had taken place at the time of the Vais`e@sika sûtras. It is probable that Ka@nâda believed that the Vedas were written by some persons superior to us (II. i. 18, VI. i. 1-2). But the fact that there is no reference to any conflict with Mîmâ@msâ suggests that the doctrine that the Vedas were never written by anyone was formulated at a later period, whereas in the days of the Vais'e@sika sûtras, the view was probably what is represented in the Vais'e@sika sûtras. As there is no reference to Îs`vara and as ad@r@s@ta proceeding out of the performance of actions in accordance with Vedic injunctions is made the cause of all atomic movements, we can very well assume that Vais'e@sika was as atheistic or non-theistic as the later Mîmâ@msâ philosophers. As regards the eternality of sound, which in later days was one of the main points of quarrel between the Nyâya-Vais'e@sika and the Mîmâ@msâ, we find that in II. ii. 25-32, Ka@nâda gives reasons in favour of the non-eternality of sound, but after that from II. ii. 33 till the end of the chapter he closes the argument in favour of the eternality of sound, which is the distinctive Mîmâ@msâ view as we know from the later Mîmâ@msâ writers [Footnote ref 1]. Next comes the question of the proof of the existence of self. The traditional Nyâya view is
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[Footnote 1: The last two concluding sûtras II. ii. 36 and 37 are in my opinion wrongly interpreted by S'a@nkara Mis'ra in his Upaskâra (II. ii. 36 by adding an "api" to the sûtra and thereby changing the issue, and II. ii. 37 by misreading the phonetic combination "samkhyabhava" as sâ@mkhya and bhava instead of sâ@mkhya and abhava, which in my opinion is the right combination here) in favour of the non-eternality of sound as we find in the later Nyâya Vais'e@sika view.]
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that the self is supposed to exist because it must be inferred as the seat of the qualities of pleasure, pain, cognition, etc. Traditionally this is regarded as the Vais'e@sika view as well. But in Vais'e@sika III. ii. 4 the existence of soul is first inferred by reason of its activity and the existence of pleasure, pain, etc., in III. ii. 6-7 this inference is challenged by saying that we do not perceive that the activity, etc. belongs to the soul and not to the body and so no certainty can be arrived at by inference, and in III. ii. 8 it is suggested that therefore the existence of soul is to be accepted on the authority of the scriptures (âgama). To this the final Vais'e@sika conclusion is given that we can directly perceive the self in our feeling as "I" (aham), and we have therefore not to depend on the scriptures for the proof of the existence of the self, and thus the inference of the existence of the self is only an additional proof of what we already find in perception as "I" (aham) (III. ii. 10-18, also IX. i. 11).