In the seventh book it is said that the qualities in eternal things are eternal and in non-eternal things non-eternal. The change of qualities produced by heat in earth has its beginning in the cause (the atoms). Atomic size is invisible while great size is visible. Visibility is due to a thing's being made up of many causes [Footnote ref 1], but the atom is therefore different from those that have great size. The same thing may be called great and small relatively at the same time. In accordance with a@nutva (atomic) and mahattva (great) there are also the notions of small and big. The eternal size of parima@n@dala (round) belongs to the atoms. Âkâs'a and âtman are called mahân or paramamahân (the supremely great or all-pervasive); since manas is not of the great measure it is of atomic size. Space and time are also considered as being of the measure "supremely great" (paramamahat), Atomic size (parima@n@dala) belonging to the atoms and the mind (manas) and the supremely great size belonging to space, time, soul and ether (âkâs'a) are regarded as eternal.
In the second chapter of the seventh book it is said that unity and separateness are to be admitted as entities distinct from other qualities. There is no number in movement and quality; the appearance of number in them is false. Cause and effect are
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[Footnote 1: I have differed from the Upaskâra in the interpretation of this sûtra.]
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neither one, nor have they distinctive separateness (ekap@rthaktva). The notion of unity is the cause of the notion of duality, etc. Contact may be due to the action of one or two things, or the effect of another contact and so is disjoining. There is neither contact nor disjoining in cause and effect since they do not exist independently (yutasiddhyabhâvât). In the eighth book it is said that soul and manas are not perceptible, and that in the apprehension of qualities, action, generality, and particularity perception is due to their contact with the thing. Earth is the cause of perception of smell, and water, fire, and air are the cause of taste, colour and touch[Footnote ref 1]. In the ninth book negation is described; non-existence (asat) is defined as that to which neither action nor quality can be attributed. Even existent things may become non-existent and that which is existent in one way may be non-existent in another; but there is another kind of non-existence which is different from the above kinds of existence and non-existence [Footnote ref 2]. All negation can be directly perceived through the help of the memory which keeps before the mind the thing to which the negation applies. Allusion is also made in this connection to the special perceptual powers of the yogins (sages attaining mystical powers through Yoga practices).
In the second chapter the nature of hetu (reason) or the middle term is described. It is said that anything connected with any other thing, as effect, cause, as in contact, or as contrary or as inseparably connected, will serve as li@nga (reason). The main point is the notion "this is associated with this," or "these two are related as cause and effect," and since this may also be produced through premisses, there may be a formal syllogism from propositions fulfilling the above condition. Verbal cognition comes without inference. False knowledge (avidyâ) is due to the defect of the senses or non-observation and mal-observation due to wrong expectant impressions. The opposite of this is true knowledge (vidyâ). In the tenth it is said that pleasure and pain are not cognitions, since they are not related to doubt and certainty.
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[Footnote 1: Upaskâra here explains that it is intended that the senses are produced by those specific elements, but this cannot be found in the sûtras.]
[Footnote 2: In the previous three kinds of non-existence, prâgabhâva (negation before production), dhvamsâbhâva (negation after destruction), and anyonyabhava (mutual negation of each other in each other), have been described. The fourth one is sâmânyâbhâva (general negation).]