Such a testimony may tell us about things which may be experienced and which are beyond experience. Objects of knowledge are said to be self (âtman), body, senses, sense-objects, understanding (buddhi), mind (manas}, endeavour (prav@rtti), rebirths, enjoyment of pleasure and suffering of pain, sorrow and salvation. Desire, antipathy, effort (prayatna), pleasure, pain, and knowledge indicate the existence of the self. Body is that which upholds movement, the senses and the rise of pleasure and pain as arising out of the contact of sense with sense-objects [Footnote ref l]; the five senses are derived from the five elements, such as prthivi, ap, tejas, vâyu and âkâs'a; smell, taste, colour, touch, and sound are the qualities of the above five elements, and these are also the objects of the senses. The fact that many cognitions cannot occur at any one moment indicates the existence of mind (manas). Endeavour means what is done by speech, understanding, and body. Do@sas (attachment, antipathy, etc) are those which lead men to virtue and vice. Pain is that which causes suffering [Footnote ref 2]. Ultimate cessation from pain is called apavarga [Footnote ref 3]. Doubt arises when through confusion of similar qualities or conflicting opinions etc., one wants to settle one of the two alternatives. That for attaining which, or for giving up which one sets himself to work is called prayojana.
Illustrative example (d@r@s@tânta) is that on which both the common man and the expert (parîk@saka) hold the same opinion. Established texts or conclusions (siddhânta) are of four kinds, viz (1) those which are accepted by all schools of thought called the sarvatantrasiddhânta; (2) those which are held by one school or similar schools but opposed by others called the pratitantrasiddhânta; (3) those which being accepted other conclusions will also naturally follow called adhikara@nasiddhânta; (4) those of the opponent's views which are uncritically granted by a debater, who proceeds then to refute the consequences that follow and thereby show his own special skill and bring the opponent's intellect to disrepute (abhyupagamasiddhânta) [Footnote ref 4]. The premisses are five:
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[Footnote 1: Here I have followed Vâtsyâyana's meaning.]
[Footnote 2: Vâtsyâyana comments here that when one finds all things full of misery, he wishes to avoid misery, and finding birth to be associated with pain becomes unattached and thus is emancipated.]
[Footnote 3: Vâtsyâyana wants to emphasise that there is no bliss in salvation, but only cessation from pain.]
[Footnote 4: I have followed Vâtsyâyana's interpretation here.]
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(1) pratijñâ (the first enunciation of the thing to be proved); (2) hetu (the reason which establishes the conclusion on the strength of the similarity of the case in hand with known examples or negative instances); (3) udâhara@na (positive or negative illustrative instances); (4) upanaya (corroboration by the instance); (5) nigamana (to reach the conclusion which has been proved). Then come the definitions of tarka, nir@naya, vâda, jalpa, vita@n@dâ, the fallacies (hetvâbhâsa), chala, jâti, and nigrahasthâna, which have been enumerated in the first sûtra.
The second book deals with the refutations of objections against the means of right knowledge (pramâna). In refutation of certain objections against the possibility of the happening of doubt, which held that doubt could not happen, since there was always a difference between the two things regarding which doubt arose, it is held that doubt arises when the special differentiating characteristics between the two things are not noted. Certain objectors, probably the Buddhists, are supposed to object to the validity of the pramâ@na in general and particularly of perceptions on the ground that if they were generated before the sense-object contact, they could not be due to the latter, and if they are produced after the sense-object contact, they could not establish the nature of the objects, and if the two happened together then there would be no notion of succession in our cognitions. To this the Nyâya reply is that if there were no means of right knowledge, then there would be no means of knowledge by means of which the objector would refute all means of right knowledge; if the objector presumes to have any means of valid knowledge then he cannot say that there are no means of valid knowledge at all. Just as from the diverse kinds of sounds of different musical instruments, one can infer the previous existence of those different kinds of musical instruments, so from our knowledge of objects we can infer the previous existence of those objects of knowledge [Footnote ref 1].