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further allusion elsewhere. The Vais'e@sika sûtras as we have already seen had argued only against the Mîmâ@msâ, and ultimately agreed with them on most points. The dispute with Mîmâ@msâ in the Nyâya sûtras is the same as in the Vais'e@sika over the question of the doctrine of the eternality of sound. The question of the self-validity of knowledge (svata@h prâmâ@nyavâda)and the akhyâti doctrine of illusion of the Mîmâ@msists, which form the two chief points of discussion between later Mîmâ@msâ and later Nyâya, are never alluded to in the Nyâya sûtras. The advocacy of Yoga methods (Nyâya sûtras, IV.ii.38-42 and 46) seems also to be an alien element; these are not found in Vais'e@sika and are not in keeping with the general tendency of the Nyâya sûtras, and the Japanese tradition that Mirok added them later on as Mahâmahopâdhyâya Haraprasâda S'astri has pointed out [Footnote ref l] is not improbable.
The Vais'e@sika sûtras, III.i.18 and III.ii.1, describe perceptional knowledge as produced by the close proximity of the self (âtman), the senses and the objects of sense, and they also adhere to the doctrine, that colour can only be perceived under special conditions of sa@mskâra (conglomeration etc.). The reason for inferring the existence of manas from the non-simultaneity (ayaugapadya) of knowledge and efforts is almost the same with Vais'e@sika as with Nyâya. The Nyâya sûtras give a more technical definition of perception, but do not bring in the questions of sa@mskâra or udbhûtarûpavattva which Vais'e@sika does. On the question of inference Nyâya gives three classifications as pûrvavat, s'e@savat and samânyatod@r@s@ta, but no definition. The Vais'e@sika sûtras do not know of these classifications, and give only particular types or instances of inference (V.S. III. i. 7-17, IX. ii. 1-2, 4-5). Inference is said to be made when a thing is in contact with another, or when it is in a relation of inherence in it, or when it inheres in a third thing; one kind of effect may lead to the inference of another kind of effect, and so on. These are but mere collections of specific instances of inference without reaching a general theory. The doctrine of vyâpti (concomitance of hetu (reason) and sâdhya (probandum)) which became so important in later Nyâya has never been properly formulated either in the Nyâya sûtras or in the Vais'e@sika. Vais'e@sika sutra, III. i. 24, no doubt assumes the knowledge of concomitance between hetu and sadhya (prasiddhipûrvakatvât apades'asya),
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[Footnote 1: J.A.S.B. 1905.]
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but the technical vyâpti is not known, and the connotation of the term prasiddhipûrvakatva of Vais'e@sika seems to be more loose than the term vyâpti as we know it in the later Nyâya. The Vais'e@sika sûtras do not count scriptures (s'abda) as a separate pramâ@na, but they tacitly admit the great validity of the Vedas. With Nyâya sûtras s'abda as a pramâ@na applies not only to the Vedas, but to the testimony of any trustworthy person, and Vâtsyâyana says that trustworthy persons may be of three kinds @r@si, ârya and mleccha (foreigners). Upamâna which is regarded as a means of right cognition in Nyâya is not even referred to in the Vais'e@sika sûtras. The Nyâya sûtras know of other pramâ@nas, such as arthâpatti, sambhava and aitihya, but include them within the pramâ@nas admitted by them, but the Vais'e@sika sûtras do not seem to know them at all [Footnote ref 1]. The Vais'e@sika sûtras believe in the perception of negation (abhâva) through the perception of the locus to which such negation refers (IX. i. 1-10). The Nyâya sûtras (II. ii. 1, 2, 7-12) consider that abhâva as non-existence or negation can be perceived; when one asks another to "bring the clothes which are not marked," he finds that marks are absent in some clothes and brings them; so it is argued that absence or non-existence can be directly perceived [Footnote ref 2]. Though there is thus an agreement between the Nyâya and the Vais'e@sika sûtras about the acceptance of abhâva as being due to perception, yet their method of handling the matter is different. The Nyâya sûtras say nothing about the categories of dravya, gu@na, karma, vis'e@sa and samavâya which form the main subjects of Vais'e@ska discussions [Footnote ref 3]. The Nyâya sûtras take much pains to prove the materiality of the senses. But this question does not seem to have been important with Vais'e@sika. The slight reference to this question in VIII. ii. 5-6 can hardly be regarded as sufficient. The Vais'e@sika sûtras do not mention the name of "Îs'vara," whereas the Nyâya sûtras try to prove his existence on eschatological grounds. The reasons given in support of the existence of self in the Nyâya sûtras are mainly on the ground of the unity of sense-cognitions and the phenomenon of recognition, whereas the
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[Footnote 1: The only old authority which knows these pramâ@nas is Caraka.
But he also gives an interpretation of sambhava which is different from
Nyâya and calls arthâpatti arthaprâpti (Caraka III. viii.).]
[Footnote 2: The details of this example are taken from Vâtsyâyana's commentary.]