[Footnote 1: See Nyâyakandalî, pp. 64-66, and Nyâyamañjarî, pp. 136-139. The Vais'e@sika sûtras regarded time as the cause of things which suffer change but denied it of things which are eternal.]
[Footnote 2: See Nyâyakandalî, pp. 66-69, and Nyayamañjarî, p. 140.]
312
of substance consists in this, that it is independent by itself, whereas the other things such as quality (gu@na), action (karma), sameness or generality (sâmânya), speciality or specific individuality (vis'e@sa) and the relation of inherence (samavâya) cannot show themselves without the help of substance (dravya). Dravya is thus the place of rest (âs'rayâ) on which all the others depend (âs'@rta). Dravya, gu@na, karma, sâmânya, vis'e@sa, and samavâya are the six original entities of which all things in the world are made up [Footnote ref 1]. When a man through some special merit, by the cultivation of reason and a thorough knowledge of the fallacies and pitfalls in the way of right thinking, comes to know the respective characteristics and differences of the above entities, he ceases to have any passions and to work in accordance with their promptings and attains a conviction of the nature of self, and is liberated [Footnote ref 2]. The Nyâya-Vais'e@sika is a pluralistic system which neither tries to reduce the diversity of experience to any universal principle, nor dismisses patent facts of experience on the strength of the demands of the logical coherence of mere abstract thought. The entities it admits are taken directly from experience. The underlying principle is that at the root of each kind of perception there must be something to which the perception is due. It classified the percepts and concepts of experience into several ultimate types or categories (padârtha), and held that the notion of each type was due to the presence of that entity. These types are six in number—dravya, gu@na, etc. If we take a percept "I see a red book," the book appears to be an independent entity on which rests the concept of "redness" and "oneness," and we thus call the book a substance (dravya); dravya is thus defined as that which has the characteristic of a dravya (dravyatva). So also gu@na and karma. In the subdivision of different kinds of dravya also the same principle of classification is followed. In contrasting it with Sâ@mkhya or Buddhism we see that for each unit of sensation (say
__________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Abhâva (negation) as dependent on bhâva (position) is mentioned in the Vais'e@sika sûtras. Later Nyâya writers such as Udayana include abhâva as a separate category, but S'rîdhara a contemporary of Udayana rightly remarks that abhâva was not counted by Pras'astapâda as it was dependent on bhâva—"abhâvasya prthaganupades'a@h bhâvapâratantryât na tvabhâvât." Nyâyakandalî, p. 6, and Lak@sa@nâvalî, p. 2.]
[Footnote 2: "Tattvato jñâte@su bâhyâdhyâtmike@su vi@saye@su do@sadars'anât viraktasya samîhâniv@rttau âtmajñasya tadarthâni karmânyakurvatah tatparityâgasâdhanâni s'rutism@rtyuditâni asa@nkalpitaphalâni upâdadânasya âtmajñânamabhyasyata@h prak@r@s@tanivarttakadharmopacaye sati paripakvâtmajñânasyâtyantikas'arîraviyogasya bhâvât." Ibid. p. 7.]
313
whiteness) the latter would admit a corresponding real, but Nyâya-Vais'e@sika would collect "all whiteness" under the name of "the quality of white colour" which the atom possessed [Footnote ref l]. They only regarded as a separate entity what represented an ultimate mode of thought. They did not enquire whether such notions could be regarded as the modification of some other notion or not; but whenever they found that there were some experiences which were similar and universal, they classed them as separate entities or categories.
The six Padârthas: Dravya, Gu@na, Karma, Sâmânya,
Vis'e@sa, Samavâya.