absence of the gamaka or vyâpya, should also be noted, for a knowledge of such a negative relation is not indispensable for the forming of the notion of the permanent relation [Footnote ref 1]. The experience of a large number of particular cases in which any two things were found to coexist together in another thing in some relation associated with the non-perception of any case of failure creates an expectancy in us of inferring the presence of the gamya in that thing in which the gamaka is perceived to exist in exactly the same relation [Footnote ref 2]. In those cases where the circle of the existence of the gamya coincides with the circle of the existence of the gamaka, each of them becomes a gamaka for the other. It is clear that this form of inference not only includes all cases of cause and effect, of genus and species but also all cases of coexistence as well.
The question arises that if no inference is possible without a memory of the permanent relation, is not the self-validity of inference destroyed on that account, for memory is not regarded as self-valid. To this Kumârila's answer is that memory is not invalid, but it has not the status of pramâna, as it does not bring to us a new knowledge. But inference involves the acquirement of a new knowledge in this, that though the coexistence of two things in another was known in a number of cases, yet in the present case a new case of the existence of the gamya in a thing is known from the perception of the existence of the gamaka and this knowledge is gained by a means which is not perception, for it is only the gamaka that is seen and not the gamya. If the gamya is also seen it is no inference at all.
As regards the number of propositions necessary for the explicit statement of the process of inference for convincing others (pârârthânumâna) both Kumârila and Prabhâkara hold that three premisses are quite sufficient for inference. Thus the first three premisses pratijñâ, hetu and d@rstânta may quite serve the purpose of an anumâna.
There are two kinds of anumâna according to Kumârila viz. pratyak@satod@rstasambandha and sâmânyatod@r@s@tasambandha. The former is that kind of inference where the permanent
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[Footnote 1: Kumârila strongly opposes a Buddhist view that concomitance (vyâpti) is ascertained only by the negative instances and not by the positive ones.]
[Footnote 2: "tasmâdanavagate'pi sarvatrânvaye sarvatas'ca vyatireke bahus'ah sâhityâvagamamâtrâdeva vyabhicârâdars'anasanâthâdanumânotpattira@ngîkartavya@h." Nyâyaratnâkara, p. 288.]
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relation between two concrete things, as in the case of smoke and fire, has been noticed. The latter is that kind of inference where the permanent relation is observed not between two concrete things but between two general notions, as in the case of movement and change of place, e.g. the perceived cases where there is change of place there is also motion involved with it; so from the change of place of the sun its motion is inferred and it is held that this general notion is directly perceived like all universals [Footnote ref 1].
Prabhâkara recognizes the need of forming the notion of the permanent relation, but he does not lay any stress on the fact that this permanent relation between two things (fire and smoke) is taken in connection with a third thing in which they both subsist. He says that the notion of the permanent relation between two things is the main point, whereas in all other associations of time and place the things in which these two subsist together are taken only as adjuncts to qualify the two things (e.g. fire and smoke). It is also necessary to recognize the fact that though the concomitance of smoke in fire is only conditional, the concomitance of the fire in smoke is unconditional and absolute [Footnote ref 2]. When such a conviction is firmly rooted in the mind that the concept of the presence of smoke involves the concept of the presence of fire, the inference of fire is made as soon as any smoke is seen. Prabhâkara counts separately the fallacies of the minor (pak@sâbhâsa), of the enunciation (pratijñâbhâsa) and of the example (d@r@s@tântâbhâsa) along with the fallacies of the middle and this seems to indicate that the Mîmâ@msâ logic was not altogether free from Buddhist influence. The cognition of smoke includes within itself the cognition of fire also, and thus there would be nothing left unknown to be cognized by the inferential cognition. But this objection has little force with Prabhâkara, for he does not admit that a pramâ@na should necessarily bring us any new knowledge, for pramâ@na is simply defined as "apprehension." So though the inferential cognition always pertains to things already known it is yet regarded by him as a pramâ@na, since it is in any case no doubt an apprehension.