The vidhis properly interpreted are the main source of dharma. The mantras which are generally hymns in praise of some deities or powers are to be taken as being for the specification of the deity to whom the libation is to be offered. It should be remembered that as dharma can only be acquired by following the injunctions of the Vedas they should all be interpreted as giving us injunctions. Anything therefore found in the Vedas which cannot be connected with the injunctive orders as forming part of them is to be regarded as untrustworthy or at best inexpressive. Thus it is that those sentences in the Vedas which describe existing things merely or praise some deed of injunction (called the arthavâdas) should be interpreted as forming part of a vidhi-vâkya (injunction) or be rejected altogether. Even those expressions which give reasons for the performance of certain actions are to be treated as mere arthavâdas and interpreted as praising injunctions. For Vedas have value only as mandates by the performance of which dharma may be acquired.
When a sacrifice is performed according to the injunctions of the Vedas, a capacity which did not exist before and whose existence is proved by the authority of the scriptures is generated either in the action or in the agent. This capacity or positive force called apûrva produces in time the beneficent results of the sacrifice (e.g. leads the performer to Heaven). This apûrva is like a potency or faculty in the agent which abides in him until the desired results follow [Footnote ref 1].
It is needless to dilate upon these, for the voluminous works of S'abara and Kumârila make an elaborate research into the nature of sacrifices, rituals, and other relevant matters in great detail, which anyhow can have but little interest for a student of philosophy.
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[Footnote 1: See Dr Ga@ngânâtha Jhâ's Prabhâkaramîmâ@msâ and Mâdhava's Nyâyamâlâvistara.]
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CHAPTER X
THE S'A@NKARA SCHOOL OF VEDÂNTA
Comprehension of the philosophical Issues more essential than the Dialectic of controversy.
Pramâ@na in Sanskrit signifies the means and the movement by which knowledge is acquired, pramâtâ means the subject or the knower who cognizes, pramâ the result of pramâ@na—right knowledge, prameya the object of knowledge, and prâmâ@nya the validity of knowledge acquired. The validity of knowledge is sometimes used in the sense of the faithfulness of knowledge to its object, and sometimes in the sense of an inner notion of validity in the mind of the subject—the knower (that his perceptions are true), which moves him to work in accordance with his perceptions to adapt himself to his environment for the attainment of pleasurable and the avoidance of painful things. The question wherein consists the prâmâ@nya of knowledge has not only an epistemological and psychological bearing but a metaphysical one also. It contains on one side a theory of knowledge based on an analysis of psychological experience, and on the other indicates a metaphysical situation consistent with the theory of knowledge. All the different schools tried to justify a theory of knowledge by an appeal to the analysis and interpretation of experience which the others sometimes ignored or sometimes regarded as unimportant. The thinkers of different schools were accustomed often to meet together and defeat one another in actual debates, and the result of these debates was frequently very important in determining the prestige of any school of thought. If a Buddhist for example could defeat a great Nyâya or Mîmâ@msâ thinker in a great public debate attended by many learned scholars from different parts of the country, his fame at once spread all over the country and he could probably secure a large number of followers on the spot. Extensive tours of disputation were often undertaken by great masters all over the country for the purpose of defeating the teachers of the opposite schools and of securing adherents to their own. These debates were therefore not generally conducted merely in a passionless philosophical