[Footnote 1: The Mahâva@msa differs from Dîpava@msa in holding that the Vajjiputtakas did not develop into the Mahâsa@nghikas, but it was the Mahâsa@nghikas who first seceded while the Vajjiputtakas seceded independently of them. The Mahâbodhiva@msa, which according to Professor Geiger was composed 975 A.D.—1000 A.D., follows the Mahava@msa in holding the Mahâsa@nghikas to be the first seceders and Vajjiputtakas to have seceded independently.
Vasumitra confuses the council of Vesali with the third council of
Pâ@taliputra. See introduction to translation of Kathâvatthu by
Mrs Rhys Davids.]
[Footnote 2: For other accounts of the schism see Mr Aung and Mrs Rhys
Davids's translation of Kathâvatthu, pp. xxxvi-xlv.]
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certain schools, of the Mahâsa@nghikas, Lokottaravâdins, Ekavyavahârikas, Kakkulikas, Prajñaptivâdins and Sarvâstivâdins, but these accounts deal more with subsidiary matters of little philosophical importance. Some of the points of interest are (1) that the Mahâsa@nghikas were said to believe that the body was filled with mind (citta) which was represented as sitting, (2) that the Prajñaptivâdins held that there was no agent in man, that there was no untimely death, for it was caused by the previous deeds of man, (3) that the Sarvâstivâdins believed that everything existed. From the discussions found in the Kathâvatthu also we may know the views of some of the schools on some points which are not always devoid of philosophical interest. But there is nothing to be found by which we can properly know the philosophy of these schools. It is quite possible however that these so-called schools of Buddhism were not so many different systems but only differed from one another on some points of dogma or practice which were considered as being of sufficient interest to them, but which to us now appear to be quite trifling. But as we do not know any of their literatures, it is better not to make any unwarrantable surmises. These schools are however not very important for a history of later Indian Philosophy, for none of them are even referred to in any of the systems of Hindu thought. The only schools of Buddhism with which other schools of philosophical thought came in direct contact, are the Sarvâstivâdins including the Sautrântikas and the Vaibhâ@sikas, the Yogâcâra or the Vijñânavâdins and the Mâdhyamikas or the S'ûnyavâdins. We do not know which of the diverse smaller schools were taken up into these four great schools, the Sautrântika, Vaibhâ@sika, Yogâcâra and the Mâdhyamika schools. But as these schools were most important in relation to the development of the different systems in Hindu thought, it is best that we should set ourselves to gather what we can about these systems of Buddhistic thought.
When the Hindu writers refer to the Buddhist doctrine in general terms such as "the Buddhists say" without calling them the Vijñânavâdins or the Yogâcâras and the S'ûnyavâdins, they often refer to the Sarvûstivûdins by which they mean both the Sautrûntikas and the Vaibhû@sikas, ignoring the difference that exists between these two schools. It is well to mention that there is hardly any evidence to prove that the Hindu writers were acquainted with the Theravûda doctrines
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as expressed in the Pâli works. The Vaibhâ@sikas and the Sautrântikas have been more or less associated with each other. Thus the Abhidharmakos'as'âstra of Vasubandhu who was a Vaibhâ@sika was commented upon by Yas'omitra who was a Sautrântika. The difference between the Vaibhâ@sikas and the Sautrântikas that attracted the notice of the Hindu writers was this, that the former believed that external objects were directly perceived, whereas the latter believed that the existence of the external objects could only be inferred from our diversified knowledge [Footnote ref 1]. Gu@naratna (fourteenth century A.D.) in his commentary Tarkarahasyadîpikâ on @Sa@ddars'anasamuccaya says that the Vaibhâsika was but another name of the Âryasammitîya school. According to Gu@naratna the Vaibhâ@sikas held that things existed for four moments, the moment of production, the moment of existence, the moment of decay and the moment of annihilation. It has been pointed out in Vastlbandhu's Abhidharmakos'a that the Vaibhâ@sikas believed these to be four kinds of forces which by coming in combination with the permanent essence of an entity produced its impermanent manifestations in life (see Prof. Stcherbatsky's translation of Yas'omitra on Abhidharmakos'a kârikâ, V. 25). The self called pudgala also possessed those characteristics. Knowledge was formless and was produced along with its object by the very same conditions (arthasahabhâsî ekasamâgryadhînah). The Sautrântikas according to Gu@naratna held that there was no soul but only the five skandhas. These skandhas transmigrated. The past, the future, annihilation, dependence on cause, âkâs'a and pudgala are but names (sa@mjñâmâtram), mere assertions (pratijñâmâtram), mere limitations (samv@rtamâtram) and mere phenomena (vyavahâramâtram). By pudgala they meant that which other people called eternal and all pervasive soul. External objects are never directly perceived but are only inferred as existing for explaining the diversity of knowledge. Definite cognitions are valid; all compounded things are momentary (k@sa@nikâh sarvasa@mskârâh).
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[Footnote 1: Mâdhavâcârya's Sarvadars'anasa@mgraha, chapter II. S'âstradîpikâ, the discussions on Pratyak@sa, Amalañanda's commentary (on Bhâmatî) Vedântakalpataru, p 286. "vaibhâ@sikasya bâhyo'rtha@h pratyak@sa@h, sautrântikasya jñânagatâkâravaicitrye@n anumeya@h." The nature of the inference of the Sautrântikas is shown thus by Amalânanda (1247-1260 A.D.) "ye yasmin satyapi kâdâcitkâ@h te tadatiriktâpek@sâ@h" (those [i.e. cognitions] which in spite of certain unvaried conditions are of unaccounted diversity must depend on other things in addition to these, i.e. the external objects) Vedântakalpataru, p. 289.]