The first meaning also is equally unsuitable. Thus for example if we take the case of any origination, e.g. that of the visual percept, we see that there cannot be any contact between visual knowledge and physical sense, the eye, and so it would not be intelligible that the former should depend upon the latter. If we interpret the maxim of pratîtyasamutpâda as this happening that happens, that would not explain any specific origination. All origination is false, for a thing can neither originate by itself nor by others, nor by a co-operation of both nor without any reason. For if a thing exists already it cannot originate again by itself. To suppose that it is originated by others would also mean that the origination was of a thing already existing. If again without any further qualification it is said that depending on one the other comes into being, then depending on anything any other thing could come into being—from light we could have darkness! Since a thing could not originate from itself or by others, it could not also be originated by a combination of both of them together. A thing also could not originate without any cause, for then all things could come into being at all times. It is therefore to be acknowledged that wherever the Buddha spoke of this so-called dependent origination (pratîtyasamutpâda) it was referred to as illusory manifestations appearing to intellects and senses stricken with ignorance. This dependent origination is not thus a real law, but only an appearance due to ignorance (avidyâ). The only thing which is not lost (amo@sadharma) is nirvâ@na; but all other forms of knowledge and phenomena (sa@mskâra) are false and are lost with their appearances (sarvasa@mskârâs'ca m@r@sâmo@sadharmâ@na@h).
It is sometimes objected to this doctrine that if all appearances
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are false, then they do not exist at all. There are then no good or bad works and no cycle of existence, and if such is the case, then it may be argued that no philosophical discussion should be attempted. But the reply to such an objection is that the nihilistic doctrine is engaged in destroying the misplaced confidence of the people that things are true. Those who are really wise do not find anything either false or true, for to them clearly they do not exist at all and they do not trouble themselves with the question of their truth or falsehood. For him who knows thus there are neither works nor cycles of births (sa@msâra) and also he does not trouble himself about the existence or non-existence of any of the appearances. Thus it is said in the Ratnakû@tasûtra that howsoever carefully one may search one cannot discover consciousness (citta); what cannot be perceived cannot be said to exist, and what does not exist is neither past, nor future, nor present, and as such it cannot be said to have any nature at all; and that which has no nature is subject neither to origination nor to extinction. He who through his false knowledge (viparyyâsa) does not comprehend the falsehood of all appearances, but thinks them to be real, works and suffers the cycles of rebirth (sa@msâra). Like all illusions, though false these appearances can produce all the harm of rebirth and sorrow.
It may again be objected that if there is nothing true according to the nihilists (s'ûnyavâdins), then their statement that there is no origination or extinction is also not true. Candrakirtti in replying to this says that with s'ûnyavâdins the truth is absolute silence. When the S'ûnyavâdin sages argue, they only accept for the moment what other people regard as reasons, and deal with them in their own manner to help them to come to a right comprehension of all appearances. It is of no use to say, in spite of all arguments tending to show the falsehood of all appearances, that they are testified by our experience, for the whole thing that we call "our experience" is but false illusion inasmuch as these phenomena have no true essence.
When the doctrine of pratîtyasamutpâda is described as "this being that is," what is really meant is that things can only be indicated as mere appearances one after another, for they have no essence or true nature. Nihilism (s'ûnyavâda) also means just this. The true meaning of pratîtyasamutpâda or s'ûnyavâda is this, that there is no truth, no essence in all phenomena that
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appear [Footnote ref 1]. As the phenomena have no essence they are neither produced nor destroyed; they really neither come nor go. They are merely the appearance of maya or illusion. The void (s'ûnya) does not mean pure negation, for that is relative to some kind of position. It simply means that none of the appearances have any intrinsic nature of their own (ni@hsvabhâvatvam).
The Madhyamaka or S'ûnya system does not hold that anything has any essence or nature (svabhâva) of its own; even heat cannot be said to be the essence of fire; for both the heat and the fire are the result of the combination of many conditions, and what depends on many conditions cannot be said to be the nature or essence of the thing. That alone may be said to be the true essence or nature of anything which does not depend on anything else, and since no such essence or nature can be pointed out which stands independently by itself we cannot say that it exists. If a thing has no essence or existence of its own, we cannot affirm the essence of other things to it (parabhâva). If we cannot affirm anything of anything as positive, we cannot consequently assert anything of anything as negative. If anyone first believes in things positive and afterwards discovers that they are not so, he no doubt thus takes his stand on a negation (abhâva), but in reality since we cannot speak of anything positive, we cannot speak of anything negative either [Footnote ref 2].
It is again objected that we nevertheless perceive a process going on. To this the Madhyamaka reply is that a process of change could not be affirmed of things that are permanent. But we can hardly speak of a process with reference to momentary things; for those which are momentary are destroyed the next moment after they appear, and so there is nothing which can continue to justify a process. That which appears as being neither comes from anywhere nor goes anywhere, and that which appears as destroyed also does not come from anywhere nor go anywhere, and so a process (sa@msâra) cannot be affirmed of them. It cannot be that when the second moment arose, the first moment had suffered a change in the process, for it was not the same as the second, as there is no so-called cause-effect connection. In fact there being no relation between the two, the temporal determination as prior and later is wrong. The supposition that there is a self which suffers changes is also not valid, for howsoever we