November 30—Japanese take 203-Metre Hill by storm, losing 12,000.
December 30—Japanese capture Urlungshan fort.
January 2—Stoessel surrenders Port Arthur to Nogi.
The siege of Port Arthur takes high rank in the history of all war. Its capture was the most brilliant achievement of Japanese arms, and its defense perhaps the most glorious page in Russian annals. Invested on May 5, 1904, the fortress held out till failing ammunition forced the surrender of January 2, 1905—242 days. Direct attacks opened on August 19. City, fort and fleet have been valued at $270,000,000; all were destroyed, at a cost to the besiegers of $100,000,000 and more than 30,000 lives; fully 70,000 Japanese were wounded in the various attacks.
CHAPTER XV.
After Port Arthur—Raids in Manchuria—The Battle of Sandepu—Kuropatkin Asks for Reinforcements—The North Sea Inquiry.
After Port Arthur
With the fall of Port Arthur, the Russo-Japanese War entered upon an entirely new phase. Although the situation of the gigantic armies that faced one another across the Sha-ho River remained unchanged, the strategic problems to be solved by their instrumentality were in effect transformed. The struggle for the possession of the great naval fortress had operated as a vitiating factor in the military counsels of both belligerents. Japan had sacrificed between 50,000 and 100,000 of her best soldiers in bringing the six months' siege to a triumphant issue, and in doing so had, by dividing her armies, moreover, forfeited the opportunity of dealing a crushing blow at her adversary. The magnificent infantry that broke themselves in so many vain assaults upon the fortifications of Port Arthur might have enabled Oyama to turn the Russian retreat at Liao-yang into a rout, or to drive the Russians, after the battle of the Sha-ho, back beyond Mukden. On the other hand, Kuropatkin had found himself hampered at every turn by the instructions imposed on him from St. Petersburg to attempt the relief of the beleaguered fortress, by which was symbolized so much of the pride and prestige of the Russian Empire. In the game of chess a strong player, to handicap himself against a weaker, will sometimes undertake to mate with a certain piece. If the piece is lost, the game is lost, and therefore the player's defence is awkwardly compromised by being divided in aim—between protecting his vital piece and at the same time shielding his king from checkmate. Very similar was the task imposed on the unhappy generalissimo of the Czar, who, while trying to baffle Oyama's vigorous combination, had to keep one eye always on Port Arthur. The fall of Port Arthur at least set free both combatants from a distracting preoccupation, and to that degree it was a strength to either side. But its ulterior effects were much less evenly balanced. The capture of Port Arthur at one stroke deprived Russian arms of the possibility of complete triumph, whatever issue future military operations might have; and it secured Japan from the last lingering fear of disastrous defeat. When the remnant of the once powerful Pacific Squadron fell into the hands of the Mikado's soldiers, Russia's last hope of recovering, during the present war, the command of the sea expired utterly; and without the command of the sea, Kuropatkin's boast of "settling the terms of peace at Tokio" could obviously never be fulfilled. Even if invincible armies swept Oyama out of Manchuria, out of Liao-tung Peninsula, and out of Korea itself, there would still be the impassable Straits of Korea to render the victory barren and to impose their inexorable "Thus far and no further". As a matter of fact it became evident to the whole world that, with Japan supreme by sea, the continuance of the war would only be a costly futility for Russia, in which she had everything to lose and nothing to gain—a struggle in which she was exhausting herself to no possible purpose. Her adversary had already won the odd-trick, and the only doubt that remained to be solved was how near she would get to making grand slam. But the blind arrogance and reckless folly which had precipitated Russia into a wanton war for which she was utterly unprepared, were still obdurate to conviction even by the logic of such disastrous events. Nothing is more stubborn than wounded pride, or more blind than baffled vanity. The more desperate the situation, the more perversely bent became the bureaucracy of Russia in prolonging it, and in refusing to recognize facts which impeached the competence and sagacity of the existing régime. Already the strain of maintaining the army in Manchuria had begun to have its effect at home in widespread distress and growing discontent among the peasant and industrial classes. The characteristic remedy of the governing clique was to attempt not a cure, but a diversion. Kuropatkin was ordered to renew his activity and to achieve something that could be represented as a victory at any cost.
THE BAMBOO GUN AT PORT ARTHUR.