"Yes," admittted the officer, "we are prepared for that. Russia may be able to place 2,000,000 men in the field. We can furnish 500,000. You know that in war four men die of disease for every one who falls from bullets. We propose to eliminate disease as a factor. Every man who dies in our army must fall on the field of battle. In this way we shall neutralize the superiority of Russian numbers and stand on a comparatively equal footing."
The Japanese Scientific
When Japan started out to make war she did so upon a scientific basis. For many months in advance the store rooms of Tokio were crowded with surgical materials, cots, tents, bedding, ambulances and all kinds of hospital supplies, ready for any emergency, and under the personal example of the Empress the women of the land made bandages for those who might be wounded. Japan realized also that the keystone to the health of the army lay in the character of the ration provided for the individual soldier. So she set about to master that problem. First of all, the ration evolved was suited to the climatic conditions of the campaign. It consisted largely of rice, compressed fish, soy, army biscuits, a few salted plums, tea—all of which necessitate the drinking of large quantities of boiled water—a few ounces of meat and some juicy, succulent pickles.
No more thorough or efficient medical preparation could be imagined that Japan made for her great conflict. Not only was the ablest of medical counsel obtained, but the members of that staff of the army were given rank and full authority to enforce their decrees. The Japanese had a medical director who ranked as a lieutenant-general. Six medical officers ranked as major-general. With every 20,000 men in line a surgeon ranking as brigadier-general, and all have power to enforce their orders. Every body of moving soldiers, however small, was accompanied by one or more medical officers, who were almost omnipresent, and were always watchful. Field and line officers and men were obliged to obey them without question. The solution of the greater problem engaged the attention of the medical corps. This was in preserving the health and fighting value of the army. Nothing seemed too small to escape the vigilance of the medical officers, or too tedious to weary his patience. He was with the first line of scouts, with his microscope and chemicals, testing and labelling wells so that the army to follow should not drink water that was contaminated. When the scouts reached a town, he immediately instituted a thorough examination of its sanitary condition. If contagious or infectious disease was found, he quarantined and placed a guard around the dangerous district. Notices were posted, so that the approaching column was warned and no soldiers were located where danger existed. Violations of such a notice was as great an offense as disobedience to a line officer on a battlefield. An officer with only the rank of a lieutenant might post the notice, and yet General Oku himself dared not disregard it. No foraging party ever set out to gather supplies unless accompanied by a medical officer.
No Detail Overlooked
He sampled the various kinds of food, fruit and vegetables sold by the natives along the line of march long before the arrival of the army. If the food was tainted, or the fruit over ripe, or the water ought to be boiled, notice was posted to that effect. In camp, too, the medical officer was always busy, lecturing the men on sanitation and the hundred and one details of personal hygiene—how to cook, to eat, and when not to drink; to bathe, and even to directions as to paring and cleansing the finger nails to prevent danger from bacteria. More than any other preventive, the boiling of all drinking water was insisted upon. Every Japanese soldier carried a small copper camp kettle with a double bottom. By the use of it he was enabled to boil water even in a gale. Charcoal was burned on the inside, the water being heated between two layers of copper. Great kettles for similar use in camps were also provided.
Large bathing basins, or kettles, formed an important part of the equipment of each company. They were placed upon the ground and are ready for use in a few minutes after camp was made. In this way personal cleanliness was maintained. A troop might encamp beside a small stream, the water of which was needed for several different purposes. It was not scooped up indiscriminately, but the flow was divided into separate channels—one for drinking or cooking, another for bathing, a third for laundry service, and so on.
Wounded Rarely Died
Up to July 1, 1106 wounded were taken to Tokio, and of that number not a single man died. These men were shot in almost every possible way; six had bullets through the brain, nine had bullets through their chests, and six had bullets through the abdomen—and yet all got well. The medical service of the United States in its war with Spain was not any more discreditable when compared with that of Japan than the medical service of the English Army during its war with the Boers. The report of the English Hospital Commission, which inquired into the medical end of that conflict, shows that there was "an immense amount of needless suffering and misery." There is no attempt "to hide incompetency and unpreparedness under the platitude that 'was is war.'" Just as in the Spanish-American War, a large number of civil surgeons were employed for army work in South Africa. They had no knowledge of military duties nor of military methods and discipline. Consequently, they were ineffective, except when accompanied and, to some extent, controlled by officers of the service. They were absolutely without authority. Perhaps all these lessons were observed and absorbed by the keen-eyed Japanese. In any event, they have given the world the most pronounced examples of scientific warfare that the hoary old globe has ever seen.
