Kuroki's Line of Front
As his army arrived at the front, General Kuroki began gradually to occupy a wider front on the south bank of the Yalu, his left wing operating at the mouth of the river in conjunction with a naval force under the command of Admiral Hosoya, and his right extending to a distance of twenty or twenty-five miles up the river, past Sukuchin.
The Russian Position
While the Japanese were thus concentrating on the left bank of the Yalu the Russians were gradually strengthening their positions on the right bank, the centre and key of which was formed by the village of Kiu-lien-cheng. During all these weeks the greatest secrecy was observed on both sides in regard to their numbers and dispositions—as far, at least, as the outside world was concerned. It seems probable from after events that the Russians themselves were largely ignorant of the strength of the force which General Kuroki had at his disposal; but, on the other hand, that able commander appears to have been thoroughly well informed in every detail as to the position occupied by his enemy. There was the greatest diversity of statement on the Russian side after the battle of the Yalu upon the question of the real intentions of General Kuropatkin in holding as he did the right bank of the river. When the disastrous result of the conflict of May 1st became known in Europe the friends of the Commander-in-Chief in the press declared that it was due to the failure of the officer in immediate command, General Sassulitch, to follow his instructions, which were to offer only a strategical resistance to the enemy and to withdraw slowly before the advance of a superior force upon Feng-haung-cheng, a position about thirty miles distant upon the Liau-yang road. If this explanation is correct, the activity shown by the Russians for weeks in constructing earthworks on the heights around Kiu-lien-cheng is rendered very remarkable, and equally difficult to understand is the size and importance of the force to which was apportioned the task of thus keeping in touch with the advancing Japanese army and conducting a mere strategic defeat. For General Sassulitch was commander of the 2nd Siberian Army Corps, and though the actual body of troops engaged in the fighting-line in resisting the passage of the Yalu by the Japanese did not amount to that strength, there is no doubt that General Sassulitch had under him in the near neighborhood a force of not less than 30,000 men. All the evidence, in fact, points to the conclusion that the Russian Generals, including the Commander-in-Chief himself, wholly underestimated the fighting power of the Japanese and the skill with which they would be led when the opposing armies came to close quarters.
Russian Confidence
The kind of talk which responsible military men in St. Petersburg indulged in before the battle of the Yalu all goes to strengthen this impression. On April 25th, the day before General Kuroki began that series of movements which were to culminate in his crossing the Yalu and driving the Russians before him in headlong rout, there appeared in the Echo de Paris the report of an interview which its St. Petersburg correspondent had had with Colonel Vannovsky, of the Russian General Staff, and formerly military attache in Japan. The utterances of this sapient officer are amusing reading in view of what happened so shortly afterwards. He thought it would still be some time before serious military operations could begin on the Yalu, for the Japanese, in his opinion, were far from having completed their concentration in Korea. They probably, he said, had three divisions of from 12,000 to 15,000 men between Ping-Yang and the Yalu; and, including the Second Army then disembarking, they had not more than 85,000 men near the front. Then followed a valuable criticism of General Kuroki and his colleague, General Oku, the commander of the Second Army. Both, he reminded the interviewer, served in the Chino-Japanese War; but "he looked for nothing extraordinary from them, both were more than sixty years of age." On the whole, he thought that the Japanese would establish themselves in Korea; if they crossed the Yalu it would be only to satisfy public opinion at Tokio. Colonel Vannovsky soon had reason to be sorry that he had spoken so disdainfully of General Kuroki, and with such sublime assurance of the Japanese plans. If the crossing of the Yalu was mainly dictated by a desire to satisfy public opinion at Tokio, it must be said that public opinion at Tokio had its wishes very amply gratified before many days had expired. It is a remarkable fact that in the history of nearly every war the greatest disasters follow the greatest self-confidence. And yet it can easily be understood how the armies that had proved successful against those famous fighters the Turks in the war of the seventies should despise the little dwarfish Japanese, who had hitherto only faced the undisciplined hordes of China.
CHAPTER VI.
Kuroki Completes his Plans—The Scene of Battle—General Sassulitch's Defences—The Russian Dispositions—The Attacking Army—Clearing the Islands—Guards Half-way Across—Parallel Movements—The Searching Japanese Fire—Bridging the Yalu—Confusion in the Russian Councils—Kuroki's Consummate Strategy—Futile Russian Opposition—Masked Batteries at Work—Serpentine Line of Dark Forms—Two Thousand Deadly Thunderbolts—Inferno Let Loose—Howitzer High-Angle Fire—Co-operation of Gunboats—Miserable Array of Russians—Four Miles of Japanese—A Moment of Tense Expectancy—The General Attack Begins—Ridges Alive with Flame—Surprise of the Russians—The Plunge Across the Ai—Overwhelming Legions—The Circling Ring of Fate—Devastating Artillery Bombardment—Black Mass of Human Figures—The Blood-Red Banner—Fight Desperately Against Fate—General Sassulitch's Retreat—The Japanese Chase—The Last Gallant Stand—Rifle Fire and Cold Steel.
Kuroki Completes his Plans
The numerous small skirmishes between outposts which took place on the Yalu and its tributaries during the earlier part of the month of April need not detain us. They were mainly encounters between small reconnoitering parties, and though there were losses on both sides, fortune on the whole leaned in favor of the Japanese. The results of these reconnaissances in locating the positions occupied by the Russians, combined with the success of the Japanese transport arrangements, which, as stated already, placed an army of 60,000 to 70,000 men at General Kuroki's disposal, enabled him to complete his preparations for the great task before him by the beginning of the last week in April. The night of the 25th found him ready at all points, and on the morrow his army entered upon the preliminary stages of a series of operations which, culminating in the crossing of the river and the capture of the Russian position, first revealed to an astonished world the hitherto undreamt-of potentialities of Japan as a military power.