Skrydloff the Raider
Another month elapsed before the Vladivostock squadron proved troublesome again. It had then come directly under the control of the new Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific fleet, Admiral Skrydloff, who had been appointed to succeed the ill-fated Makaroff, and whose reputation in the Russian navy was second only to that of his distinguished predecessor. Unfortunately for Russia, Admiral Skrydloff arrived in the Far East too late to reach his main fleet. At Harbin he learnt that Port Arthur was invested both by land and sea, and that it was impossible for him to assume the command at the place where his services were most needed. He was, therefore, compelled to go on to Vladivostock instead and direct the operations of the cruiser squadron there in the desperate hope that at a later period an opportunity might occur of effecting a junction with his Port Arthur fleet. A further piece of bad news awaited him at the northern port. One of the four cruisers which were all that now furnished his attenuated command had gone ashore in a fog a few days previously, and had become a total wreck. This was the Bogatyr. She was, indeed, the smallest ship in the squadron, being a second-class protected cruiser of 6,750 tons, but her speed was high, and her loss in the dark circumstances of the hour was a serious blow. However, the gallant Admiral proceeded to make the best of the material which lay at his disposition, and in the course of the next two months he pursued most vigorous tactics, venturing southwards with great frequency, harrying the coasts of Japan, and bringing maritime commerce in that part of the world almost to a standstill.
Kamimura on the Track
Admiral Kamimura with his cruisers made the most strenuous efforts to catch his elusive enemy, but the bad luck which had visited him at Gensan at the end of April continued to dog him still for a long time. Again and again a convenient fog intervened to favor the escape of the Russians; moreover, the Japanese squadron had to be depleted in order to furnish aid to the main fleet which was blockading Port Arthur, and assisting in the landing of troops; and furthermore, the strategic necessity of closely guarding the Straits between Japan and Korea and preventing the possibility of a junction between the two Russian fleets, severely limited the area of Kamimura's activity. In these circumstances Admiral Skrydloff's cruisers had an almost uncheckered run of success for a period of two months. The Japanese Admiral came in for some sharp criticism at the hands of the general public in Japan for his apparent lack of energy, but the authorities at Tokio, who had all the conditions of the campaign before them in their true proportions, trusted him thoroughly, and their trust was magnificently vindicated on the 14th of August, when he at last managed to trap the Russians into his net, and administered to them a signal defeat in a pitched battle on the high seas.
Approaching Port Arthur
A return must now be made to the land operations upon the Liao-tung Peninsula. Undeterred by the loss of the Hatsuse and the Yoshino, the Japanese continued to pour in troops at Yentoa Bay and Pitszewo. At the same time the 3rd Army, under General Nodzu, began to disembark at Takushan. But it was to General Oku and the 2nd Army that the honor fell of striking the next blow for the Mikado. This was the capture of Kinchau and the storming of the Russian entrenchments on Nanshan Hill, which, after preliminary operations lasting over some days, was finally effected on the 26th of May.
Importance of Nanshan
The narrow neck of land, a mile and three-quarters in breadth, running between Kinchau Bay on the west and Hand Bay—a small inlet of Talienwan Bay—on the east, possesses great strategical importance. The high ground to the south of it, of which the salient point is the Nanshan Hill, completely commands the approach to Port Arthur from the north, and, as it cannot be outflanked by any ordinary method, it gives an admirable opportunity, to a defending force to resist an attack from that quarter. It is, indeed, commanded in its turn by an eminence called Mount Sampson, which lies to the northeast; but in this instance the disadvantage was more than counterbalanced by the fact that the Japanese could only oppose to the heavy fortress guns which the Russians had mounted on Nanshan, field artillery of an inferior calibre. After the landing of the enemy at Yentoa and the cutting of the railway had made clear the imminence of the peril which threatened Port Arthur, the governor of the fortress, General Stoessel, wasted no time in erecting powerful defences at this naturally strong position. During the ensuing weeks the Russian engineers went feverishly to work constructing entrenchments on Nanshan and the connecting chains of hills, and also on a second line of eminences further to the south, the chief of which is named Nankuenling. These careful preparations might well seem to have rendered the position impregnable. Ten forts almost permanent in character were established on Nanshan, and at every available point trenches and rifle pits were dug and concealed with the greatest skill, and their approaches guarded by barbed wire entanglements, while at convenient places mines were laid to entrap an unwary foe. Over 70 guns, many of them pieces of fortress artillery of heavy calibre, were placed in position here, and the whole was manned by a force of 12,000 men; the utmost number of troops that could with advantage be employed in such a confined area. Altogether, with the exception of Port Arthur itself, no more formidable obstacle has ever been presented to the advance of an invading army in modern times than was offered by General Stoessel at Kinchau. The village of Kinchau itself, it should be explained, though it gave the name to the battle, was of comparatively small strategical importance, lying as it does on the low ground to the northeast of the isthmus and offering an easy prey, but at the same time no particular advantage, to the enemy.
Japan Dispositions
The concentration of the Japanese army proceeded in the circumstances with great rapidity. On the 21st of May, the whole force, consisting of three divisions, or about 60,000 men, was established to the north of Hand Bay. Under the protection of the angle formed by the range of hills to the south of Mount Sampson, the troops were formed up for battle, and General Oku explained to his chief subordinates his dispositions for the attack. Careful reconnaissances during the next two days, by drawing the fire of the enemy, revealed the strength of the Russian position, which stretched from Nanshan to the west to Hushangtao on the east. At this latter point eight guns were stationed, commanding the waters of Hand Bay, so that co-operation by the Japanese gunboats from this side was impossible. On the other hand, the Russians had a gunboat themselves stationed in the bay, and this was able to render valuable assistance to the defending force when the attack developed. On the west the waters of Kinchau Bay were too shallow to admit of the approach of vessels of any but the smallest draught, but four of the Japanese gunboats were able to enter close up to the shore, and gave conspicuous aid to General Oku in the course of the operations.