The Russian Advance
The world was naturally startled by such a pronouncement—so much easier to explain than to justify; but the Russians and their friends in France were overjoyed, believing that the time of their tribulation was at last over. The Muscovite nature has during this war shown an unrivalled capacity for self-deception; and not only the General Staff, but Kuropatkin himself seem to have persuaded themselves that the enemy had been unable to get over the shock of Liao-yang. The perfectly natural delay of the Japanese in advancing was attributed to the discouragement caused by the enormous losses sustained in the last battle and to inability to make these losses good. There were other influences at work, as Kuropatkin's address shows. "The importance of victory to Russia", and the necessity of relieving "our brothers in Port Arthur", were circumstances that evidently dominated Russian counsels; and in Kuropatkin's mind there was probably another consideration of a personal nature. After Liao-yang the Czar had ordered the formation of a Second Manchurian Army under a separate command, on the ground that the active direction in the field of such enormous forces as these two armies would represent would be beyond the capacity of any one man. General Gripenberg, a tried old soldier, was appointed to command the Second Army, and there was talk of sending out a Grand Duke to take the supreme direction of the campaign. This would have meant in degree the suppression of General Kuropatkin, and that capable soldier may well have looked with dissatisfaction on such a reward for his signal services. He may have argued with himself that if he could only achieve a decisive victory at this moment his prestige would be restored and his paramountcy assured; and, according to the information which had reached him, that victory was within his grasp. But, unfortunately, that information was wholly erroneous. Far from being dispirited and exhausted, the Japanese forces were on the very point of advancing to the attack again when Kuropatkin formed his momentous resolution and issued orders for "the march to Liao-yang". If his movement was hailed with almost delirious enthusiasm in St. Petersburg, it was observed with hardly less satisfaction at Tokio, where it was at once recognized that the enemy were obligingly releasing Marshal Oyama from the necessity of a long march and another attack on fortified positions.
Reinforcements for Both Sides
By this time Kuropatkin's forces—thanks to the completion of the Circum-Baikal railway—had reached 250,000, with more than 800 guns. The Japanese strength, after reinforcements both from Japan and from the army investing Port Arthur, cannot have been much less; though at the close of the battle which was about to be fought Marshal Oyama asserted that at all points his victorious troops had been outnumbered. However that may be, the Japanese had the advantage of a prepared position, the key of which was in rugged mountainous country. Unlike the battle of Liao-yang, of which minute details have already been furnished, the battle of Yentai, as it was first called, or of Sha-ho, as it came to be known afterwards, can only be followed in its broad outline, mainly because the maps available are utterly inadequate. The place-names which mark the direction of the operations in one official report rarely agree with those in the other official report, and can only be vaguely identified. But a rough sketch-map is at least sufficient to give the general bearings of the operations. The Japanese front extended in a horseshoe formation from Yentai, on the railway, to Pensihu, on the Taitse River, with Oku on the left, Nodzu in the centre, and Kuroki on the right. The plan of Kuropatkin—a plan which in the light of after events we know to have been beyond the possibility of achievement—was to attack the right wing of the Japanese army under Kuroki, and roll it back upon Liao-yang, while the Japanese left and centre were held in front; then to shut up Oyama and his troops in Liao-yang, much as Sir George White was shut up in Ladysmith, while a rapid march southwards was made to the relief of Port Arthur.
Battle of the Sha-ho
On the 5th October the Russian advance began on both sides of the railway from Mukden, and from Fushan against the Japanese right. The flank movement, on the success of which all Kuropatkin's schemes were based, was entrusted to Stackelberg and Rennenkampf—Stackelberg attacking from the north, and Rennenkampf with his Cossacks, working round from the northeast. On Sunday, the 9th October, the first contact between the opposing armies was made, and Stackelberg—much to his own surprise—was able to occupy Bentsiaputse, a place north of the Yentai coalmines, commanding the main roads to Fushan, Mukden, and Liao-yang. It had been expected that the Japanese would make a desperate stand here, but they retreated after offering only a feeble resistance. Meanwhile, Rennenkampf fiercely assailed Kuroki's extreme right at Pensihu, while a force of Cossacks some 3,000 strong daringly crossed the Taitse River and severed Kuroki's communications in the rear. Up to this moment everything had seemed to go well with the Russian plan of attack. Several important positions east of Pensihu were taken by assault, and Kuroki's situation seemed critical for the moment. But Marshal Oyama appears never to have doubted the ability of his well-tried lieutenant to hold his own, and no sooner had the whole scheme of his enemy been developed than he decided to counter it with a vigorous offensive. Kuroki was reinforced on the 10th, while a force of cavalry detached to operate against the Cossacks south of the Taitse-ho succeeded in driving the enemy off and in restoring the interrupted communications. As soon as the reinforcements reached Kuroki at Pensihu he put the possibility of his being "rolled up" beyond all doubt by fiercely assailing Stackelberg and recapturing the positions which had temporarily fallen into Russian hands. Thereafter he remained completely master of the situation, and the desperate but futile assaults which he sustained in the next few days only resulted in a tremendous casualty list for the enemy—a list totalling at least 20,000. The decisive repulse of the Russian flanking movement involved the frustration of the whole of Kuropatkin's plans in advancing from the Hun-ho. But the battle had only just begun yet, for the Russian right and centre, which had begun their southward march with such confidence, now found their role changed from attack to defence; and instead of the Japanese being, according to program, forced back upon Liao-yang, it became a question whether the Russians would be able to make good their retreat on Mukden. General Oku, advancing along the railway to the west, after two days' hard fighting drove back Kuropatkin's right to the line of the Shi-li-ho; while General Nodzu on the east of the railway was equally successful, and signalized his victory by a considerable capture of guns. Oyama's object now was to drive his enemy eastwards from the railway and back upon the Hun-ho, when it would be impossible for him to escape disaster. For some days this tremendous issue hung in the balance, and the Japanese forces were within an ace of accomplishing their purpose. But thanks to the dogged tenacity of the Russian troops, and thanks still more to the terribly wasting and exhausting effect of a week's continuous fighting, the impetus of the Japanese attack was not quite sufficient to complete the promised triumph; and at last the two great armies came to a standstill some ten miles south of Mukden, incapable of further action.
Two Hundred Hours of Carnage
From the 9th October to the 17th the relentless struggle raged along this wide front of more than 20 miles. Day and night the devoted troops on either side flung themselves with reckless bravery on the positions of their foes; while from nearly 2,000 guns an incessant storm of shrapnel and shell burst over the contested ground. Liao-yang had been terrible enough; but from all accounts the artillery duel at the battle of Sha-ho even eclipsed the terrific incidents of the earlier engagements. On the 13th the Russian retreat became general, and Oku, capturing twenty-five Russian guns, succeeded in driving the troops opposed to him back from the line of the Shi-li-ho to the Sha-ho, where behind defences which the forethought of Kuropatkin had provided, they prepared to make their last desperate stand. The forces before Kuroki had retreated towards Fushan in a northeasterly direction; and those before Nodzu in the centre, after suffering losses almost as heavy as Stackelberg's columns had sustained, fell back in something approaching to disorder on the line of the Sha-ho. The position of Kuropatkin's army was now exceedingly critical, and it was not without cause that he issued a general order that the ground occupied must be held at all costs. It is evident that to make good the retreat Stackelberg's troops on the extreme east, which were far in advance of the rest of the Russian line, must be withdrawn first, and that the central army under Zarubaieff, which again was far in advance of the right wing, must be drawn back next; and that during these perilous operations General Bilderling, who commanded the Russian right resting behind the Sha-ho, must stand firm. By the skin of his teeth, almost, Bilderling just managed to hold his ground. On the 13th Oku's impetuous assault upon the Russian lines succeeded so far as to break the Russian centre. Had that advantage been maintained nothing could have saved the Russian army. But by a tremendous effort the last reserves were brought up and recaptured the ground that had been lost. For thirty-six hours the battle raged with varying fortune at this critical point; but the Russians held on, and these thirty-six priceless hours being gained, the Russian centre and left were saved. On the 14th, five days after the battle had begun, a deluge of rain fell—a deluge precipitated, as at Liao-yang, by the heavy and incessant firing—and the already sorely-tried troops of Oku found their further movements grievously impeded. For several days more, however, the contest on the Sha-ho raged with unabated fury. Again and again the Russians made fierce counter-attacks on the Japanese, sustaining terrible losses in consequence. One position—a dominant elevation on the south bank of the Sha-ho, known as Lonely-Tree Hill—was the scene of long-continued and desperate fighting, in which both armies alternately captured and were driven from the vantage ground. It was here that the one substantial success of the Russian arms was achieved in the capture of twelve Japanese guns. During Sunday, the 16th of October the Russians had delivered no less than seven counter-attacks on Oku's troops, and all of them had been beaten back with loss. In these engagements a conspicuous part had been played by a force under Brigadier-General Yamada, made up of troops from Nodzu's and Oku's commands, which succeeded in penetrating the Russian line and in capturing two guns. But in returning to camp after this exploit, Yamada's force had ventured too far and was enveloped by a Russian division, and was only able to win through by the sacrifice of its guns, after a fierce hand-to-hand encounter in which the casualties were nearly 1,000.
JAPANESE OUTPOSTS RELIEVING GUARD NEAR THE SHA-HO.