3.—The Commission is to have power to settle all questions of procedure.
4.—The parties bind themselves to supply the Commission with all necessary information, facilities, &c.
5.—The Commission is to meet at Paris as soon as possible after the signature of the Convention.
6.—The report of the Commission is to be officially communicated to the respective Governments.
Russian Allegations
Not the least interesting part of Mr. Balfour's statement was that in which he examined and dealt with the justification which Admiral Rozhdestvensky had put forward, and in particular with the allegation that the Russian fleet had been attacked by torpedo-boats. This allegation, as Mr. Balfour pointed out, involved a charge of bad faith on the part of Great Britain, and such a charge he indignantly resented. If only one torpedo-boat was sunk, what, he pertinently asked, had become of the other? The world did not require to be convinced of the essential absurdity of this story; but the Russians persisted in it with determination. The most circumstantial narratives were presently forthcoming from the four officers who had been detained to give evidence before the International Commission. One narrator stated that information of the presence of Japanese torpedo-boats in the Norway fiords, and of the Japanese having hired fishing vessels in Hull, Southampton, Hamburg, and Christiania, had been received by the Russians. He proceeded as follows: "We lodged information of the Japanese intentions with the Governments of those countries where the Japanese were making their preparations, but it was only in Denmark and Germany that we found any readiness to interfere with them.... Before leaving the Scaw the Russians received a number of alarming messages from their agents. All these messages agreed in stating that in one very deep Norwegian fiord four Japanese torpedo-boats had been seen, and that these vessels were afterwards observed a short distance to the west of the Scaw. The Russians left the Scaw in the morning, proceeding in different divisions. All the torpedo craft went on ahead, in two divisions, making for Cherbourg. Next came Admiral Folkersahm with the four older battleships making for Tangier. The small cruisers were under orders to proceed to Arosa, 40 miles north of Vigo, while the large cruisers with the transport Kamchatka, under the command of Admiral Enquist, had instructions to make for Tangier like Admiral Folkersahm.
"Last of all we put to sea with the four best battleships, Suvaroff, Alexander III., Borodino, and Orel. Our destination was Brest, where we were to coal. Observe, therefore, that there was not with us a single torpedo-boat or a single small vessel. All such were far ahead of us.... On the 8th of October, at 8 o'clock in the evening, when it was already quite dark, we received a wireless message stating that 30 miles behind us was the transport Kamchatka, which had fallen behind her consorts (the cruisers Dmitri Donskoi and Aurora) in consequence of an injury to her engines, and that several torpedo-boats were following her closely, but had not discharged any torpedoes. Admiral Enquist, who was in front with the two cruisers, was at once ordered by wireless message to slacken speed and wait for the Kamchatka, or to continue his course in order not to expose himself to the torpedo-boats, which, of course, also received our messages, but did not know from what spot they were sent. The Japanese, however, attempted to find out our whereabouts. While we were exchanging messages with the Kamchatka we suddenly received a succession of telegrams, in excellent Russian, purporting to come from the Kamchatka: 'Where is the squadron?' 'Give your latitude and longitude.' 'Where is the Suvaroff?' These telegrams appeared to us suspicious, and, in order to assure ourselves that they were really sent by the Kamchatka, instead of answering we asked for the name of one of the officers of the Kamchatka. To this no answer was returned, and we continued our conversation with the Kamchatka in cypher. At 12.55 A. M. we suddenly saw in front of us ... two long dark silhouettes, emitting quantities of smoke and evidently steaming at high speed. At the same time we saw a yellow-red rocket, such as is generally sent up by vessels in distress. A moment later a searchlight was thrown upon us from ahead.... We at once turned our searchlights on the torpedo-boats and opened fire on them. As soon as they saw that they were discovered, they turned aside, but came under the fire of the Alexander III., Borodino, and Orel, which were following us. About the same time our searchlights began to fall from time to time on some small vessels, apparently fishing craft, whose behavior, however, was very suspicious. They showed no lights, there was not a man on their decks, and they obstinately remained under the bows of our ships, barring their course. They were thus in a position to launch floating mines. In spite of this, however, the Admiral, as soon as he caught sight of them, ordered that the searchlights on board the Suvaroff should be turned skywards, which was a signal to cease firing.
"To remain where we were after the torpedo-boats had disappeared in order to aid the steamers would have been the height of imprudence. We should have risked the most formidable part of our fleet, and as there were several steamers they were in a position to aid each other. As far as could be perceived, one of the enemy's torpedo-boats was sunk."
The narrator argued that either the fishing vessels were accomplices or the Japanese took advantage of their proximity without their knowledge. He inclined to the former alternative, and asked, "Why Hull fishing boats so far from England—almost off the Danish coast?"
The best commentary on this narrative was supplied by the Russian Government themselves, who, six weeks after the North Sea outrage, published the following significant admission of facts, which had, of course, been perfectly well known to them almost from the first:—