Japan and the California Problem

by T. Iyenaga; Kennosuke Sato

Policy of Self-Preservation.

Many as are the pitfalls into which Japan has fallen in pursuance of her Asiatic policy, it may confidently be asserted that the road she has trodden has, on the whole, been straight. She can face with a clean conscience the verdict of history. When Far Eastern history, from the China-Japan War to the conclusion of the Versailles Treaty, is carefully examined and rightly understood, it will be conceded that the course which Japan has adopted, so far as its general principles are concerned, is the one which any nation of self-respect and right motive would pursue. Fundamentally Japan’s Asiatic policy is the policy of self-preservation, the policy of defense, and never of aggression. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which was and still remains the cornerstone of Japan’s Asiatic policy, was formed for purely defensive purposes, in order to maintain peace in Asia and safeguard mutual interests vested therein of the two Powers. Only the “inexorable march of events” has brought Japan into Korea, Manchuria, and East Siberia. None of the statesmen who took part in the Meiji Restoration could ever have dreamed that their country would in the course of time be driven through sheer force of circumstances to plant its flag on the Asiatic mainland. It was solely in self-defense that Japan took up arms against China and Russia. Once enmeshed in continental politics, however, it became imperative for her to take such measures as would ensure and consolidate the position and gains that were won through enormous sacrifice of blood and treasure. Herein, in short, is the genesis of Japan’s present status in Korea and Manchuria.

Even at the present time, the heavy arming of Japan is a case of necessity, so long as the Far East remains in such an unstable condition as exists there to-day, and is not free from the menace of the Bolsheviki, who, professing pacifism, are not slow to emulate the military machine of Imperial Russia. Nothing could be more welcome to the Japanese people than to see the curtailment of their naval and military equipments, for the maintenance of which they have to bear the burden of crushing taxes, and to behold the day when they can, without fear of interference by force of arms, win their spurs in the Far East by engaging in the peaceful enterprises of farming, trade, and industry.

Precisely as the position of Japan on the Asiatic mainland was the result of arbitrament by the sword, drawn in response to a challenge made by others, and is now upheld by the prestige of arms, her Asiatic policy, although conceived in self-defense, came to assume in the eyes of the outside world a semblance of military aggrandizement. As a consequence, Japan is looked upon as a militaristic nation, bent upon conquest. Suspicion and fear are thereby engendered. This is, to say the least, extremely unfortunate. No stone should be left unturned to smooth the sharp edges cut by this historical retrospect and to obliterate the unpleasant memories of the past. No effort would be too great for Japan to convince the world of her genuine faith that her future lies “not in territorial and military conquest, but on the water in the carrying trade and on land in her commercial and industrial expansion abroad.” Her erstwhile failure to dispel the suspicion of the world about her intentions and to take it into her confidence is the root of many ills with which she has been afflicted for the past few years.

Shantung Settlement.

The storm of criticism we have witnessed in America about the Shantung settlement is a good illustration. Whatever part party politics in the United States may have played in raising the furor, had Japan secured the complete confidence of the American people, all the eloquence expended for the denunciation of the Shantung clause in the Versailles Treaty would surely have fallen on deaf ears. That our judgment is not wrong is sustained by the fact that the Portsmouth Treaty evoked not a word of protest in America. We need not remind our readers that the Treaty concluded through the good offices of President Roosevelt and the settlement made at Versailles are not only based upon the same principles but are exactly identical in many respects, with this most important exception—namely, that the former Treaty transferred to Japan the lease of the Kwantung territory, and she still holds it, while in the latter case she pledges herself to relinquish the leasehold of Kiaochow, thereby restoring the complete sovereignty of China over Shantung, which had been infringed upon by Germany. The Shantung settlement is, consequently, of a far greater advantage to China. What Japan secures in that province is only the same economic rights and privileges which are enjoyed by other Powers in other parts of China. There is, therefore, no justifiable ground for singling out Japan for attack with regard to the international arrangement now in vogue in China. Were the complete reconstruction of China, the re-writing of her history, to be attempted, international justice would demand that the parties interested should all share equal responsibilities and sacrifices. Discrimination against Japan alone is unjust, unfair. The would-be builders of the new heaven and the new earth can ill afford to lay the cornerstone of their edifice on such an unsafe and unlevel ground. Manifestly, the dawn of the millennium is still far away. We have to make the best of the world as it is. To ignore this fact is to make the confusion in the world worse confounded. As a result of this misapprehension of history, the Shantung question still remains in abeyance, because of China’s refusal to enter into negotiations with Japan for the restoration of Kiaochow, thus delaying perfect accord between the two Oriental neighbors whom destiny has called to be on the best of terms. The foregoing interpretation of the Shantung question could not in ordinary circumstances have failed to convince the practical American people of the appropriateness of the Versailles settlement, were they not tempted to indulge suspicions of Japan and, hence, ready to be easily misled by false stories, misrepresentations, and slanders concocted by her enemies.

Rather unfortunate, one is sometimes tempted to think, has been the heading of the clause in the Versailles Treaty, that has readjusted the German-China Treaty of 1898 and its sequel, and disposed of the rights and privileges Germany had secured thereby in the province of Shantung. Like “the three R’s” and other catchwords that have in American history often proved so powerful in misleading the people, so this curt phrase “Shantung clause,” which was seized on and skillfully utilized by Japan’s critics, has been a cause of mountains of misunderstanding that have crept into the heads of the American people, who, as a rule, take neither time nor pains to examine the subject carefully and thoroughly. As a result, they imagine that the whole province of Shantung was ceded to Japan by the Peace Treaty. Great, indeed, as is this mistake, it would be extremely difficult to correct it, as the mischief has already been done, except by the actual restoration of Kiaochow. Japan cannot, of course, be held responsible for the misinterpretations of other people, but at the same time it would be well for her to spare no effort to convince China of the wisdom of entering into negotiations for the recovery of the leased territory, and, consequently, of her complete sovereignty over the province of Shantung. Until this pledge is redeemed, Japan’s credit will suffer, and all her pronouncements on justice and humanity fall flat on the ears of the world.

Coöperation with China.

While Japan’s Asiatic policy was, of course, primarily formulated to further her own interests, it has also been inspired with the laudable ambition of rendering a good record of stewardship over the people who have come within the orbit of its influence. No one who knows the work undertaken in Korea and South Manchuria will grudge a word of praise for the record. It has bestowed untold benefits on the inhabitants. Theodore Roosevelt, in reviewing the enterprise of Japan in Korea, grew enthusiastic over it. The same story is repeated in South Manchuria, where the South Manchurian Railroad Company, acting as a civilizing agent, has wrought marvels. We should like to dwell here with patriotic pride on these reforms and undertakings in some detail, were they not out of place in this book.

Commendable as are these civilizing measures adopted by Japan, the fact remains that she has signally failed in one great essential, namely, in winning the good will and friendship of her neighbors. This is the weakest spot in the armor of her Asiatic policy. She is thereby jeopardizing her future. The sentiment of good will is as much a fact, though imponderable, as any other fact, and is a force of immense consequence. How vital this moral asset is to Japan can easily be gauged when we consider that in her neighboring lands are found the indispensable materials for her industrial expansion and the best market for her commerce. Japanese leaders are thoroughly aware of the importance of this moral asset, and have done all that they could to secure it.