[298]. See the passage quoted from Chenery’s translation of Hariri by Dr. Taylor (Dirge of Coheleth, p. 55); comp. Rückert’s rhyming translation (Hariri, i. 104-5).

[299]. Renan’s list is i. 15, 18; ii. 2, 14; iii. 2-8, iv. 5, 14; v. 2; vii. 1-6; 7, 8; 9b; 13b; 24; viii. 1, 4; ix. 16, 17; x. 2, 12, 18; xi. 4, 7; xii. 3-5; 10; 11, 12. Bickell’s, i. 7, 8; 15; 18; ii. 2; v. 9; vi. 7; iv. 5; ii. 14; viii. 8; ix. 16-x. 1; vii. 1-6, vi. 9, vii. 7-9; vii. 11, 12; vii. 20; v. 2; x. 16-20; xi. 6; xi. 4; viii. 1-4, x. 2, 3; x. 6, 7; x. 10-15; ix. 7; xi. 9, 10, xii. 1a; xii. 1b-5; 6. (The order of these passages arises out of Bickell’s critical theory; on which see [Chap. XII.])

[300]. See the fantastic legend to account for the past tense in Midrash Koheleth (transl. Wünsche), or Ginsburg (p. 268; comp. p. 38).

[301]. Dean Plumptre thinks Koheleth (like ἐκκλησιαστής), which is rendered by him ‘the Debater,’ means rather a member of an assembly, than a teacher or preacher, and compares Ecclus. xxxviii. 33, where the son of Sirach says of labourers and artisans that they ‘shall not sit high in the congregation,’ i.e. in the ecclesia or academy of sages. But judging from the parallel line the ‘congregation’ is rather that of the people in general (comp. Ecclus. xv. 5). The Dean’s view that the book embodies the inward debates of a Jewish philosopher may be to a great extent true, but for all that Koheleth is throughout represented as speaking alone and with authority. On the philological explanation of the word, see Appendix.

[302]. This seems a reasonable view. Bickell boldly maintains that i. 1, 12, 16, ii. 7, 8, 9 [12] are interpolations (made presumably to facilitate the recognition of the book as canonical). Observe however that the (fictitious) author is nowhere declared to be Solomon, but only ben-David (i. 1). He claims attention merely as a private person, as an interpreter of the complaints of humanity. Though he does once expressly refer to his royal state (i. 12), it is only to suggest to his readers what ample opportunities he has enjoyed of learning the vanity of earthly grandeur. So, very plausibly, Bloch (Ursprung des Kohelet, p. 17).

[303]. The passage indeed is obscure and possibly corrupt (so Bickell), but the above words probably do justice to the mood described.

[304]. Among the many other interpretations of this difficult passage, two may be mentioned here. (1) ‘He has also set worldliness in their heart, without which man cannot understand the work that God does, from beginning to end.’ So Kalisch (Path and Goal, frequently). This is an improvement upon the translation of Gesenius and others, who render, not ‘without which’ &c., but ‘so that man may not’ &c. The objection to the latter rendering is that it gives ‘worldliness’ a New Testament sense (comp. 1 John ii. 15). Kalisch, however, in full accord with the spirit of Judaism, makes Koheleth frankly accept ‘worldliness’ as a good, understanding by ‘worldliness’ a sense of worldly duties and enjoyments. Had this however been Koheleth’s meaning, would he not have coined another of his favourite abstract terms (comp. the Peshitto’s ’olmoyuthō = αἰὼν in Eph. ii. 2)? (2) ‘Also he has put eternity into their heart, but so that man cannot’ &c. So Ginsburg and Delitzsch (desiderium æternitatis, taking ‘eternity’ in a metaphysical sense = ‘that which is beyond time’); so also Nowack (taking it in the popular sense of years following upon years without apparent limit). Ginsburg’s view is against the context, in which the continuance of the human spirit is doubted; but Nowack’s explanation is not unacceptable. Man has been enabled to form the idea of Time (for the popular view of ‘eternity’ comes practically to this), and has divided this long space into longer and shorter periods; what happens in one period or season, he can compare with what happens in another, thus finding all well-adapted and ‘beautiful.’ But he cannot grasp the whole of Time in one view. But I still prefer the explanation given in the text, as being simpler, in spite of the fact that ’ōlām nowhere else occurs in the sense of ‘world’ (or the present order of things), so common in later Hebrew.

[305]. This is the rendering of the four principal versions and of all the best critics, including Mercier, Ewald, Ginsburg, Grätz and Delitzsch; it agrees with the general tendency of Koheleth, and in particular with vii. 5, where the grave is called man’s ‘eternal home’ (see below). It is no doubt opposed by the vowel-points, which are followed in King James’s Bible. But it is more than probable (considering other parallel phenomena) that the authors of the points were directed by a theological and therefore uncritical motive, that, namely, of effacing as far as possible a trace of Koheleth’s opposition to the doctrine, by that time recognised as orthodox, of the immortality of the soul.

[306]. Swinburne, On the Verge.

[307]. Hitzig in his commentary refers to the history of the high priest Onias and his nephew Joseph. Afterwards he recalled this opinion; but we may be thankful to him for directing attention to this curious and instructive historical episode.