However unsuccessful, after this exposure, the gentleman appears in maintaining his monstrous proposition, that the American people are by their own Constitution forbidden to try the aiders and abettors of armed traitors and rebellion before military tribunals, and subject them, according to the laws of war and the usages of nations, to just punishment for their great crimes, it has been made clear from what I have already stated that he has been eminently successful in mutilating this beautiful production of that great mind; which act of mutilation every one knows is violative alike of the laws of peace and war. Even in war the divine creations of art and the immortal productions of genius and learning are spared.
In the same spirit, and it seems to me with the same unfairness as that just noted, the learned gentleman has very adroitly pressed into his service by an extract from the autobiography of the war-worn veteran and hero, General Scott, the names of the late secretary of war, Mr. Marcy, and the learned ex-attorney general, Mr. Cushing. This adroit performance is achieved in this way: after stating the fact that General Scott in Mexico proclaimed martial law for the trial and punishment by military tribunals of persons guilty of "assassination, murder, and poisoning," the gentleman proceeds to quote from the autobiography, "that this order when handed to the then secretary of war (Mr. Marcy) for his approval, 'a startle at the title (martial law order) was the only comment he then or ever made on the subject,' and that it was 'soon silently returned as too explosive for safe handling.' 'A little later (he adds) the attorney general (Mr. Cushing) called and asked for a copy, and the law officer of the government, whose business it is to speak on all such matters, was stricken with legal dumbness.'" Thereupon the learned gentleman proceeds to say: "How much more startled and more paralyzed would these great men have been had they been consulted on such a commission as this! A commission, not to sit in another country, and to try offences not provided for in any law of the United States, civil or military, then in force, but in their own country, and in a part of it where there are laws providing for their trial and punishment, and civil courts clothed with ample powers for both, and in the daily and undisturbed exercise of their jurisdiction."
I think I may safely say, without stopping to make any special references, that the official career of the late secretary of war (Mr. Marcy) gave no indication that he ever doubted or denied the constitutional power of the American people, acting through their duly constituted agents, to do any act justified by the laws of war for the suppression of a rebellion or to repel invasion. Certainly there is nothing in this extract from the autobiography which justifies any such conclusion. He was startled we are told. It may have been as much the admiration he had for the boldness and wisdom of the conqueror of Mexico as any abhorrence he had for the trial and punishment of "assassins, poisoners, and murderers," according to the laws and usages of war.
But the official utterances of the ex-attorney general, Cushing, with which the gentleman doubtless was familiar when he prepared this argument, by no means justify the attempt here made to quote him as authority against the proclamation and enforcement of martial law in time of rebellion and civil war. That distinguished man, not second in legal attainments to any who have held that position, has left an official opinion of record touching this subject. Referring to what is said by Sir Mathew Hale, in his "History of the Common Law," concerning martial law, wherein he limits it, as the gentleman has seemed by the whole drift of his argument desirous of doing, and says that it is "not in truth and in reality law, but something indulged rather than allowed as a law—the necessity of government, order, and discipline in an army," Mr. Cushing makes this just criticism: "This proposition is a mere composite blunder, a total misapprehension of the matter. It confounds martial law and law military; it ascribes to the former the uses of the latter; it erroneously assumes that the government of a body of troops is a necessity more than of a body of civilians or citizens. It confounds and confuses all the relations of the subject, and is an apt illustration of the incompleteness of the notions of the common-law jurists of England in regard to matters not comprehended in that limited branch of legal science.... Military law, it is now perfectly understood in England, is a branch of the law of the land, applicable only to certain acts of a particular class of persons and administered by special tribunals; but neither in that nor in any other respect essentially differing as to foundation in constitutional reason from admiralty, ecclesiastical, or indeed chancery and common law.... It is the system of rules for the government of the army and navy established by successive acts of Parliament.... Martial law, as exercised in any country by the commander of a foreign army, is an element of the jus belli.
"It is incidental to the state of solemn war, and appertains to the law of nations.... Thus, while the armies of the United States occupied different provinces of the Mexican republic, the respective commanders were not limited in authority by any local law. They allowed, or rather required, the magistrates of the country, municipal or judicial, to continue to administer the laws of the country among their countrymen; but in subjection always to the military power, which acted summarily and according to discretion, when the belligerent interests of the conqueror required it, and which exercised jurisdiction, either summarily or by means of military commissions for the protection or the punishment of citizens of the United States in Mexico."—Opinions of Attorneys General, vol. viii., 366-69.
Mr. Cushing says, "That, it would seem, was one of the forms of martial law"; but he adds that such an example of martial law administered by a foreign army in the enemy's country "does not enlighten us in regard to the question of martial law in one's own country, and as administered by its military commanders. That is a case which the law of nations does not reach. Its regulation is of the domestic resort of the organic laws of the country itself, and regarding which, as it happens, there is no definite or explicit legislation in the United States, as there is none in England.
"Accordingly, in England, as we have seen, Earl Grey assumes that when martial law exists it has no legal origin, but is a mere fact of necessity to be legalized afterwards by a bill of indemnity if there be occasion. I am not prepared to say that, under existing laws, such may not also be the case in the United States."—Ibid., 370.
After such a statement, wherein ex-Attorney General Cushing very clearly recognizes the right of this government, as also of England, to employ martial law as a means of defence in a time of war, whether domestic or foreign, he will be as much surprised when he reads the argument of the learned gentleman, wherein he is described as being struck with legal dumbness at the mere mention of proclaiming martial law and its enforcement by the commander of our army in Mexico, as the late secretary of war was startled with even the mention of its title.
Even some of the reasons given, and certainly the power exercised by the veteran hero himself, would seem to be in direct conflict with the propositions of the learned gentleman.
The lieutenant-general says he "excludes from his order cases already cognizable by court-martial, and limits it to cases not provided for in the act of Congress establishing rules and articles for the government of the armies of the United States." Has not the gentleman who attempts to press General Scott into his service argued and insisted upon it that the commander of the army cannot subject the soldiers under his command to any control or punishment whatever, save that which is provided for in the articles?