[[30]] iv, 65.
[[31]] iv, 69.
[[32]] iv, 70. Long before (about 500 B.C.) eraclitus had said (fragm. 61): "To
God all things are beautiful and good and just; but men have supposed some things to be unjust and others just." For this doctrine of the relativity of good and bad to the whole, cf. hymn of Cleanthes to Zeus:—
allà sù kaì tà perissá t' epístasai artia theînai,
kaì kosmein ta kosma, kaì ou phila soì phila estín.
ôde gàr eis èn pánta synérmokas esthlà kakoîsin
ôsth' éna gígnesthai pántôn logon aièn eónta.
Cf. also the teaching of Chrysippus, as given by Gellius, N.A. vii, 1: cum bona malis contraria sint, utraque necessum est opposita inter sese et quasi mutuo adverse quæque fulta nisu consistere; nullum adeo contrarium est sine contrario altero ... situleris unum abstuleris utrumque. See also M. Aurelius in the same Stoic vein, viii, 50; ix, 42. On the other side see Plutarch's indignant criticism of this attribution of the responsibility for evil to God, de comm. not. adv. Sto. 14, 1065 D, ff. In opposition to Marcion, Tertullian emphasizes the worth of the world; his position, as a few words will show, is not that of Celsus, but Stoic influence is not absent: adv. Marc. i, 13, 14; Ergo nec mundus deo indignus: nihil etenim deus indignum st fecit, etsi mundum homini non sibi fecit, etsi omne opus inferius est suo artifice; see p. 317.
[[33]] iv, 3.
[[34]] iv, 6.
[[35]] iv, 7.
[[36]] vii, 36.
[[37]] viii, 63.