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PRINCE OF YSEMBOURG DEFEATED.

It was at this period that count de Clermont resigned his command, which was conferred upon M. de Contades, and the French army was considerably reinforced. He even threatened to attack prince Ferdinand in his turn, and made some motions with that design, but was prevented by the little river Erff, behind which the prince resolved to lie quiet, until he should be joined by the body of the British troops under the command of the duke of Marlborough, the first division of which had just landed at Embden. He flattered himself that the prince of Ysembourg, at the head of the Hessian troops, would find employment for the prince de Soubise, who had marched from Hanau, with a design to penetrate into the landgraviate of Hesse-Cassel: his vanguard had been already surprised and defeated by the militia of the country; and the prince Ysembourg was at the head of a considerable body of regular forces, assembled to oppose his further progress. Prince Ferdinand therefore hoped that the operations of the French general would be effectually impeded, until he himself, being joined by the British troops, should be in a condition to pass the Maese, transfer the seat of war into the enemy’s country, thus make a diversion from the Rhine, and perhaps oblige the prince de Soubise to come to the assistance of the principal French army commanded by M. de Contades. He had formed a plan which would have answered these purposes effectually, and, in execution of it, marched to Ruremond on the Maese, when his measures were totally disconcerted by a variety of incidents which he could not foresee. The prince of Ysembourg was, on the twenty-third day of July, defeated at San-garshausen by the duke de Broglio, whom the prince de Soubise had detached against him with a number of troops greatly superior to that which the Hessian general commanded. The duke de Broglio, who commanded the corps that formed the vanguard of Soubise’s army, having learned at Cassel that the Hessian troops, under the prince of Ysembourg, were retiring towards Munden, he advanced, on the twenty-third of July, with a body of eight thousand men, to the village of Sangarshausen, where he found them drawn up in order of battle, and forthwith made a disposition for the attack. At first his cavalry were repulsed by the Hessian horse, which charged the French infantry, and were broke in their turn. The Hessians, though greatly inferior in number to the enemy, made a very obstinate resistance, by favour of a rock in the Fulde that covered their right, and a wood by which their left was secured. The dispute was so obstinate, that the enemy’s left was obliged to give ground; but the duke de Broglio, ordering a fresh corps to advance, changed the fortune of the day. The Hessians, overpowered by numbers, gave way; part plunged into the river, where many perished, and part threw themselves into the wood, through which they escaped from the pursuit of the hussars, who took above two hundred soldiers and fifty officers, including the count de Canitz, who was second in command. They likewise found on the field of battle seven pieces of cannon, and eight at Munden; but the carnage was pretty considerable, and nearly equal on both sides. The number of the killed and wounded, on the side of the French, exceeded two thousand; the loss of the Hessians was not so great. The prince of Ysembourg, having collected the remains of his little army, took post at Eimbeck, where he soon was reinforced, and found himself at the head of twelve thousand men; but, in consequence of this advantage, the enemy became masters of the Weser, and opened to themselves a free passage into Westphalia.

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GENERAL IMHOFF DEFEATS M. DE CHEVERT.

The progress of prince Ferdinand upon the Maese, had been retarded by a long succession of heavy rains, which broke up the roads, and rendered the country impassable; and now the certain information of this unlucky check left him no alternative but a battle or a retreat across the Rhine: the first was carefully avoided by the enemy; the latter resolution, therefore, he found himself under a necessity to embrace. In his present position he was hampered by the French army on one wing, on the other by the fortress of Gueldres, the garrison of which had been lately reinforced, as well as by divers other posts, capable of obstructing the convoys and subsistence of the combined army; besides, he had reason to apprehend, that the prince de Soubise would endeavour to intercept the British troops in their march from Embden. Induced by these considerations, he determined to repass the Rhine, after having offered battle to the enemy, and made several motions for that purpose. Finding them averse to an engagement, he made his dispositions for forcing the strong pass of Waehtendonck, an island surrounded by Niers, of very difficult approach, and situated exactly in his route to the Rhine. This service was performed by the hereditary prince of Brunswick, who, perceiving the enemy had drawn up the bridge, rushed into the river at the head of his grenadiers, who drove them away with their bayonets, and cleared the bridges for the passage of the army towards Rhinebergen. At this place prince Ferdinand received intelligence that M. de Chevert, reputed one of the best officers in the French service, had passed the Lippe with fourteen battalions and several squadrons, to join the garrison of Wesel, and fall upon lieutenant-general Imhoff, who commanded a detached corps of the combined army at Meer, that he might be at hand to guard the bridge which the prince had thrown over the Rhine at Rees. His serene highness was extremely desirous of sending succours to general Imhoff; but the troops were too much fatigued to begin another march before morning; and the Rhine had overflowed its banks in such a manner as to render the bridge at Rees impassable, so that M. Imhoff was left to the resources of his own conduct and the bravery of his troops, consisting of six battalions and four squadrons, already weakened by the absence of different detachments. This general having received advice, on the fourth of August, that the enemy intended to pass the Lippe the same evening with a considerable train of artillery, in order to burn the bridge at Rees, decamped with a view to cover this place, and join two battalions which; had passed the Rhine in boats, under the command of general Zastrow, who reinforced him accordingly; but the enemy not appearing, he concluded the information was false, and resolved to resume his advantageous post at Meer. Of this he had no sooner repossessed himself, than his advanced guards were engaged with the enemy, who marched to the attack from Wesel, under the command of lieutenant-general de Chevert, consisting of the whole corps intended for the siege of Dusseldorp. Imhoffs front was covered by coppices and ditches, there being a rising ground on his right, from whence he could plainly discern the whole force that advanced against him, together with the manner of their approach. Perceiving them engaged in that difficult ground, he posted one regiment in a coppice, with orders to fall upon the left flank of the enemy, which appeared quite uncovered; and as soon as their fire began, advanced with the rest of his forces to attack them in front. The bayonet was used on this occasion, and the charge given with such impetuosity and resolution, that after a short resistance, the enemy fell into confusion, and fled towards Wesel, leaving on the spot eleven pieces of cannon, with a great number of waggons and other carriages; besides the killed and wounded, who amounted to a pretty considerable number, the victor took three hundred and fifty-four prisoners, including eleven officers; whereas, on his part the victory was purchased at a very small expense.

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GENERAL OBERG DEFEATED by the FRENCH.

Immediately after this action, general Wangenheim passed the Rhine with several squadrons and battalions, to reinforce general Imhoff, and enable him to prosecute the advantage he had gained, while prince Ferdinand marched with the rest of the army to Santen: from whence he proceeded to Rhinebergen, where he intended to pass; but the river had overflowed to such a degree, that here, as well as at Rees, the shore was inaccessible; so that he found it necessary to march farther down the river, and lay a bridge at Griethuyzen. The enemy had contrived four vessels for the destruction of this bridge; but they were all taken before they could put the design in execution, and the whole army passed on the tenth day of August, without any loss or further interruption. At the same time the prince withdrew his garrison from Dusseldorp, of which the French immediately took possession. Immediately after his passage he received a letter from the duke of Marlborough, acquainting him that the British troops had arrived at Lingen, in their route to Coesfeldt: to which place general Imhoff was sent to receive them, with a strong detachment. Notwithstanding this junction, the two armies on the Rhine were so equally matched, that no stroke of importance was struck on either side during the remaining part of the campaign. M. de Contades, seeing no prospect of obtaining the least advantage over prince Ferdinand, detached prince Xaverius of Saxony with a strong reinforcement to the prince de Soubise, who had taken possession of Gottengen, and seemed determined to attack the prince of Ysembourg at Eimbeck. That this officer might be able to give him a proper reception, prince Ferdinand detached general Oberg with ten thousand men to Lipstadt, from whence, should occasion require, they might continue their march, and join the Hessians. The whole body, when thus reinforced, did not exceed twenty thousand men, of whom general Oberg now assumed the command: whereas the troops of Soubise were increased to the number of thirty thousand. The allies had taken post upon the river Fulde at Sangarshausen, where they hoped the French would attack them; but the design of Soubise was first to dislodge them from that advantageous situation. With this view, he made a motion, as if he had intended to turn the camp of the allies by the road of Munden. In order to prevent the execution of this supposed design, general Oberg decamped on the tenth of October, and, passing by the village of Landwernhagen, advanced towards Lutten-berg, where, understanding the enemy were at his heels, he forthwith formed his troops in order of battle, his right to the Fulde, and his left extending to a thicket upon an eminence, where he planted five field-pieces. The cavalry supported the wings in a third line, the village of Luttenberg was in the rear, and four pieces of cannon were mounted on a rising ground that flanked this village. The French having likewise passed Landwernhagen, posted their left towards the Fulde, their right extending far beyond the left of the allies, and their front being strengthened with above thirty pieces of cannon. At four in the afternoon the enemy began the battle with a severe cannonading, and at the same time the first line of their infantry attacked major-general Zastrow, who was posted on the left wing of the allies. This body of the French was repulsed; but in the same moment, a considerable line of cavalry advancing, charged the allies in front and flank. These were supported by a fresh body of infantry with cannon, which, after a warm dispute, obliged the confederates to give way; and general Oberg, in order to prevent a total defeat, made a disposition for a retreat, which was performed in tolerable order; not but that he suffered greatly, in passing through a defile, from the fire of the enemy’s cannon, which was brought up and managed under the direction of the duke de Broglio. Having marched through Munden by midnight, the retiring army lay till morning under arms in the little plain near Grupen, on the other side of the Weser; but at day-break prosecuted their march, after having withdrawn the garrison from Munden, until they arrived in the neighbourhood of Guntersheim, where they encamped. In this engagement general Oberg lost about fifteen hundred men, his artillery, baggage, and ammunition. He was obliged to abandon a magazine of hay and straw at Munden, and leave part of his wounded men in that place to the humanity of the victor. But, after all, the French general reaped very little advantage from his victory.

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