561 ([return])
[ Note 4 O, p. 561. Copy of a Letter from the marquis of Granby to the earl of Holdernesse. My Lord, It is with the greatest satisfaction that I have the honour of acquainting your lordship of the success of the hereditary prince yesterday morning.
General Sporcken’s corps marched from the camp at Kalle to Liebenau, about four in the afternoon of the twenty-ninth; the hereditary prince followed the same evening with a body of troops, among which were the two English battalions of grenadiers, the two of Highlanders, and four squadrons of dragoons, Cope’s and Conway’s.
The army was under arms all day on the thirtieth, and about eleven at night marched off, in six columns, to Liebenau. About five the next morning, the whole army be assembled, and formed on the heights near Corbeke. The hereditary prince was, at this time, marching in two columns, in order to turn the enemy’s left flank; which he did by marching to Donhelbourg, leaving Klein-Eder on his left, and forming in two lines, with the left towards Dossel, and his right near Grimbeck, opposite to the left flank of the enemy, whose position was with the left to the high hill near Offendorf, and their right to Warbourg, into which place they had flung Fischer’s corps. The hereditary prince immediately attacked the enemy’s flank, and, after a very sharp dispute, obliged them to give way, and, by a continual fire, kept forcing them to fall back upon Warbourg. The army was at this time marching with the greatest diligence to attack the enemy in front, but the infantry could not get up in time: general Waldegrave, at the head of the British, pressed their march as much as possible: no troops could show more eagerness to get up than they showed. Many of the men, from the heat of the weather, and overstraining themselves to get on through morassy and very difficult ground, suddenly dropped down on their march.
General Mostyn, who was at the head of the British cavalry that was formed on the right of our infantry on the other side of a large wood, upon receiving the duke’s orders to come up with the cavalry as fast as possible, made so much expedition, bringing them up at full trot, though the distance was near five miles, that the British cavalry had the happiness to arrive in time to share the glory of the day, having successfully charged several times both the enemy’s cavalry and infantry.
I should do injustice to the general officers, to every officer and private man of the cavalry, if I did not beg your lordship would assure his majesty that nothing could exceed their gallant behaviour on that occasion.
Captain Philips made so much expedition with his cannon, as to have an opportunity, by a severe cannonade, to oblige those who had passed the Dymel, and were formed on the other side, to retire with the utmost precipitation.
I received his serene highness’s orders yesterday, in the evening, to pass the river after them, with twelve British battalions and ten squadrons, and am now encamped upon the heights of Wilda, about four miles from Warbourg, on the heights of which their grand army is encamped.
M. de Muy is now retiring from the heights of Volk-Missen, where he lay under arms last night, towards Wolfshagen. I cannot give your lordship any account of the loss on either side. Captain Faucitt, whom I send off with this, shall get all the intelligence he can upon this head before he sets off. I am, &c,
GRANBY.
Saturday morning, six o’clock.
P.S.—As I had not an opportunity of sending off captain Faucitt so soon as I intended, I opened my letter to acquaint your lordship that I have just joined the grand army with my detachment.]
564 ([return])
[ Note 4 P, p. 564. The Germans are in general but indifferent engineers, and little acquainted with the art of besieging. On this occasion the Austrian general had no other prospect than that of carrying the place by a sudden attack, or intimidating count Tavenzein, the governor, to an immediate surrender: for he knew the Russian army was at a considerable distance; and judged, from the character of prince Henry of Prussia, that he would advance to the relief of the place long before it would be taken according to the usual forms. Influenced by these considerations, when he had invested the town, he sent a letter to the governor, specifying that his army consisted of fifty battalions, and fourscore squadrons; that the Russian army, amounting to seventy-five thousand men, was within three days’ march of Breslau; that no succour could be expected from the king of Prussia, encamped as he was on the other side of the Elbe, and overawed by the army of count Daun; that prince Henry, far from being in a condition to bring relief, would not be able to stand his ground against the Russians; that Breslau, being an open mercantile town (not a fortress), could not be defended without contravening the established rules of war; and therefore the governor, in case of obstinacy, had no reason to expect an honourable capitulation, the benefit of which was now offered. He, at the same time, sent a memorial to the civil magistrates, threatening the town with destruction, which could by no other means be prevented than by joining with the inhabitants in persuading the governor to embrace immediately the terms that were proposed. Count Tavenzein, instead of being intimidated, was encouraged by these menaces, which implied an apprehension in Laudolm that the place would be relieved. He therefore replied to the summons he had received, that Breslau was not simply a mercantile town, but ought to be considered as a place of strength, as being surrounded with works and wet ditches; that the Austrians themselves had defended it as such after the battle of Lissa, in the year one thousand seven hundred and fifty-seven; that the king his master having commanded him to defend the place to the last extremity, he could neither comply with general Laudohn’s proposals, nor pay the least regard to his threat of destroying the town; as he had not been intrusted with the care of the houses, but with the defence of the fortifications. The Austrian convinced him that same evening, that he threatened nothing but what he meant to perform. He opened his batteries, and poured in upon the town a most terrible shower of bombs and red-hot bullets, which continued till midnight. During this dreadful discharge, which filled the place with horror and desolation, he attempted the outworks by assault. The Croats attacked the covered way in different places with their usual impetuosity; but were repulsed with considerable loss, by the conduct and resolution of the governor and garrison. These proceedings having made no impression on Tavenzein, the besieging general had recourse again to negotiation; and offered the most flattering articles of capitulation, which were rejected with disdain. The governor gave him to understand, that the destruction of the town had made no change in his resolution; though it was a practice contrary to the law of arms, as well as to the dictates of common humanity, to begin the siege of a fortress by ruining the inhabitants; finally, he assured him he would wait for him upon the ramparts, and defend the place to the utmost of his power. His observation was certainly just: nothing could be more infamously inhuman than this practice of making war upon the helpless unarmed inhabitants of a town which has the misfortune to be beleaguered; yet the besieger pleaded the example of the Prussian monarch, who had before acted the same tragedy at Dresden. Laudohn being thus set at defiance, continued to batter and bombard; and several subsequent assaults were given to the fortifications.]