The question I have set myself to elucidate is very modest, very limited and circumscribed, representing only part of the problem indicated above. It may, however, teach us something of the ultimate nature of concepts. It is as follows:
When we think, hear, or read a general term, what arises as sign in consciousness, directly and without reflexion?
I have purposely italicised these words in order to emphasise my principal aim, which was to discover the instantaneous operations (conscious or unconscious) that occur in such a case, in persons whose habits of mind are widely different. I endeavored as much as possible to eliminate reflexion and to seize the mental state. With time and effort, minds that are least apt in abstraction will arrive at a more or less successful translation of general terms, or at the substitution for them of some mangled and halting definition. I set myself as far as possible to suppress this secondary phase of the mental process, and to arrest it at the first, in order to determine what the word evokes immediately[80] and in what degree this differs with the individual.
In order to make the answers more exactly comparable, I interrogated only the adults of both sexes, excluding all children. It was indispensable to my investigation that it should comprise people of very different degrees of culture, habits of mind, and profession. The principal classes were mathematicians, physicists, doctors, scientists, philosophers, painters, musicians, architects, men of the world, women, novelists, poets, artisans. The last class made such confused replies that I must regard their documents as worthiest. Too much is left for individual interpretation. The total number of persons interrogated amounted to one hundred and three.
The method was invariably the same. We said to the subject: “I am going to pronounce certain words; will you tell me directly, without reflexion, whether this word calls up anything or nothing in your mind? If anything, what is suggested to you?” The reply was noted down at once; if delayed beyond five to seven seconds, it was held to be null, or doubtful. In the case of naïve subjects, I employed certain preliminaries: before pronouncing abstract words, concrete terms (designating a monument, or person) such as would evoke a simple image, were heard; then the impulse being given, I proceeded to the enumeration of general terms.
The words which served as material for the inquiry were fourteen in number, proceeding from the concrete to the highest abstractions. They were enunciated in an indifferent order and were as follows: dog, animal, color, form, justice, goodness, virtue, law,[81] number, force, time, relation, cause, infinity.
The inquiry was invariably oral, never in writing, the greatest care being taken to prevent the person from knowing the end in view, unless afterwards: which led in certain cases to interesting explanations. The very nature of my method prevented me from extending it as widely as I could have wished. I could not, as was done in England, distribute printed questions among the public, because it was necessary to note the spontaneous answer immediately before it was corrected by later reflection. Moreover, I needed unsophisticated subjects, ignorant of my purpose, and therefore eliminated all whom I suspected of being even indirectly acquainted with it.
The majority were interrogated on the fourteen terms cited above, others on a few only; so that the total number of responses was over nine hundred. It would be beside the mark to publish them here. They are nothing more than data which have to be interpreted. Three principal or pure types appear to stand out from them, besides the failures or mixed cases. These may be termed the concrete type, the visual typographic type, and the auditory type. Each of these corresponds with a particular mode of representing the general idea. We will examine them separately.
1. Concrete Type. Here the abstract word nearly always evokes an image, vague or precise; usually visual, sometimes muscular. It is not a simple sign, it does not represent the total substitution, it is not dry, and finally reduced. It is immediately and spontaneously transformed into a concrete. In fact, the persons of this type think only in images. Words are for them no more than a kind of vehicle, a social instrument of mutual comprehension. When a sequence of general or abstract terms passes through their minds, what really passes is a succession of concretes, save for the very abstract words which “evoke nothing.” This is an answer I have often received, and which, in virtue of its importance, will be considered apart, at the end of this chapter.
The concrete type appears to be the most widely distributed; it obtains almost to exclusion among women, artists, and all who have not the habit of scientific abstraction. I have selected a few examples from among the many observations belonging to this type.