I thought that after an interval of two years it might be interesting to repeat the same inquiry on the same people; but the results were not encouraging in this direction. Some, remembering the previous investigation, declared that “they felt themselves influenced beforehand.” Others, who had a more vague recollection (perhaps because they did not understand the object of the inquiry) gave answers analogous to their former replies. In short, notwithstanding the lapse of time, and change of circumstances, each seemed to be consistent with his former self.
I must admit that in the preceding research the psychological nature of the concepts was studied under a particular aspect. This objection was made at the London Psychological Congress[84] by the President, Professor Sidgwick, whose remarks may be summarised as follows:
First, Professor Sidgwick believes that the act of suddenly calling attention to a word, in a person not accustomed to introspective observation, evokes a response which does not exactly correspond to the state ordinarily aroused by such words. In his own particular case he has found that the images evoked (usually visual) were extremely feeble, but that when he dwelt upon them they were enlivened. Secondly, the images vary a great deal according to the terms employed; for example, when he is occupied with mathematical and logical trains of thought, he sees only the printed words. If he is engaged upon the subject of political economy, the general terms sometimes have for their concomitants extremely fantastic images: like value, for instance, which is accompanied by the indistinct and fragmentary image of a man placing something upon the pan of a balance. Thirdly, when for such words as infinity, relation, etc., the subject answers nothing, the only conclusion justified is that the subject is incapable of describing the confused elements which exist in his consciousness. Fourthly, Professor Sidgwick’s own experience points to the conclusion that my types may succeed each other in the same person.
On this last point—the co-existence of several modes of conception in the same person—I am quite in agreement with Professor Sidgwick, and my own data, drawn up from personal observations, would provide me with sufficient evidence. At the same time the object of my investigation was not to determine the manner in which each individual conceives, but the forms under which men as a whole think of concepts. Nor did I profess to follow the work of the mind when it resolves its general ideas into concretes, when it makes coin out of its bank-notes, but only to seize the subjacent labor that accompanies the current and facile use of general terms, in speaking, listening, reading or writing. No doubt it would be advisable to treat the subject in another manner by studying—no longer the momentary state that corresponds with the presence of the concept in consciousness—but the stable organised turn of mind due to a long habit of dealing with concepts. To this end it would be desirable more especially to question mathematicians and metaphysicians. My data are neither numerous nor clear enough to permit of my hazarding any dictum on this subject. Some mathematicians have told me that they invariably require a figured representation, a construction, and that even when these are considered as purely fictitious their support is indispensable to the train of reasoning. Contra those who think geometrically, there are others who think algebraically, eliminating all configuration, or construction, and proceeding by simple analysis with the aid of signs: which (with the necessary corrections and descriptions) would bring the first under the concrete, and the second under the audito-motor type. Among metaphysicians the typographical visual type seems largely to predominate. One (who is well known) belongs to the pure auditory type. All this, however, is inadequate; the investigation would have to be followed out, by and upon others.
A young Russian doctor, M. Adam Wizel, who was interested in the subject, put the same questions (following the method indicated above) to persons in the hypnotic state. Admitting the unconscious mental activities to preponderate in this state he asked whether by this procedure it would not be possible to penetrate farther into the unknown substrate of consciousness. His experiments were undertaken at the Salpêtrière, in Charcot’s clinique, upon six women—hysterics of the first order. The subjects were first put into a state of somnambulism, then after a preliminary explanation were questioned, as above. After getting the answers Wizel ordered the subjects to forget all that had happened, and then woke them. He now began again in the waking state, asking the same questions, so that he was able to compare the answers given successively in the two cases. They are nearly always clearer and more explicit during somnambulism than during the waking state, as may be judged by the following example (taken from the third observation):
| QUESTIONS | SOMNAMBULISM | WAKING STATE |
|---|---|---|
| Dog: | A big grey animal | Nothing |
| Form: | A red cardboard head | Nothing |
| Law: | A tribunal | Nothing |
| Justice: | A magistrate | State of justice |
| Number: | Figure 12 in white | The number of a note (?) |
| Color: | Green | Blue |
Where the replies are concrete in the two cases I note a tolerable analogy between them. M. Wizel (who eliminated all doubtful cases, and any accompanied by crises) never encountered the typographical visual type, nor the pure auditory type, in his experiments. His six hysterics belong to the concrete type, with the predominance of visual images—much more rarely of motor images, provoked by the word “force.” The answer “nothing” is very frequent; less so, however, during somnambulism than during the waking state.
II.
We now reach the most obscure and difficult part of our subject. Among the nine hundred and odd replies collected, the one most frequently met with is “nothing.” There is no observation in which it does not occur at least once: in the majority of cases it is found one, two, three, four, or more times. If I take the word cause, the formula “I have no representation,” forms fifty-three per cent. of the total of answers collected; the rest saw the printed word or some concrete image; e. g., a stone falling, horses drawing, or other simulacra, of which several have already been enumerated. It is the same with all the other highly abstract terms (time, infinity, etc.). So that to return to the question which was to be the exclusive object of our investigation,—“Is the general idea when thought, read, or heard, accompanied by anything in consciousness?”—we may reply, an image, a typographical vision, or nothing. We must now inquire, what this nothing is, for it must be something.