443. NOMINATION BY PETITION.—The system of nomination by petition came into use between 1880 and 1890. It provides that candidates may be placed in nomination by filing with some specified officer nomination papers, or petitions, signed by a specified number of qualified voters. The filing of these papers entitles the candidates named thereon to have their names printed upon the official ballot. The merit of this device is that it prevents the party machine from dictating the choice of candidates, and that it enables independent candidates to be brought forward. On the other hand, it has encouraged the circulation of petitions for hire.
On the whole this method of nomination is proving more and more popular in local elections. It seems well adapted to the needs of municipalities, for it reduces partisanship to a minimum. It is said that in some cases it practically eliminates national politics from local elections. The supporters of nomination by petition are increasing, and it is now proposed to apply it to all local and state nominations. In such an event the Direct Primary would be radically modified, or even abolished.
444. MAJORITY REPRESENTATION.—How can we make certain that an individual nominated or elected represents a majority of those voting? When there are only two candidates, the one receiving the largest number of votes receives both a plurality and a majority. But when there are several candidates, it often happens that the individual receiving the largest number of votes does not receive a majority. Suppose, for example, that 100,000 votes are cast, and that A receives 20,000, B 25,000 C 30,000 and D 25,000. Ordinarily C will be declared successful because he has received a plurality of the votes cast. But he has not received a majority of the votes cast. This custom of declaring successful the candidate receiving a plurality constitutes a defect in our representative system, since a plurality candidate may represent only a small minority of those actually voting.
Several attempts have been made to remedy this defect. In some southern states it is the practice to require an absolute majority for election. If no aspirant receives a majority, a second ballot is taken on the two candidates standing highest on the list. In a number of northern cities, the evil of plurality voting has been attacked through the preferential voting device. This system of voting allows the voter to designate not only his first, but his second and third choices as well. If any candidate receives a clear majority of first choice votes, he is declared elected. But if no one receives such a majority, the second choices are added to the first choices. If this further calculation does not give any candidate a majority, third choices are resorted to. In cities where the plan has been tried, preferential voting is said to have proved markedly successful.
445. MINORITY REPRESENTATION.—Related to the question of making sure that successful candidates represent a majority of those voting is the problem of the adequate representation of the minority. The most notorious phase of this problem has grown out of our custom of electing one national Representative from each of the congressional districts into which every state is divided. Often gerrymandering [Footnote: The origin and nature of "gerrymandering" are discussed in Chapter XLII, Sections 542 and 543.] is resorted to, that is to say, congressional districts are so arranged as to give the minority party overwhelming majorities in a few districts, while the dominant party is allowed to carry the remaining districts by very small majorities. The result is gross misrepresentation in Congress, because the party having a bare majority often secures a large percentage of the representatives, while the minority is very inadequately represented.
Such misrepresentation also appears in connection with the choice of representatives to the state legislatures.
In the attempt to remedy this type of misrepresentation various plans of proportional representation have been put forth. In Illinois members of the lower house of the state legislature have long been chosen as follows: Each state senatorial district is given the right to elect three assemblymen. Every elector in the district has the right to cast three votes, one each for three different persons, or two votes for one candidate and one for another, or all for one candidate. By concentrating its votes upon one candidate, an average minority can be sure of at least one representative in each district. A plan employed in several other states likewise aims to give each political party representation proportional to the number of votes cast by the party, regardless of whether the number is a minority or a majority. The principle of proportional representation, if fully worked out, and if made simple enough to be comprehended by the average voter, would insure majority rule and at the same time allow the adequate representation of minorities.
446. OBSTACLES TO INTELLIGENTY VOTING.—Several obstacles to intelligent voting in this country are intimately connected with the long ballot. [Footnote: The term "long ballot" refers to the fact that so many officials are elective that the ballot on which their names appear is often of great length. The term "short ballot" refers to a reduction of the length of this ballot by making fewer officers elective.] The wave of democracy which swept the country in the last century had the double effect of increasing the number of elective offices, and of shortening the terms during which officials were allowed to hold office. A greatly lengthened ballot, together with the great frequency of elections, has made it impossible for the average voter to exercise proper judgment at the polls. The difficulty of investigating the merits of the numerous candidates, or even of becoming familiar with their names, has discouraged many from voting. Of those who still pretend to reach independent decisions regarding candidates and issues, a considerable number really rely upon the direction and advice of professional politicians. The long ballot is the enemy of democracy, since it allows politicians, rather than the masses, to control actual government.
447. SHORTENING THE BALLOT.—The chief remedy for these evils is the short ballot. The essential features of the short ballot plan are as follows: Popular elections should be resorted to only for the purpose of choosing those officials who have to do with public policies. For example, state voters ought to select only the governor, lieutenant governor, and members of the legislature; city voters ought to choose only the mayor and council; [Footnote: Where this form of municipal government is still employed.] while county voters ought to confine their attention to a small group of county commissioners or supervisors. All other officials ought to be appointed, either directly by chief executive officers, or by means of the merit plan. Along with the shortening of the ballot, we should be increasingly willing to allow officials to hold office for longer terms. A supplementary feature of great value would be the establishment of such means of popular control as would protect the public against abuse of power by officials to whom these longer terms had been extended.
448. MERITS OF THE SHORT BALLOT.—There can be little doubt that a drastic shortening of the ballot would work a great improvement in our electoral system. If the vast majority of officials were made appointive, the voter could give more time and thought to the consideration of a few important elective officials. A short ballot would lessen the possibilities of manipulation by rings and bosses. Unquestionably the interest of the voter would be quickened, since his influence upon the political life of his community would be more apparent. And not only would the short ballot make government more representative, but it would help to make it more responsible.