14. The influence of economic interests upon the Constitution of 1787. (Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States, pages 324-325.)
15. The outlook for American democracy in 1789. (Bryce, Modern Democracies, vol. ii, chapter xxxviii.)
CHAPTER IV
ESSENTIALS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT
31. THE AIM OF THIS CHAPTER.—The form of government established in this country by the Constitution of 1787 is known as a republic. A republic may be defined as a representative democracy, or, in the popular sense of the term, simply as a democracy. Now, to point out that a government is democratic does not necessarily mean that it is a sound government. Granting that self-government is morally right, the fate of a democracy will depend, partly upon the character of the people, and partly upon the nature of the governmental machinery through which that people expresses its will. The proof of democracy is in its workings. The aim of this chapter is not to pass judgment upon democracy, but rather to outline the essential characteristics of American constitutional government. When this background has been secured we shall be in a position to begin a detailed study of applied democracy, to point out its merits, to call attention to its defects, and to consider how and to what extent it may be improved.
32. STRENGTH.—American constitutional government is a strong government. The weaknesses of the Articles of Confederation were avoided in framing the Constitution of 1787. Whereas the Confederation government was really headless, the Constitution of 1787 provided for a strong executive. The Confederation Congress could not levy taxes, but the Congress of the United States has adequate powers in this regard. There can be no recurrence of one of the chief financial troubles of the Revolutionary period, for at the present time the several states may neither coin money nor emit bills of credit. The Federal government has exclusive control of foreign affairs, so that no state may individually enter into any agreement with a foreign power. The Federal Constitution is the supreme law of the land, and no state action may contradict it. Unity has given us strength, and great crises, such as the Civil War and the World War, have ended by increasing that strength.
33. THE CHECK AND BALANCE SYSTEM.—A striking characteristic feature of American constitutional government is the check and balance system. By this system we mean all those constitutional provisions which divide and subdivide governmental power among various sets of public agents. [Footnote: For a fuller discussion of the check and balance system see Chapter XXXIX.]
This division of powers is threefold. First, there is a division of power between the Federal government and the governments of the several states. The states are obliged to act in concert on most questions involving the nation as a whole, but the Federal Constitution safeguards the rights of the states by reserving to them all powers not specifically delegated to the Federal government. Second, in both Federal and state governments, power is still further distributed among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches in such a way that each branch constitutes a check upon the other two. Third, in both Federal and state governments there is a division of power within each of the three branches of government. Thus both the President of the United States and the governors of the various states are at least partially controlled by subordinate executive officials, while in the legislative branch of both Federal and state governments the upper and lower houses constitute a check upon one another. In the case of both Federal and state judicial systems there is a division of jurisdiction.
34. THE CHECK AND BALANCE SYSTEM SECURES STABILITY.—American government is not only strong, it is stable. This stability is due chiefly to the admirable way in which different governmental agents are balanced against one another. The check and balance system renders us safe from the danger of anarchy, for though ultimate control is vested in the people, sufficient powers are entrusted to the governmental mechanism to protect it against popular passion. The system likewise protects us against despotism. So long as the Constitution endures, neither the Federal government nor the governments of the states may destroy each other. The undue concentration of political power is likewise rendered difficult by the division of power between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of both Federal and state governments.
The significance of a properly applied check and balance system appears clearly when we compare our government with that of various other republics. In many of the ancient republics, for example, the powers of government were so unequally and so indefinitely divided that republican government degenerated either to despotism or to anarchy. Within the last century many Latin-American republics have modeled their governments after ours, and yet some of these republics are constantly threatened by either revolution or despotism. The explanation of this, according to Elihu Root, is that these republics have adapted our check and balance system so carelessly that they find it difficult, if not impossible, to maintain a really stable government. [Footnote: Here we are pointing out the fundamental merits of the check and balance system; later (Chapters XXXIV, XXXV, and XXXVI) we shall have occasion to notice some of the disadvantages of this system.]