The Provinces of the Roman Empire, from Caesar to Diocletian. v. 1

by Theodor Mommsen

Marcomanian war.The war named after the Marcomani was not kindled by any single personage of the type of Hannibal or Decebalus. As little did aggressions on the part of the Romans provoke this war; the emperor Pius injured no neighbour, either powerful or humble, and set on peace almost more than its just value. The realm of Maroboduus and of Vannius had thereafter, perhaps in consequence of the partition under Vangio and Sido ([p. 216]), become divided into the kingdom of the Marcomani in what is now Bohemia and that of the Quadi in Moravia and upper Hungary. Conflicts with the Romans do not appear to have occurred here; the vassal–relation of the princes of the Quadi was even formally recognised under the reign of Pius by the confirmation asked for. Shiftings of peoples, which lay beyond the Roman horizon, were the proximate cause of the great war. Soon after the death of Pius († 161) masses of Germans, especially Langobardi from the Elbe, but also Marcomani and other bodies of men, appeared in Pannonia, apparently to gain new abodes on the right bank. Pressed hard by the Roman troops who were despatched against them, they sent the prince of the Marcomani, Ballomarius, and with him a representative of each of the ten tribes taking part, to renew their request for assignation of land. But the governor abode by his decision and compelled them to go back over the Danube.

Its beginning.This was the beginning of the great Danubian war.[134] The governor of upper Germany, Gaius Aufidius Victorinus, the father–in–law of Fronto known in literature, had already, about the year 162, to repel an assault of the Chatti, which likewise may have been occasioned by tribes from the Elbe pressing on their rear. Had equally energetic steps been taken, greater mischief might have been averted. But just then the Armenian war had begun, into which the Parthians soon entered; though the troops were not actually sent away from the threatened frontier to the east, for which there is at least no evidence,[135] there was at any rate a want of men to take up the second war at once with energy. This temporising severely avenged itself. Just when people were triumphing in Rome over the kings of the east, on the Danube the Chatti, the Marcomani, the Quadi, the Jazyges burst as with a thunderclap into the Roman territory. Raetia, Noricum, the two Pannonias, Dacia, were inundated at the same moment; in the Dacian mine–district we can still follow the traces of this irruption. What devastations they then wrought in those regions, which for long had seen no enemy, is shown by the fact that several years afterwards the Quadi gave back first 13,000, then 50,000, and the Jazyges even 100,000 Roman captives. Nor did the matter end with the injury done to the provinces. Invasion of Italy. There happened what had not occurred for three hundred years and begun to be accounted as impossible—the barbarians broke through the wall of the Alps and invaded Italy itself; from Raetia they destroyed Opitergium (Oderzo); bands from the Julian Alps invested Aquileia.[136] Defeats of individual Roman divisions must have taken place in various cases; we learn only that one of the commandants of the guard, Victorinus, fell before the enemy, and the ranks of the Roman armies were sorely thinned.

Pestilence.This grave attack befell the state at a most unhappy moment. No doubt the Oriental war was ended; but in its train a pestilence had spread throughout Italy and the west, which swept men away more continuously than the war, and in more fearful measure. When the troops were concentrated, as was necessary, the victims of the pestilence were all the more numerous. As dearth always accompanies pestilence, so on this occasion there appeared with it failure of crops and famine, and severe financial distress; the taxes did not come in, and in the course of the war the emperor saw himself under the necessity of alienating by public auction the jewels of his palace.

Verus and Marcus.There was lack of a fitting leader. A military and political task so extensive and so complicated could, as things stood in Rome, be undertaken by no commissioned general, but only by the ruler himself. Marcus had, with a correct and modest knowledge of his shortcomings, on ascending the throne, placed by his side with equal rights his younger adopted brother Lucius Verus, on the benevolent assumption that the jovial young man—as he was a vigorous fencer and hunter—would also grow into an able general. But the worthy emperor did not possess the sharp glance of one who knows men; the choice had proved as unfortunate as possible; the Parthian war just ended had shown the nominal general to be personally dissolute, and as an officer incapable. The joint regency of Verus was nothing but an additional calamity, which indeed was obviated by his death, that ensued not long after the outbreak of the Marcomanian war (169). Marcus, by his leanings more reflective than inclined to practical life, and not at all a soldier, nor in general a strong personality, undertook the exclusive and personal conduct of the requisite operations. He may, in doing so, have made mistakes enough in detail, and perhaps the long duration of the struggle is partly traceable to this; but the unity of supreme command, his clear insight into the object for which the war was waged, the tenacity of his statesmanly action, above all the rectitude and firmness of the man administering his difficult office with self–forgetful faithfulness, ultimately broke the dangerous assault. This was a merit all the higher, as the success was due more to character than to talent.

Progress of the war.The character of the task set before the Romans is shown by the fact that the government, despite the want of men and money in the first year of this war, had the walls of the capital of Dalmatia, Salonae, and of the capital of Thrace, Philippopolis, restored by its soldiers and at its expense; certainly these were not isolated arrangements. They had to prepare themselves to see the men of the north everywhere investing the great towns of the empire; the terrors of the Gothic expeditions were already knocking at the gates, and were perhaps for this time averted only by the fact that government saw them coming. The immediate superintendence of the military operations, and the regulation, demanded by the state of the case, of the relations to the frontier–peoples and reformation of the existing arrangements on the spot, might neither be omitted nor left to his unprincipled brother or individual leaders. In fact, the position of matters was changed as soon as the two emperors arrived at Aquileia, in order to set out thence with the army to the scene of war. The Germans and Sarmatians, far from united in themselves, and without common leading, felt themselves unequal to such a counter–blow. The masses of invaders everywhere retreated; the Quadi sent in their submission to the imperial generals, and in many cases the leaders of the movement directed against the Romans paid for this reaction with their lives. Lucius thought that the war had demanded victims enough, and advised a return to Rome; but the Marcomani persevered in haughty resistance, and the calamity which had come upon Rome, the hundred thousands of captives dragged away, the successes achieved by the barbarians, imperatively demanded a more vigorous policy and the offensive continuance of the war. The son–in–law of Marcus, Tiberius Claudius Pompeianus, as an extraordinary measure took the command in Raetia and Noricum; his able lieutenant, the subsequent emperor, Publius Helvius Pertinax, cleared the Roman territory without difficulty with the first auxiliary legion called up from Pannonia. In spite of the financial distress two new legions were formed, particularly from Illyrian soldiers, in the raising of which no doubt many a previous highway–robber was made a defender of his country; and, as was already stated (pp. [161], [198]), the hitherto slight frontier–guard of these two provinces was reinforced by the new legion–camps of Ratisbon and Enns. The emperors themselves went to the upper Pannonian camps. It was above all of consequence to restrict the area within which the fire of war was raging. The barbarians coming from the north, who offered their aid, were not repelled, and fought in Roman pay, so far as they did not—as also occurred—break their word and make common cause with the enemy. The Quadi, who sued for peace and for the confirmation of the new king Furtius, had the latter readily granted to them, and nothing demanded of them but the giving back of the deserters and the captives. Success in some measure attended the attempt to restrict the war to the two chief opponents, the Marcomani and the Jazyges from of old allied with them. Against these two peoples it was carried on in the following years with severe conflicts and not without defeat. We know only isolated details, which do not admit of being brought into set connection. Marcus Claudius Fronto, to whom had been entrusted the commands of upper Moesia and Dacia united as an extraordinary measure, fell about the year 171 in conflict against Germans and Jazyges. The commandant of the guard, Marcus Macrinius Vindex, likewise fell before the enemy. They and other officers of high rank obtained in these years honorary monuments in Rome at the column of Trajan, because they had met death in defence of their fatherland. The barbaric tribes, who had declared for Rome, again partially fell away—such as the Cotini and above all the Quadi, who granted an asylum to the fugitive Marcomani and drove out their vassal–king Furtius, whereupon the emperor Marcus set a price of 1000 gold pieces on the head of his successor Ariogaesus.

Its issue; and second war.Not till the sixth year of the war (172) does the complete conquest of the Marcomani seem to have been achieved, and Marcus to have thereupon assumed the well–deserved title of victory, Germanicus. Then followed the overthrow of the Quadi; lastly in 175 that of the Jazyges, in consequence of which the emperor received the further surname of Conqueror of the Sarmatae. The terms which were laid down for the conquered tribes show that Marcus designed not to punish but to subdue. The Marcomani and the Jazyges, probably also the Quadi, were required to evacuate a border–strip along the river to the breadth of ten, subsequently modified to five, miles. In the strongholds on the right bank of the Danube were placed Roman garrisons, which, among the Marcomani and Quadi alone, amounted together to not less than 20,000 men. All the subdued had to furnish contingents to the Roman army; the Jazyges, for example, 8000 horsemen. Had the emperor not been recalled by the insurrection of Syria, he would have driven the latter entirely from their country, as Trajan drove the Dacians. That Marcus intended to treat the revolted Transdanubians after this model, was confirmed by the further course of events. Hardly was that hindrance removed, when the emperor went back to the Danube and began, just like Trajan, in 178 the second definitive war. The ground put forward for thus declaring war is not known; the aim is doubtless correctly specified to the effect that he purposed to erect two new provinces, Marcomania and Sarmatia. To the Jazyges, who must have shown themselves submissive to the designs of the emperor, their burdensome imposts were for the most part remitted, and, in fact, for intercourse with their kinsmen dwelling to the east of Dacia the Roxolani, right of passage through Dacia was granted to them under fitting supervision—probably just because they were already regarded as Roman subjects. The Marcomani were almost extirpated by sword and famine. The Quadi in despair wished to migrate to the north, and to seek settlements among the Semnones; but even this was not allowed to them, as they had to cultivate the fields in order to provide for the Roman garrisons. After fourteen years of almost uninterrupted warfare, he who was a warrior–prince against his will reached his goal, and the Romans were a second time face to face with the acquisition of the upper Elbe; now, in fact, all that was wanting was the announcement of the wish to retain what was won. Thereupon he died—not yet sixty years of age—in the camp of Vindobona on 17th March 180.

Results of the Marcomanian war.We must not merely acknowledge the resoluteness and tenacity of the ruler, but must also admit that he did what right policy enjoined. The conquest of Dacia by Trajan was a doubtful gain, although in this very Marcomanian war the possession of Dacia not only removed a dangerous element from the ranks of the antagonists of Rome, but probably also had the effect of preventing the host of peoples on the lower Danube, the Bastarnae, Roxolani, and others, from interfering in the war. But after the mighty onset of the Transdanubians to the west of Dacia had made their subjugation a necessity, this could only be accomplished in a definitive way by embracing Bohemia, Moravia, and the plain of the Theiss within the Roman line of defence, although these regions were probably accounted, like Dacia, as having only the position of advanced posts, and the strategical frontier–line was certainly meant to remain the Danube.

Conclusion of peace by Commodus.The successor of Marcus, the emperor Commodus, was present in the camp when his father died, and as he had already for several years nominally shared the throne with his father, he entered with the latter’s death at once into possession of unlimited power. Only for a brief time did the nineteen years’ old successor allow the men who had enjoyed his father’s confidence—his brother–in–law Pompeianus, and others who had borne with Marcus the heavy burden of the war—to rule in his spirit. Commodus was in every respect the opposite of his father; not a scholar, but a fencing–master; as cowardly and weak in character, as his father was resolute and tenacious of purpose; as indolent and forgetful of duty, as his father was active and conscientious. He not merely gave up the idea of incorporating the territory won, but voluntarily granted even to the Marcomani conditions such as they had not ventured to hope for. The regulation of the frontier–traffic under Roman control, and the obligation not to injure their neighbours friendly to the Romans, were matters of course; but the garrisons were withdrawn from their country, and there was retained only the prohibition of settlement on the border–strip. The payment of taxes and the furnishing of recruits were doubtless stipulated for, but the former were soon remitted, and the latter were certainly not furnished. A similar settlement was made with the Quadi; and the other Transdanubians must have been similarly dealt with. Thereby the conquests made were given up, and the work of many years of warfare was in vain; if no more was wished for, a similar arrangement of things might have been reached much earlier. Nevertheless the Marcomanian war secured in these regions the supremacy of Rome for the sequel, in spite of the fact that Rome let slip the prize of victory. It was not by the tribes that had taken part in it that the blow was dealt, to which the Roman world–power succumbed.

The colonate.Another permanent consequence of this war was connected with the removals, to which it gave occasion, of the Transdanubians over into the Roman empire. Of themselves such changes of settlement had occurred at all times; the Sugambri, transplanted under Augustus to Gaul, the Dacians sent to Thrace, were nothing but new subjects or communities of subjects added to those formerly existing, and probably not much different were the 3000 Naristae, whom Marcus allowed to exchange their settlements westward of Bohemia for such settlements within the empire, while the like request was refused to the otherwise unknown Astingi on the Dacian north frontier. But the Germans settled by him not merely in the land of the Danube, but in Italy itself at Ravenna, were neither free subjects nor strictly non–free persons; these were the beginnings of the Roman villanage, the colonate, the influence of which on the agricultural economy of the whole state is to be set forth in another connection. That Ravennate settlement, however, had no permanence; the men rose in revolt and had to be conveyed away, so that the new colonate remained restricted primarily to the provinces, particularly to the lands of the Danube.

The advancing Northmen.The great war on the middle Danube was once more followed by sixty years’ time of peace, the blessings of which could not be completely neutralised by the internal misgovernment that was constantly increasing during its course. No doubt various isolated accounts show that the frontier, especially the Dacian, which was most exposed, remained not without trouble; but above all, the stern military government of Severus did its duty here, and at least Marcomani and Quadi appear even under his immediate successors in unconditional dependence, so that the son of Severus could cite a prince of the Quadi before him and lay his head at his feet. The conflicts occurring at this epoch on the lower Danube were of subordinate importance. But probably at this period a comprehensive shifting of peoples from the north–east towards the Black Sea took place, and the Roman frontier–guard on the lower Danube had to confront new and more dangerous opponents. Up to this time the antagonists of the Romans there had been chiefly Sarmatian tribes, among whom the Roxolani came into closest contact with them; of Germans there were settled here at that time only the Bastarnae, who had been long at home in this region. Now the Roxolani disappear, merged possibly among the Carpi apparently akin to them, who thenceforth were the nearest neighbours of the Romans on the lower Danube, perhaps in the valleys of the Seret and Pruth.