The Campaign of Chancellorsville

by Theodore Ayrault Dodge

Hooker still had in line at Chancellorsville, counting out his losses of Saturday, over eighty-five thousand men. Lee had not exceeding half the number. But every musket borne by the Army of Northern Virginia was put to good use; every round of ammunition was made to tell its story. On the other hand, of the effective of the Army of the Potomac, barely a quarter was fought au fond, while at least one-half the force for duty was given no opportunity to burn a cartridge, to aid in checking the onset of the elated champions of the South.

Almost any course would have been preferable to Hooker's inertness. There was a variety of opportune diversions to make. Reynolds, with his fresh and eager corps, held the new right, protected in his front by Hunting Run. It would have been easy at any time to project a strong column from his front, and take Stuart's line of battle in reverse. Indeed, a short march of three miles by the Ely's Ford, Haden's Ford, and Greenwood Gold Mines roads, none of which were held by the enemy, would have enabled Reynolds to strike Stuart in rear of his left flank, or seize Dowdall's clearing by a coup de main, and absolutely negative all Stuart's efforts in front of Fairview. Or an advance through the forest would have accomplished the same end. To be sure, the ground was difficult, and cut up by many brooks and ravines; but such ground had been, in this campaign, no obstacle to the Confederates. Nor would it have been to Reynolds, had he been given orders to execute such a manoeuvre. Gen. Doubleday states in his testimony: "The action raged with the greatest fury near us on our left." "I thought that the simple advance of our corps would take the enemy in flank, and would be very beneficial in its results. Gen. Reynolds once or twice contemplated making this advance on his own responsibility. Col. Stone made a reconnoissance, showing it to be practicable."

The same thing applies to the Eleventh and portions of the Fifth Corps on the left. A heavy column could have been despatched by the Mine and River roads to attack McLaws's right flank. Barely three miles would have sufficed, over good roads, to bring such a column into operating distance of McLaws. It may be said that the Eleventh Corps was not fit for such work, after its defeat of Saturday night. But testimony is abundant to show that the corps was fully able to do good service early on Sunday morning, and eager to wipe off the stain with which its flight from Dowdall's had blotted its new and cherished colors. But, if Hooker was apprehensive of trusting these men so soon again, he could scarcely deem them incapable of holding the intrenchments; and this left Meade available for the work proposed.

Instead, then, of relying upon the material ready to his hand, Hooker conceived that his salvation lay in the efforts of his flying wing under Sedgwick, some fifteen miles away. He fain would call on Hercules instead of putting his own shoulder to the wheel. His calculations were that Sedgwick, whom he supposed to be at Franklin's and Pollock's crossings, three or four miles below Fredericksburg, could mobilize his corps, pass the river, capture the heights, where in December a few Southern brigades had held the entire Army of the Potomac at bay, march a dozen miles, and fall upon Lee's rear, all in the brief space of four or five hours. And it was this plan he chose to put into execution, deeming others equal to the performance of impossibilities, while himself could not compass the easiest problems under his own eye.

To measure the work thus cut out for Sedgwick, by the rule of the performances of the wing immediately commanded by Gen. Hooker, would be but fair. But Sedgwick's execution of his orders must stand on its own merits. And his movements are fully detailed elsewhere.

An excuse often urged in palliation of Hooker's sluggishness, is that he was on Sunday morning severely disabled. Hooker was standing, between nine and ten A.M., on the porch of the Chancellor House, listening to the heavy firing at the Fairview crest, when a shell struck and dislodged one of the pillars beside him, which toppled over, struck and stunned him; and he was doubtless for a couple of hours incapacitated for work.

But the accident was of no great moment. Hooker does not appear to have entirely turned over the command to Couch, his superior corps-commander, but to have merely used him as his mouthpiece, retaining the general direction of affairs himself.

And this furnishes no real apology. Hooker's thorough inability to grasp the situation, and handle the conditions arising from the responsibility of so large a command, dates from Thursday noon, or at latest Friday morning. And from this time his enervation was steadily on the increase. For the defeat of the Army of the Potomac in Sunday morning's conflict was already a settled fact, when Hooker failed at early dawn so to dispose his forces as to sustain Sickles and Williams if over-matched, or to broach some counter-manoeuvre to draw the enemy's attention to his own safety.

It is an ungracious task to heap so much blame upon any one man. But the odium of this defeat has for years been borne by those who are guiltless of the outcome of the campaign of Chancellorsville; and the prime source of this fallacy has been Hooker's ever-ready self-exculpation by misinterpreted facts and unwarranted conclusions, while his subordinates have held their peace. And this is not alone for the purpose of vindicating the fair fame of the Army of the Potomac and its corps-commanders, but truth calls for no less. And it is desired to reiterate what has already been said,—that it is in all appreciation of Hooker's splendid qualities as a lieutenant, that his inactivity in this campaign is dwelt upon. No testimony need be given to sustain Hooker's courage: no man ever showed more. No better general ever commanded an army corps in our service: this is abundantly vouched for. But Hooker could not lead an hundred thousand men; and, unlike his predecessor, he was unable to confess it. Perhaps he did not own it to himself. Certainly his every explanation of this campaign involved the shifting of the onus of his defeat to the shoulders of his subordinates,—principally Howard and Sedgwick. And the fullest estimation of Hooker's brilliant conduct on other fields, is in no wise incompatible with the freest censure for the disasters of this unhappy week. For truth awards praise and blame with equal hand; and truth in this case does ample justice to the brave old army, ample justice to Hooker's noble aides.

The plan summarized by Warren probably reflected accurately the intentions of his chief, as conceived in his tent on Saturday night. It was self-evident that Anderson and McLaws could be readily held in check, so long as Jackson's corps was kept sundered from them. Indeed, they would have necessarily remained on the defensive so long as isolated. Instead, then, of leaving the Third Corps, and one division of the Twelfth, to confront Jackson's magnificent infantry, had Hooker withdrawn an entire additional corps, (he could have taken two,) and thrown these troops in heavy masses at dawn on Stuart, while Birney retained Hazel Grove, and employed his artillery upon the enemy's flank; even the dauntless men, whose victories had so often caused them to deem themselves invincible, must have been crushed by the blows inflicted.