The impression that an attack should have been made, prevailed among many of his subordinates. Gen. Wadsworth thus testified before the Committee on the Conduct of the War: "Question.—Can you tell why it was not ordered to attack the enemy at the time Gen. Sickles with his Third Corps was driven back; or why it was not ordered to attack the next day, when you heard the sound of Gen. Sedgwick's engagement with the enemy? Answer.—I have no means of knowing; at the time we were ordered to re-cross the river, so far as I could judge of the temper and spirit of the officers and men of the army, they were ready to take the offensive. I do not know why we were withdrawn then; I think we should not have withdrawn. I think the enemy were whipped; although they had gained certain advantages, they were so severely handled that they were weaker than we were."
"Question.—Is it your opinion as a military man, that, if our army had been ordered to take the offensive vigorously, we would have gained a victory there? Answer.—I think we should have taken the offensive when the enemy attacked Gen. Sedgwick."
Again Hooker: "During the 3d and 4th, reconnoissances were made on the right," (i. e., at Chancellorsville,) "from one end of the line to the other, to feel the enemy's strength, and find a way and place to attack him successfully; but it was ascertained that it could only be made on him behind his defences, and with slender columns, which I believed he could destroy as fast as they could be thrown on to his works. Subsequent campaigns have only confirmed the opinion I then ascertained."
Now, Hooker, at the time of giving this testimony, (March 11, 1865), had had nearly two years in which to become familiar with the true state of facts. He must have known these facts from the reports of his subordinates, if not from the accounts of the action in the Southern press. He must have known that all day Monday, he had only Jackson's corps opposed to him. He must have known that these troops had time enough to erect none but very ordinary intrenchments. And yet he excuses himself from not attacking his opponents, when he outnumbered them four to one. Would not his testimony tell better for him, if he had said that at the time he supposed he had more than eighteen thousand men before him? It is a thankless task to pursue criticism upon such capricious and revocatory evidence.
Sickles also, in his testimony, states that from our new lines we felt the enemy everywhere in his front, and that Gen. Griffin with his entire division made a reconnoissance, and developed the enemy in great force on our right flank. This work of reconnoitring can scarcely have been done with great thoroughness, for we know to a certainty what force Lee left behind. It would be well to say little about it. But it is not strange that the purposelessness of the commander should result in half-hearted work by the subordinates.
The following extract from the evidence of Gen. Sedgwick before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, compared with Hooker's and the actual facts, shows palpably who is in the right.
"At nine A.M., May 4, I sent this despatch to Gen. Hooker: 'I am occupying the same position as last night. I have secured my communication with Banks's Ford. The enemy are in possession of the heights of Fredericksburg in force. They appear strongly in our front, and are making efforts to drive us back. My strength yesterday, A.M., was twenty-two thousand men: I do not know my losses, but they were large, probably five thousand men. I can't use the cavalry. It depends upon the condition and position of your force whether I can sustain myself here. Howe reports the enemy advancing from Fredericksburg.'
"Question.—When you were in the position on the 4th, to which you have referred, were you where you could have co-operated with the army at Chancellorsville in an attack upon the enemy?
"Answer.—I could not proceed in that direction. I think Gen. Hooker might have probably relieved me if he had made an attack at that time. I think I had a much larger force of the enemy around me than Gen. Hooker had in front of him. There were two divisions of the enemy on the heights of Fredericksburg, which was in my rear; and they would have attacked me the moment I undertook to proceed towards Chancellorsville. About one A.M. of May 5, Gen. Hooker telegraphed me to cross the river, and take up the bridges. This is the despatch: 'Despatch this moment received. Withdraw; cover the river, and prevent any force crossing. Acknowledge receipt.'
"This was immediately done: as the last of the column was crossing, between three and four o'clock, the orders to cross were countermanded, and I was directed to hold a position on the south bank. The despatch was dated 1.20 A.M., and was received at 3.20, as follows:—