The trouble is in the confusion of ideas which results in trying to apply the same principle to two totally different classes of cases. A State like Switzerland or Holland differs only in size from the greatest of civilized nations, and in everything except size stands at least on a level with them. Such a State is absolutely competent to preserve order within its own bounds, to execute substantial justice, and to secure the rights of foreigners. All that is necessary, therefore, is to guarantee it against aggression; and when the great Powers have thus guaranteed it, all covenanting to protect it from the aggression of any one of their own number, their duty is done and the needs of the situation completely met. In such a State the people themselves guarantee stability, order, liberty, and protection for the rights of others. There is not the slightest need of interfering with them, of seeking to develop them, of protecting them from themselves. The needs of civilization and humanity are sufficiently met by protecting them from outside aggression.
There is no analogy at all with what occurs in a community unable to keep elementary order, or to secure elementary justice within its own borders, and unable or unwilling to do justice to foreign nations. The very worst thing from the standpoint of humanity which can happen to such a community may be to guarantee it against outside aggression. The condition of Algeria under French rule is infinitely better than its condition before the French came to Algeria, or than the condition of Morocco at this moment. The condition of Turkestan under Russia has very greatly improved. The condition of the Sudan at present, as compared with the condition of the Sudan under Mahdist rule, is the most striking example of all. In the same way, Panama has benefited immeasurably from every standpoint by the presence of Americans on the Isthmus. Any arrangement which had guaranteed Algeria against the French, or Turkestan against the Russians, or the Sudan against the English, or Panama against the Americans, would have been an arrangement against the interests of humanity and civilization, and against the interests of the natives of the countries themselves.
Moreover, if there must be interference for the sake of the country itself, to promote its growth in order and civilization, actual experience has shown that such interference can only come efficiently by one nation, and not by many. Untried theorists, or even practical men who are influenced by national jealousy and are untaught by the lessons of history, have a curious fondness for trying a system of joint interference or joint control. Americans forget, for instance, that we have actually tried this system and found it completely wanting, in the case of Samoa. We made an arrangement with England and Germany by which there was a joint protectorate over Samoa. The system worked wretchedly. It resulted badly for the natives; it was a fruitful source of bickering among the three Powers. Then we abandoned the system, each Power took its own sphere, and since then we have gotten along admirably; the only trouble in connection with Samoa which arose during my entire administration as President came because we were not able to grant the earnest request of the natives that we should take real and complete possession of our part of the islands and really regulate the government instead of leaving it so much in the hands of the native chiefs.
In the case of the Philippines, there were just two things that we could do which would have been worse than leaving them under Spanish rule. One of these would have been to turn the islands adrift to manage themselves. The second would have been to try to manage them by a joint arrangement of various Powers. Any such arrangement in the case of as rich and valuable islands as the Philippines would very possibly have led to war between the great Powers. It would have certainly led to jealousy, bickerings, and intrigue among them, would have held the islands back, would have prevented any development along the lines of progress and civilization, and would have insured an endless succession of devastating little civil wars.
When all that is necessary as regards a small State is to protect it from external aggression, then the great Powers can with advantage join to guarantee its integrity. When anything more is necessary to try to develop the people and civilization, to put down disorder, to stop civil war and secure justice, then a combination of Powers offers the worst possible way of securing the object sought to be achieved. Indeed, under such circumstances it is probably better for the State concerned to be under the control of a single Power, even though this Power has not high ideals, rather than under the control of three or four Powers which may possess high ideals but which are put into such an impossible situation that they are certain to be riven asunder by jealousy, distrust, and intrigue, and to do damage rather than good to the people whom they are supposed to protect.
A Remedy for Some Forms of Selfish Legislation
The August number of the “World’s Work” contains an article which is of interest to all who are concerned in the vital subject to which we give the somewhat foggy title of “Political Reform.” The article, for obvious reasons anonymous, is written by a member of Congress who, the editors of the “World’s Work” say, has served for more than ten years in the House of Representatives, has acted on many important committees, and has been successful in “getting things” for his constituency. The article is described as “showing the reason why the ‘pork-barrel,’ special tariff favors, and private pension bills become law,” the reason being, to quote the words of the author, that “the dictum of the constituency to the Congressmen is, ‘Get all you can for US.’ There are no restrictions placed upon his method of getting it.... Until the American people themselves become more National and less local, until constituencies cease to regard their Congressmen as solicitors at the National Treasury, Congress will continue to enact iniquitous groups of local favors into National legislation.”
This serious charge against the American people—for which there is unquestionably altogether too much justification—the author proceeds to substantiate by relating some of his own experiences with constituents which, however surprising they may seem to the general reader, will seem almost commonplace to all who know how the average American constituency does in actual practice treat its Congressman.
The writer sets forth the fact that, in the first place, ninety per cent of the letters which a Congressman receives are requests for special favors to be obtained in some way or other, directly or indirectly, from the United States Treasury. For instance, while the Payne-Aldrich Tariff Law was under discussion, this particular Congressman received in May, 1909, the following letter from the secretary of a powerful commercial association in his district:
I have been instructed by the board of directors of this association to advise you that at special meeting May 20, a resolution, copy of which is enclosed, was unanimously adopted, urging our Representatives in Congress to use every endeavor to have the present tariff on [mentioning three of the products of the industries referred to] increased one cent per pound and the present tariff on [mentioning the other two products] increased half a cent per pound. I wish to further advise you that we have heard from Senator —— and he informs us that he will take care of this matter in the Senate.