Many of the gun-boats were much smaller than those just mentioned, trusting mainly to their sweeps for motive power, and each relying for offence on one long pivot gun, a 12- or 18-pounder. In the Chesapeake there was a quite a large number of these small gallies, with a few of the larger kind, and here it was thought that by acting together in flotillas the gun-boats might in fine weather do considerable damage to the enemy's fleet by destroying detached vessels, instead of confining themselves to the more humble tasks in which their brethren elsewhere were fairly successful. At this period Denmark, having lost all her larger ships of war, was confining herself purely to gun-brigs. These were stout little crafts, with heavy guns, which, acting together, and being handled with spirit and skill, had on several occasions in calm weather captured small British sloops, and had twice so injured frigates as to make their return to Great Britain necessary; while they themselves had frequently been the object of successful cutting-out expeditions. Congress hoped that our gun-boats would do as well as the Danish; but for a variety of reasons they failed utterly in every serious attack that they made on a man-of-war, and were worse than useless for all but the various subordinate employments above mentioned. The main reason for this failure was in the gun-boats themselves. They were utterly useless except in perfectly calm weather, for in any wind the heavy guns caused them to careen over so as to make it difficult to keep them right side up, and impossible to fire. Even in smooth water they could not be fought at anchor, requiring to be kept in position by means of sweeps; and they were very unstable, the recoil of the guns causing them to roll so as to make it difficult to aim with any accuracy after the first discharge, while a single shot hitting one put it hors de combat. This last event rarely happened, however, for they were not often handled with any approach to temerity, and, on the contrary, usually made their attacks at a range that rendered it as impossible to inflict as to receive harm. It does not seem as if they were very well managed; but they were such ill-conditioned craft that the best officers might be pardoned for feeling uncomfortable in them. Their operations throughout the war offer a painfully ludicrous commentary on Jefferson's remarkable project of having our navy composed exclusively of such craft.
The first aggressive attempt made with the gun-boats was characteristically futile. On June 20th 15 of them, under Captain Tarbell, attacked the Junon, 38, Captain Sanders, then lying becalmed in Hampton Roads, with the Barossa, 36, and Laurestinus, 24, near her. The gun-boats, while still at very long range, anchored, and promptly drifted round so that they couldn't shoot. Then they got under way, and began gradually to draw nearer to the Junon. Her defence was very feeble; after some hasty and ill-directed vollies she endeavored to beat out of the way. But meanwhile, a slight breeze having sprung up, the Barossa, Captain Sherriff, approached near enough to take a hand in the affair, and at once made it evident that she was a more dangerous foe than the Junon, though a lighter ship. As soon as they felt the effects of the breeze the gun-boats became almost useless and, the Barossa's fire being animated and well aimed, they withdrew. They had suffered nothing from the Junon, but during the short period she was engaged, the Barossa had crippled one boat and slightly damaged another; one man was killed and two wounded. The Barossa escaped unscathed and the Junon was but slightly injured. Of the combatants, the Barossa was the only one that came off with credit, the Junon behaving, if any thing, rather worse than the gun-boats. There was no longer any doubt as to the amount of reliance to be placed on the latter. [Footnote: Though the flotilla men did nothing in the boats, they acted with the most stubborn bravery at the battle of Bladensburg. The British Lieutenant Graig, himself a spectator, thus writes of their deeds on that occasion ("Campaign at Washington," p. 119). "Of the sailors, however, it would be injustice not to speak in the terms which their conduct merits. They were employed as gunners, and not only did they serve their guns with a quickness and precision which astonished their assailants, but they stood till some of them were actually bayoneted with fuses in their hands; nor was it till their leader was wounded and taken, and they saw themselves deserted on all sides by the soldiers, that they quitted the field." Certainly such men could not be accused of lack of courage. Something else is needed to account for the failure of the gun-boat system.]
On June 20, 1813, a British force of three 74's, one 64, four frigates, two sloops, and three transports was anchored off Craney Island. On the north-west side of this island was a battery of 18-pounders, to take charge of which Captain Cassin, commanding the naval forces at Norfolk, sent ashore one hundred sailors of the Constellation, under the command of Lieutenants Neale, Shubrick, and Saunders, and fifty marines under Lieutenant Breckenbridge.[Footnote: Letter of Captain John Cassin, June 23, 1813.] On the morning of the 22d they were attacked by a division of 15 boats, containing 700 men, [Footnote: James, vi, 337.] seamen, marines, chasseurs, and soldiers of the 102d regiment, the whole under the command of Captain Pechell, of the San Domingo, 74. Captain Hanchett led the attack in the Diadem's launch. The battery's guns were not fired till the British were close in, when they opened with destructive effect. While still some seventy yards from the guns the Diadem's launch grounded, and the attack was checked. Three of the boats were now sunk by shot, but the water was so shallow that they remained above water; and while the fighting was still at its height, some of the Constellation's crew, headed by Midshipman Tatnall, waded out and took possession of them. [Footnote: "Life of Commodore Josiah Tatnall," by Charles C. Jones, Jr. (Savannah, 1878), p. 17.] A few of their crew threw away their arms and came ashore with their captors; others escaped to the remaining boats, and immediately afterward the flotilla made off in disorder having lost 91 men. The three captured barges were large, strong boats, one called the Centipede being fifty feet long, and more formidable than many of the American gun-vessels. The Constellation's men deserve great credit for their defence, but the British certainly did not attack with their usual obstinacy. When the foremost boats were sunk, the water was so shallow and the bottom so good that the Americans on shore, as just stated, at once waded out to them; and if in the heat of the fight Tatnall and his seamen could get out to the boats, the 700 British ought to have been able to get in to the battery, whose 150 defenders would then have stood no chance. [Footnote: James comments on this repulse as "a defeat as discreditable to those that caused it as honorable to those that suffered in it." "Unlike most other nations, the Americans in particular, the British, when engaged in expeditions of this nature, always rest their hopes of success upon valor rather than on numbers." These comments read particularly well when it is remembered that the assailants outnumbered the assailed in the proportion of 5 to 1. It is monotonous work to have to supplement a history by a running commentary on James' mistakes and inventions; but it is worth while to prove once for all the utter unreliability of the author who is accepted in Great Britain as the great authority about the war. Still, James is no worse than his compeers. In the American Coggeshall's "History of Privateers," the misstatements are as gross and the sneers in as poor taste—the British, instead of the Americans, being the objects.]
On July 14, 1813, the two small vessels Scorpion and Asp, the latter commanded by Mr. Sigourney, got under way from out of the Yeocomico Creek, [Footnote: Letter of Midshipman McClintock, July 15, 1813.] and at 10 A.M. discovered in chase the British brig-sloops Contest, Captain James Rattray, and Mohawk, Captain Henry D. Byng. [Footnote: James, vi, 343.] The Scorpion beat up the Chesapeake, but the dull-sailing Asp had to reenter the creek; the two brigs anchored off the bar and hoisted out their boats, under the command of Lieutenant Rodger C. Curry; whereupon the Asp cut her cable and ran up the creek some distance. Here she was attacked by three boats, which Mr. Sigourney and his crew of twenty men, with two light guns, beat off; but they were joined by two others, and the five carried the Asp, giving no quarter. Mr. Sigourney and 10 of his men were killed or wounded, while the British also suffered heavily, having 4 killed and 7 (including Lieutenant Curry) wounded. The surviving Americans reached the shore, rallied under Midshipman H. McClintock (second in command), and when the British retired after setting the Asp on fire, at once boarded her, put out the flames, and got her in fighting order; but they were not again molested.
On July 29th, while the Junon, 38, Captain Sanders, and Martin, 18, Captain Senhouse, were in Delaware Bay, the latter grounded on the outside of Crow's Shoal; the frigate anchored within supporting distance, and while in this position the two ships were attacked by the American flotilla in those waters, consisting of eight gun-boats, carrying each 25 men and one long 32, and two heavier block-sloops, [Footnote: Letter of Lieutenant Angus, July 30, 1813.] commanded by Lieutenant Samuel Angus. The flotilla kept at such a distance that an hour's cannonading did no damage whatever to anybody; and during that time gun-boat No. 121, Sailing-master Shead, drifted a mile and a half away from her consorts. Seeing this the British made a dash at her, in 7 boats, containing 140 men, led by Lieutenant Philip Westphal. Mr. Shead anchored and made an obstinate defence, but at the first discharge the gun's pintle gave way, and the next time it was fired the gun-carriage was almost torn to pieces. He kept up a spirited fire of small arms, in reply to the boat-carronades and musketry of the assailants; but the latter advanced steadily and carried the gun-boat by boarding, 7 of her people being wounded, while 7 of the British were killed and 13 wounded. [Footnote: Letter of Mr. Shead. Aug. 5, 1813.] The defence of No. 121 was very creditable, but otherwise the honor of the day was certainly with the British; whether because the gun-boats were themselves so worthless or because they were not handled boldly enough, they did no damage, even to the grounded sloop, that would seem to have been at their mercy. [Footnote: The explanation possibly lies in the fact that the gun-boats had worthless powder. In the Naval Archives there is a letter from Mr. Angus ("Masters' Commandant Letters," 1813, No. 3: see also No. 91), in which he says that the frigate's shot passed over them, while theirs could not even reach the sloop. He also encloses a copy of a paper, signed by the other gun-boat officers, which runs: "We, the officers of the vessels comprising the Delaware flotilla, protest against the powder as being unfit for service.">[
On June 18th the American brig-sloop Argus, commanded by Lieutenant William Henry Allen, late first of the United States, sailed from New York for France, with Mr. Crawford, minister for that country, aboard, and reached L'Orient on July 11th, having made one prize on the way. On July 14th she again sailed, and cruised in the chops of the Channel, capturing and burning ship after ship, and creating the greatest consternation among the London merchants; she then cruised along Cornwall and got into St. George's Channel, where the work of destruction went on. The labor was very severe and harassing, the men being able to get very little rest. [Footnote: Court of Inquiry into loss of Argus, 1815.] On the night of August 13th, a brig laden with wine from Oporto was captured and burnt, and unluckily many of the crew succeeded in getting at some of the cargo. At 5 A.M. on the 14th a large brig-of-war was discovered standing down under a cloud of canvas. [Footnote: Letter of Lieutenant Watson, March 2, 1815.] This was the British brig-sloop Pelican, Captain John Fordyce Maples, which, from information received at Cork three days previous, had been cruising especially after the Argus, and had at last found her; St. David's Head bore east five leagues (lat. 52° 15' N. and 5° 50' W.)
The small, fine-lined American cruiser, with her lofty masts and long spars, could easily have escaped from her heavier antagonist: but Captain Allen had no such intention, and, finding he could not get the weather-gage, he shortened sail and ran easily along on the starboard tack, while the Pelican came down on him with the wind (which was from the south) nearly aft. At 6 A.M. the Argus wore and fired her port guns within grape distance, the Pelican responding with her starboard battery, and the action began with great spirit on both sides. [Footnote: Letter of Captain Maples to Admiral Thornborough, Aug. 14, 1813.] At 6.04 a round shot carried off Captain Allen's leg, inflicting a mortal wound, but he stayed on deck till he fainted from loss of blood. Soon the British fire carried away the main-braces, main-spring-stay, gaff, and try-sail mast of the Argus; the first lieutenant, Mr. Watson, was wounded in the head by a grape-shot and carried below; the second lieutenant, Mr. U. H. Allen (no relation of the captain), continued to fight the ship with great skill. The Pelican's fire continued very heavy, the Argus losing her spritsail-yard and most of the standing rigging on the port side of the foremast. At 6.14 Captain Maples bore up to pass astern of his antagonist, but Lieutenant Allen luffed into the wind and threw the main-top-sail aback, getting into a beautiful raking position [Footnote: Letter of Lieutenant Watson.]; had the men at the guns done their duty as well as those on the quarter-deck did theirs, the issue of the fight would have been very different; but, as it was, in spite of her favorable position, the raking broadside of the Argus did little damage. Two or three minutes afterward the Argus lost the use of her after-sails through having her preventer-main-braces and top-sail tie shot away, and fell off before the wind, when the Pelican at 6.18 passed her stern, raking her heavily, and then ranged up on her starboard quarter. In a few minutes the wheel-ropes and running-rigging of every description were shot away, and the Argus became utterly unmanageable. The Pelican continued raking her with perfect impunity, and at 6.35 passed her broadside and took a position on her starboard bow, when at 6.45 the brigs fell together, and the British "were in the act of boarding when the Argus struck her colors," [Footnote: Letter of Captain Maples.] at 6.45 A.M. The Pelican carried, besides her regular armament, two long 6's as stern-chasers, and her broadside weight of metal was thus: [Footnote: James, vi, 320.]
1 X 6 1 X 6 1 X 12 8 X 32
or 280 lbs. against the Argus':