Afghanistan and the Anglo-Russian Dispute

by Theophilus F. Rodenbough

Here we may glance at the method by which Russia took firmer root on the shores of the Caspian, and established a commercial link with the Khivan region. In 1869 a military post and seaport was planted at Krasnovodsk, on that point of the east shore of the Caspian, which presents the greatest facilities for shipping, and as a base of operations against the Turcomans, who were at that time very troublesome. Several military expeditions set out from this point, and every year detachments of troops were despatched to keep the roads open toward Khiva, the Kepet Dagh, or the banks of the Attrek. Within five years (1870-'75) the nomads living within the routes named had become "good Turcomans," carried the Czar's mails to Khiva, and furnished the Krasnovodsk-Khivan caravans with camels and drivers. But the colonization scheme on the lower Caspian had once more brought the Russians to the Persian boundary. In 1869 the Shah had been rather officiously assured that Russia would not think of going below the line of the Attrek; yet, as Colonel Veniukoff shows, she now regrets having committed herself, and urges "geographical ignorance" of the locality when the assurance was given, and the fact that part of her restless subjects, on the Attrek, pass eight months of the year in Russian territory and four in "so-called" Persia; it is therefore not difficult to imagine the probable change on the map of that quarter.

The march continued toward Khiva, and after the usual iron-hand-in-velvet-glove introduction, General Kaufmann in 1873 pounced upon that important khanate, and thus added another to the jewels of the Empire. Nominally, Khiva is independent, but nevertheless collects and pays to Russia a considerable contribution annually.

In 1868 Russia seized Samarcand, and established over the khanate of Bokhara a similar supervision to that in Khiva. As the distinguished Russian already quoted remarks: "The programme of the political existence of Bokhara as a separate sovereignty was accorded to her by us in the shape of two treaties, in 1868 and 1873, which defined her subordinate relation to Russia. But no one looks at these acts as the treaties of an equal with an equal. They are instructions in a polite form, or programmes given by the civilized conqueror to the conquered barbarians, and the execution of which is guaranteed by the immediate presence of a military force."

The district of Khokand, whose ruler, Khudoyar Khan, submitted himself to Russia in 1867, was for a number of years nominally independent, but becoming disturbed by domestic dissensions, was ultimately annexed under the name of the Fergana Province.

To this point we have followed Colonel Veniukoff's account of the Russian advance. It will doubtless interest the reader to continue the narrative from an English view, exceptionally accurate and dispassionate in its nature.

In a lecture before the Royal United Service Institution in London, May 16, 1884, Lieut.-General Sir Edward Hamley, of the British Army, discussed the Central Asian question before an audience comprising such Indian experts as Sir Henry Rawlinson, Lord Napier of Magdala, and Mr. Charles Marvin, and many distinguished officers, including Lord Chelmsford, Sir F. Haines, and Colonel Malleson. Among other things, General Hamley said:

"Probably England has never been quite free, during the present century, from some degree of anxiety caused by the steady, gradual approaches of Russia through Central Asia toward India. It was seen that where her foot was planted it never went back. It was seen that with forces comparatively small she never failed to effect any conquest she was bent on, and that the conquest, once effected, was final. This security in possession was owing in great measure to the fact that the governments she displaced were bad governments, and that she substituted one far better in itself and of a simplicity which was well adapted to the people with whom she was dealing. She aimed mainly at three things--the establishment of order and of confidence and the obtaining of some return for her own heavy expenses. From the establishment of order and of confidence sprang a prosperity which enabled her to obtain a certain revenue, though entirely inadequate to her expenditure. Thus we beheld her pressing solidly on, and we knew not where she might stop. Pretexts, such as it was difficult to find a flaw in, were never wanting on which to ground a fresh absorption of territory. And seeing behind this advance a vast country--almost a continent--which was not merely a great Asiatic Power, but a great European State, under autocratic, irresponsible rule, with interests touching ours at many points, it is not to be wondered at that we watched with anxiety her progress as she bore steadily down toward our Indian frontier."

General Hamley says that England became particularly suspicious of Russia in 1867 when she absorbed Turkestan, and this feeling was intensified in 1878, while the Treaty of Berlin was still pending. General Kaufmann assembled a small army of about 12,000 men and thirty-two guns on the frontier of Bokhara, and although upon the signing of the treaty all threatening movements ceased, yet the British commander then operating in Afghanistan knew that Kaufmann had proposed to march in the direction of Kabul, and menace the British frontier.

It has ever been the practice of Russia, in her schemes of aggrandizement, to combine her diplomatic with her military machinery; but, unlike other nations, the ambassador has generally been subordinate to the general.

At the time that General Kaufmann sheathed his sword under the influence of the Treaty of Berlin, in 1878, there remained another representative of Russia--General Stolietoff--who had been quietly negotiating with the Ameer of Afghanistan, Shere Ali, the terms of a "Russian treaty," whose characteristics have already been described. Hearing of this, the English Ambassador at St. Petersburg questioned the Russian Minister, who answered him "that no mission had been, nor was intended to be, sent to Kabul, either by the Imperial Government or by General Kaufmann." This denial was given on July 3d, the day after Stolietoff and his mission had started from Samarcand. After the envoy's arrival at Kabul, another remonstrance met with the reply that the mission was "of a professional nature and one of simple courtesy," and was not, therefore, inconsistent with the pacific assurances already given. The real nature of this mission became known from papers found by General Roberts at Kabul in 1879. These showed that Shere Ali had been invited to form a close alliance with the Russian Government. General Kaufmann had advised Shere Ali to try and stir up disaffection among the Queen's Indian subjects, promising to aid him, eventually, with troops. Finding that this scheme was impracticable at the moment, Russia dropped the Ameer, who fled from the scene of his misfortunes, and died soon after.