[102] Ibid.
[103] Principia Philosophiæ, Pars IV. Sect. 196.—p. 190, 191. Amst. 1664.
[104] On the Intellectual Powers, Essay II. c. 8.
[105] Clerici Pneumatologia, Sect. i. cap. v. subsect. 10.
[106] Tentamen Novum Metaphysicum, Sect. xxxvii.—Groningæ, 1725.
[LECTURE XXVII.]
EXAMINATION OF DR REID'S SUPPOSED CONFUTATION OF IDEALISM, CONCLUDED.
My last Lecture, Gentlemen, brought to a conclusion the remarks which I had to offer on the Sense of Touch, and particularly on the manner in which I supposed the mind to acquire its knowledge of external things.
With this very important question of the existence of matter, the name of Dr Reid is intimately connected, to whom the highest praise is usually given, for his supposed confutation of all scepticism on the subject; as if he had truly established, by argument, the existence of a material world. And yet, I confess, that with all my respect for that excellent philosopher, I do not discover, in his reasonings on the subject, any ground for the praise which has been given. The evidence for a system of external things,—at least, the sort of evidence for which he contends,—was not merely the same, but was felt also to be precisely the same, before he wrote as afterwards. Nay, I may add, that the force of the evidence,—if that term can be justly applied to this species of belief,—was admitted, in its fullest extent, by the very sceptic, against whom chiefly his arguments were directed.