Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind (Vol. 1 of 3)

by Thomas Brown

	PAGE.
LECTURE I.
Introduction,	[9]
LECTURE II.
Relation of the Philosophy of Mind to the Sciences in general,	[20]
LECTURE III.
Relation of the Philosophy of Mind to the Intellectual Sciencesand Arts,	[35]
LECTURE IV.
Relation of the Philosophy of Mind to the Cultivation ofMoral Feeling,	[50]
LECTURE V.
On the Nature of Physical Inquiry in general,	[64]
LECTURE VI.
On the Nature of Physical Inquiry in general,	[80]
LECTURE VII.
On Power, Cause, and Effect,	[98]
LECTURE VIII.
On Hypothesis and Theory,	[113]
LECTURE IX.
Recapitulation of the Four preceding Lectures,	[129]
Application of the Laws of Physical Inquiry to the Study ofMind,	[135]
LECTURE X.
Continuation of the same Subject,	[144]
LECTURE XI.
Continuation of the same Subject,	[162]
On the Phenomena of Mind in General,	[167]
On Consciousness,	[169]
LECTURE XII.
On Consciousness,	[178]
On Mental Identity,	[180]
Identity irreconcilable with the Doctrine of Materialism,	[180]
Distinction between Personal and Mental Identity,	[182]
Shaftesbury's Opinion of Identity,	[184]
Objections to the Doctrine of Mental Identity,	[185]
LECTURE XIII.
On the Direct Evidence of Mental Identity,	[192]
Objections answered,	[204]
LECTURE XIV.
Continuation of the same Subject,	[207]
LECTURE XV.
Continuation of the same Subject,	[224]
Opinion of Mr Locke respecting Identity,	[230]
Source of his Paradox respecting it,	[234]
Reflections suggested by his Paradox,	[235]
LECTURE XVI.
On the Classification of the Phenomena of Mind,	[239]
LECTURE XVII.
Continuation of the same Subject,	[254]
On the External Affections of Mind, in general,	[262]
On the less Definite External Affections,	[264]
LECTURE XVIII.
On the more Definite External Affections,	[269]
LECTURE XIX.
On the Corporeal Part of the Process, in Sensation,	[283]
LECTURE XX.
Particular Consideration of our Sensations,	[298]
On Smell,	[300]
On Taste,	[301]
On Hearing,	[305]
LECTURE XXI.
Continuation of the same Subject,	[312]
On Touch,	[326]
LECTURE XXII.
On the Feelings ascribed to the Sense of Touch,	[328]
Analysis of these Feelings,	[330]
LECTURE XXIII.
Continuation of the same Subject,	[345]
LECTURE XXIV.
Continuation of the same Subject,	[358]
LECTURE XXV.
On the Distinction between Sensation and Perception,	[379]
On the Primary and Secondary Qualities of Matter,	[384]
LECTURE XXVI.
On Dr. Reid's supposed Confutation of the Ideal System,	[395]
Hypothesis of the Peripatetics regarding Perception,	[396]
Opinion of Locke—Hobbes—Des Cartes—Arnauld—Le Clerc De Crousaz, regarding Perception,	[399]
LECTURE XXVII.
Examination of Dr Reid's supposed Confutation of Idealism	[411]
LECTURE XXVIII.
Conclusion of the Subject,	[427]
On Vision,—Analysis of the Feelings ascribed to it,	[431]
LECTURE XXIX.
Continuation of the same Subject,	[442]
LECTURE XXX.
History of Opinions regarding Perception,	[459]
Opinion of the Peripatetics,	[462]
—— of Des Cartes,	[464]
—— of Malebranche,	[469]
—— of St Austin,	[472]
LECTURE XXXI.
—— of Leibnitz,	[474]
On the External Affections combined with Desire,	[479]
Attention,	[482]
LECTURE XXXII.
Continuation of the Same Subject,	[490]
On the Internal Affections of Mind,	[497]
On the Classification of these Affections,	[500]
LECTURE XXXIII.
On Locke, Condillac, and Reid's Classification of the MentalPhenomena,	[505]
New Classification of the Internal Affections,	[518]
LECTURE XXXIV.
On Simple Suggestion,	[523]
Advantages resulting from the Principle of Suggestion,	[526]
On Mr Hume's Classification of the Associating or SuggestingPrinciples,	[532]

LECTURES
ON THE
PHILOSOPHY OF THE HUMAN MIND.

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[LECTURE I.—(Introduction.)]

Gentlemen,

The subject on which we are about to enter, and which is to engage, I trust, a considerable portion of your attention for many months, is the Philosophy of the Human Mind,—not that speculative and passive philosophy only, which inquires into the nature of our intellectual part, and the mysterious connexion of this with the body which it animates, but that practical science, which relates to the duties, and the hopes, and the great destiny of man, and which, even in analyzing the powers of his understanding, and tracing all the various modifications of which it is individually susceptible, views it chiefly as a general instrument of good—an instrument by which he may have the dignity of co-operating with his beneficent Creator, by spreading to others the knowledge, and virtue, and happiness, which he is qualified at once to enjoy, and to diffuse.

“Philosophy,” says Seneca, “is not formed for artificial show or delight. It has a higher office than to free idleness of its languor, and wear away and amuse the long hours of a day. It is that which forms and fashions the soul, which gives to life its disposition and order, which points out what it is our duty to do, what it is our duty to omit. It sits at the helm, and in a sea of peril, directs the course of those who are wandering through the waves.” “Non est philosophia populare artificium, nec ostentationi paratum; non in verbis sed in rebus est. Nec in hoc adhibetur ut aliqua oblectatione consumatur dies, ut dematur otio nausea. Animum format et fabricat, vitam disponit, actiones regit, agenda et omittenda demonstrat, sedit ad gubernaculum, et per ancipitia fluctuantium dirigit cursum.” Ep. 16.

Such, unquestionably, is the great practical object of all philosophy. If it increase the happiness and virtue of human kind, it must be allowed to have fulfilled, to human beings, the noblest of earthly ends. The greatness of this primary object, however, perhaps fixed too exclusively the attention of the moral inquirers of antiquity, who, in considering man as capable of virtue and happiness, and in forming nice and subtle distinctions as to his supreme good, and the means by which he might attain it, seem almost to have neglected the consideration of his intellectual nature, as an object of mere physical science. Hence it happens, that, while the systems of ancient philosophy exhibit, in many instances, a dignity of moral sentiment as high, or almost as high, as the unassisted reason of man could be supposed to reach, and the defects of which we perhaps discover only by the aid of that purer light, which was not indulged to them, they can scarcely be said to have left us a single analysis of complex phenomena of thought and feeling. By some of them, indeed, especially by the Peripatetics and Stoics, much dialectic subtilty was employed in distinctions, that may seem at first to involve such an analysis; but even these distinctions were verbal, or little more than verbal. The analytical investigation of the mind, in all its complexity of perceptions, and thoughts, and emotions, was reserved to form almost a new science in the comprehensive philosophy of far later years.

If, however, during the flourishing periods of Greek and Roman letters, this intellectual analysis was little cultivated, the department of the philosophy of the mind, which relates to practical ethics, was enriched, as I have said, by moral speculations the most splendid and sublime. In those ages, indeed, and in countries in which no revealed will of heaven had pointed out and sanctioned one unerring rule of right, it is not to be wondered at, that, to those who were occupied in endeavouring to trace and ascertain such a rule in the moral nature of man, all other mental inquiries should have seemed comparatively insignificant. It is even pleasing thus to find the most important of all inquiries regarded as truly the most important, and minds of the highest genius, in reflecting on their own constitution, so richly diversified and adorned with an almost infinite variety of forms of thought, discovering nothing, in all this splendid variety, so worthy of investigation, as the conduct which it is fitting for man to pursue.