In examining these and other occupations of the Quakers, with a view of seeing how far the objections which have been advanced against them are valid, I own I have a difficult task to perform. For what standard shall I fix upon, or what limits shall I draw upon this occasion? The objections are founded in part upon the principle, that Quakers ought not to sell those things, of which their own practice shows that they disapprove. But shall I admit this principle without any limitation or reserve? Shall I say without any reserve, that a Quaker-woman, who discards the use of a simple ribbon from her dress, shall not sell it to another female, who has been constantly in the habit of using it, and this without any detriment to her mind? Shall I say again, without any reserve, that a Quaker-man who discards the use of black cloth, shall not sell a yard of it to another? And, if I should say so, where am I to stop? Shall I not be obliged to go over all the colours in his shop, and object to all but the brown and the drab? Shall I say again, without any reserve, that a Quaker cannot sell any thing which is innocent in itself, without inquiring of the buyer its application or its use? And if I should say so, might I not as well say, that no Quaker can be in trade? I fear that to say this, would be to get into a labyrinth, out of which there would be no clew to guide us.
Difficult, however, as the task may seem, I think I may lay down three positions, which will probably not be denied, and which, if admitted, will assist us in the determination of the question before us. The first of these is, that no Quaker can be concerned in the sale of a thing, which is evil in itself. Secondly, that he cannot encourage the sale of an article, which he knows to be essentially, or very generally, that is, in seven cases out of ten, productive of evil. And, thirdly, that he cannot sell things which he has discarded from his own use, if he has discarded them on a belief that they are specifically forbidden by Christianity, or that they are morally injurious to the human mind.
If these positions be acknowledged, they will give ample latitude for the condemnation of many branches of trade.
A Quaker-bookseller, according to these positions, cannot sell a profane or improper book.
A Quaker spirit-merchant cannot sell his liquor but to those whom he believes will use it in moderation, or medicinally, or on proper occasions.
A Quaker, who is a manufacturer of cotton, cannot exercise his occupation but upon an amended plan.
A Quaker-silversmith cannot deal in any splendid ornaments of the person.
The latter cannot do this for the following reasons. The Quakers reject all such ornaments, because they believe them to be specifically condemned by Christianity. The words of the apostles Paul and Peter, have been quoted both by Fox, Penn, Barclay, and others, upon this subject. But surely, if the Christian religion positively condemns the use of them in one, it condemns the use of them in another. And how can any one, professing this religion, sell that, the use of which he believes it to have forbidden? The Quakers also have rejected all ornaments of the person, as we find by their own writers, on account of their immoral tendency; or because they are supposed to be instrumental in puffing up the creature, or in the generation of vanity and pride. But if they have rejected the use of them upon this principle, they are bound, as Christians, to refuse to sell them to others. Christian love, and the Christian obligation to do as we would wish to be done by, positively enjoin this conduct. For no man, consistently with this divine law and obligation, can sow the seeds of moral disease in his neighbour's mind.
And here I may observe, that though there are trades, which may be innocent in themselves, yet Quakers may make them objectionable by the manner in which they may conduct themselves in disposing of the articles which belong to them. They can never pass them off, as other people do, by the declaration that they are the fashionable articles of the day. Such words ought never to come out of Quakers' mouths; not so much because their own lives are a living protest against the fashions of the world, as because they cannot knowingly be instrumental in doing a moral injury to others. For it is undoubtedly the belief of the Quakers, as I had occasion to observe in a former volume, that the following of such fashions, begets a worldly spirit, and that in proportion as men indulge this spirit, they are found to follow the loose and changeable morality of the world, instead of the strict and steady morality of the gospel.
That some such positions as these may be fixed upon for the farther regulation of commercial concerns among the Quakers, is evident, when we consider the example of many estimable persons in this society.