The South American Republics, Part 2 of 2

by Thomas Cleland Dawson

BAKER ON HORSEBACK, LIMA.

Although less infected than any other province, being the one where the Spanish bureaucracy was most numerous and powerful, even in Peru Creole society was honeycombed with revolutionary sentiment. The plots to secure autonomy came to Abascal's notice, and with the first overt act he pounced upon the plotters. Two republican visionaries, named Ubaldo and Aguilar, were the first martyrs for liberty. A few learned and respected professors in Lima dared to speculate on the future of America as affected by recent events in Europe, but the viceroy summoned them to his presence and his stern warnings silenced them. Two young lawyers held evening parties where politics were discussed by the rising youth of the capital. One of the ringleaders was condemned to ten years' imprisonment and the other sent to Spain, while several more were shipped off to southern Chile. Although the liberals continued to meet and conspire, and the priests were particularly active, for the present nothing definite came of all this.

Even the news of the deposition of the Spanish authorities at Quito, La Paz, and Charcas, in 1809, met with no response from the liberals at Lima. Abascal banished Riva Aguëro, their leader; his expeditions quickly suppressed the insurrections in Bolivia and Ecuador; and he redoubled his exertions to strengthen his army, recruiting among the Indians and half-breeds, and casting cannon. That his apprehensions were justified was proved by the events of the following year. In rapid succession Buenos Aires, northern New Granada, Caracas, and Santiago installed revolutionary juntas in place of the Spanish governors. The flames of revolution spread rapidly from these centres. Soon the Spanish officials were overthrown throughout Argentina, Chile, New Granada, and Venezuela; Bolivia and Ecuador were divided; and only Peru remained steady. But Abascal, resolute and unshaken, sent his armies against the triumphant revolutionists. The story of these campaigns is elsewhere told in connection with the countries where they were conducted. Though the patriots won some important victories, the loyal arms steadily advanced.

The redemption of Ecuador, Chile, and Bolivia had been mainly achieved with the resources which Abascal had picked up in South America. Until 1813 the people of the Peninsula were fighting desperately for national independence against the armies of the great Napoleon. No money or men could be spared for South America, and Abascal even managed to remit two million dollars to Spain in a single year—that of 1811. The armies with which his generals won their early victories were recruited almost entirely from the native population of Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador. In this struggle between Spaniard and Creole, the sturdy Indian of the plateau, who was dragged reluctant from his home, took no great interest, but any sympathy he felt was anti-Spanish. Nevertheless, so ingrained was the habit of obedience that when drilled and commanded by Spanish officers the half-breeds and Indians made excellent soldiers. During these six years, only one insurrection touched the territory of Peru proper. In 1814 the Indians of the Cuzco region rose under the leadership of one of their own caciques. The whole population of this, the most southern province of Peru, seems to have sympathised with the insurrection, and the same feeling extended over the Bolivian border. When Pumacagua, the Indian leader, advanced into Bolivia the people about La Paz joined him. But his army was an undisciplined, unarmed mob, only eight hundred of the twenty thousand who followed him possessing muskets. The Spanish general, Ramirez, hastened up from southern Bolivia; the Indians retreated over the Cordillera to Arequipa, where they were followed by the Spaniards. When Ramirez approached they again retired to the Bolivian plateau and the game of hide-and-seek ended with the horrible slaughter of Umachiri near Lake Titicaca.

In 1816 Abascal thought that his work was virtually completed and that he had earned the right to retire. Resistance was confined to Buenos Aires, to the thinly populated provinces of Tucuman and Cuyo, and to the banks of the Orinoco. The Argentine revolutionists were fighting among themselves, and that they must succumb before an advance in force from the Bolivian plateau appeared certain. The last act of his administration was to send out a fleet that compelled four Argentine ships which Admiral William Brown had brought around the Horn to withdraw to the Atlantic. He was succeeded by General Pezuela, a strategist of no mean abilities, who had borne a brilliant part in the Bolivian campaigns. The new viceroy straightway set about final preparations for a decisive advance across the pampas to Buenos Aires, but like a thunderbolt from a clear sky came the news that San Martin had made a sudden descent on Chile and won the battle of Chacabuco, annihilating the Spanish forces in that country. Pezuela saw himself obliged to begin a war to reduce Chile to obedience—an undertaking sure to be long and arduous, and in which he must encounter a general whose technical mastery of the profession had enabled him to create an army equal in discipline and effectiveness to any the viceroy might hope to throw against him. Pezuela abandoned the idea of an immediate Argentine campaign, and contented himself with maintaining a defensive attitude on the Bolivian frontier. He managed to repulse the armies which the Buenos Aireans sent against Bolivia, but it was in vain that he poured into Chile all the troops he could possibly spare. They were overthrown and annihilated in the decisive battle of Maipo. The viceroy sent for help to Spain and New Granada, but Venezuela had risen in insurrection under Bolivar and Paez; and it was impossible to spare any considerable number of troops from the Caribbean.

So long, however, as Spanish ships commanded the Pacific, Peru itself was safe from attack and the viceroy could securely await the arrival of reinforcements, and then attack Chile where he chose. Happily for the cause of South American independence, the war-ship of the beginning of the nineteenth century was not the expensive, complicated, slow-built machine it has since become. San Martin subordinated everything to the creation of a fleet. He forced the Argentine and Chilean governments to furnish him money, and his agents hastened to Europe and North America to buy ships and engage British and American captains. The Spaniards had four frigates and thirteen smaller ships, mounting in all three hundred and thirty guns, while San Martin was able to improvise only three frigates and as many brigs, mounting about one hundred and eighty cannon. This disparity of force was more than made up by the superior skill and experience of the foreign seamen. His admiral was Lord Cochrane, a Scotchman of noble family, but radical principles and adventurous disposition. A daring and reckless fighter, inventive and fertile in resource, he excelled in leading cutting-out expeditions and surprises. His marvellous activity and the capture by Blanco Encalada of their largest frigate dismayed the Spanish captains. When Cochrane sailed up the coast he found the Spaniards huddled under the guns of Callao castle. Returning to Valparaiso, he reported to San Martin that he could guarantee the unmolested transport of an army to any point on the Peruvian coast, and again sailed away for Callao. Though his attempt to destroy the Spaniards with fire-ships and rockets was unsuccessful, he captured and sacked several towns and terrorised the Spanish authorities all along the coast. San Martin after many disappointments and interruptions succeeded in preparing an army of invasion. For ten years war had desolated every other part of Spanish South America, while Peru had remained untouched. At length the conflict was to be transferred to the very centre of Spanish power.

On September 7, 1820, Lord Cochrane's fleet dropped anchor in a bay near Pisco, one hundred and fifty miles south of Lima. San Martin's army, numbering four thousand five hundred Argentines and Chileans, disembarked without opposition and occupied the fertile, vine-covered valleys. To undertake a campaign for the conquest of Peru with such a force seemed absurd. The viceroy's troops were five times as numerous; at Lima alone he had nearly nine thousand men; as many more were quartered at Cuzco, Jauja, and Arequipa, besides the six thousand veterans who guarded the Bolivian frontier against an invasion from Buenos Aires. The contest was, however, really not so unequal as it appeared. The Spanish armies were made up of native Peruvians and Bolivians, with some Venezuelans; sympathisers with the patriot cause swarmed in their ranks; many were waiting an opportunity to desert; the viceroy had little control over his generals, and the arrival of the Argentine army stimulated the activity of the patriot societies in the Peruvian cities.

From Pisco San Martin detached a force of twelve hundred men under the command of General Arenales, which ascended the Cordillera, roused the population of the plateaux immediately back of Lima, and defeated a detachment under General O'Reilly near Cerro de Pasco. The Indians rose, but when the Spaniards came up in force Arenales retired to the coast, leaving his allies to be mercilessly slaughtered. Meanwhile San Martin with the main body had taken ship at Pisco and, sailing north, landed at Huacho, seventy miles beyond the capital. His three thousand men could not hope to succeed in a direct attack on the city, defended by thrice that number of disciplined troops. On the other hand, the Spanish army was shut off from the sea; its base was now far back in the interior; its line of communication might be cut at any moment by other expeditions like that of Arenales. Lima and the coast towns were decidedly disaffected. San Martin's plan was to wait patiently until a rising should compel the Spaniards to retire to the interior, and then to organise the country and gather an army for the final campaign on the plateau. He kept, therefore, at a safe distance from the Spaniards; sent out detachments which scoured the country up to the walls of Lima; and entered into communication with the conspirators in the city. Crowds of young enthusiasts hastened out to join him; Cochrane daringly cut out the frigate Esmeralda under the very guns of Callao castle; an expedition sent to Tacna, on the extreme southern coast, was enthusiastically received; and numerous desertions from the Spanish army culminated in a battalion of Venezuelans coming over in a body. The viceroy was sorely puzzled. He hesitated to send his army to attack San Martin, fearing an insurrection or surprise during his absence, and knowing that defeat meant irretrievable ruin. Really only two courses of action lay open to the Spaniards—they must either fight San Martin, and the sooner the better, for he was becoming stronger every day—or they must abandon Lima and concentrate on their base in the mountains. The viceroy could not make up his mind to abandon the ancient capital, and he was reluctant to expose his family to the hardships of a guerilla warfare in the mountains.