Another example constitution is the “Pareto-Majority” rule. One first selects all Paretian improvements from the Status Quo. That is, those points where some advance while nobody loses. There may be more Paretian points, such as B > A and C > A, with the Status Quo as A. When there is no Paretian order between B and C, then it suffices to decide on these points by simple majority. Of course, with more than two points, majority voting can result into cycling, but that again means indifference, which could be settled by dice, by the chairperson, or by other creative ways.
See my home page and The Economics Pack for implementation of these rules in the program Mathematica. Little helps so much as a trying it out for yourself.
A reappraisal of the literature
Our discussion arrives at a conclusion that differs from the literature, and thus warrants a reappraisal of that literature. This reappraisal is not the topic of this paper, but some examples are useful.
(1) Note that the Tobin quote above was misleading. The problem with ‘unborn generations’ should not be mixed up with the Arrow difficulty. The Tobin problem actually can have a rather simple solution. It are the preferences of the currently living that matter, and what they prefer for the future unborn (which can also be based on a forecast of such preferences). These future preferences cannot logically be included, since they don’t exist yet.
(2) Arrow 1951 also stated:
“If consumers’ values can be represented by a wide range of individual orderings, the doctrine of voters’ sovereignty is incompatible with that of collective rationality.”
This is clearly inaccurate. The statement suggests that we have to adopt Arrow’s axioms, while the sensible thing is to reject these axioms and to adopt both voters’ sovereignty and collective rationality.
(3) One of the more interesting points made here is the distinction between the learning process and the end result. How should Arrow’s result be presented in the future ? Is it possible to maintain the teaching strategy to call the axioms ‘reasonable’, then have the students get into a fixture, and them let them find a way out ? It is good teaching practice ! However, in a Palgrave meant for a wider audience (or a general encyclopedia that even might be read by dictators), it might be improper to call Arrow’s axioms ‘reasonable’. It should be ‘seemingly reasonable’ at the least.
Note that the phrase then becomes less enchanting: