BI(1, 0) | truth. But we are concerned with durable cases for which implied control would be costly. We want to see deliberate rejection of the use of BI(0, 1). But this information is not present. Hence the endurance of 0 is caused by chance.
Table 16: States of the system
| J | J(1) | J(0) | s | meaning | ||
(1) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | given J = 1 | one chooses | s = 1 |
(2) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | given J = 1 | one chooses | s = 0 |
(3) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | given J = 0 | one chances at | s = 1 |
(4) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | given J = 0 | one chances at | s = 0 |
(5) | - | 1 | 0 | 1 | given J(1) = 1 | one chooses | s = 1 |
(6) | - | 1 | 0 | 0 | given J(0) = 0 | one chances at | s = 0 |
(7) | - | 0 | 1 | 1 | given J(1) = 0 | one chances at | s = 1 |
(8) | - | 0 | 1 | 0 | given J(0) = 1 | one chooses | s = 0 |
Note that a conscious choice is made when one does not use
the information to switch to the other state.
The special theorem
When we apply Lemma III, which is about information handling in general, to our subject matter of employment, we get what for this area amounts to a theorem. The first theorem is special since it assumes the BHL property.
Definition: There is wrong co-ordination if a SWF optimal change is blocked only by ‘lack of knowledge’ of the power elite while the information actually is available. (Co-ordination can go wrong on other counts too.)
Theorem BHL.2: Given theorem BHL.1:
(i) full employment results from conscious choice or chance
(ii) unemployment results from conscious choice or from wrong co-ordination
Proof: