[55] This was actually developed in Colignatus (1992b, 1995a). Dutch readers will benefit from Colignatus (1994b).

[56] See also the appendix on this book.

[57] This was known before, and in fact it is a good hypothesis that much of Euclid’s geometric knowledge had already been developed in ancient Egypt. The Greek contribution appears to be the notion of ‘proof’.

[58] Stephen Levinson - interview in NRC-Handelsblad, December 18 1999

[59] See also the appendix on this book.

[60] My understanding of quantum mechanics benefitted much from the papers on the site of Richard Gill, at http://www.math.uu.nl/people/gill/ and Gill (1996, 1997a & b), and Barndorf-Nielsen, Gill and Jupp (1998).

[61] Rutherford seems to have said: “If you need statistics, then you have the wrong model” (or something to this effect).

[62] Physicists might object to my use of the word ‘understanding’. Their modern method is to describe the mechanism or process, and to stay far from other ways of understanding. This is considered to be an advancement compared to earlier methods, where they apparently lost a lot of time trying to understand ‘force’ instead of simply modeling and measuring. But if this is understood, there is no reason to avoid the word ‘understanding’.

[63] See chapter 34 for deontic logic on this. Note that ‘God on Earth’ would be a situation of for some T, with x the vector of allocations to the agents, both observed and the optimal SWF point. Since there is no objective SWF, the concept of eternal bliss hangs in the air as well, though.

[64] There appears to exist a strange miscommunication between physics and mathematics. Gill quotes Suppes: “For those familiar with the applications of probability and mathematical statistics in mathematical psychology or mathematical economics, it is surprising indeed to read the treatements of probability even in the most respected texts of quantum mechanics. ... What is surprising is that the level of treatment in both terms of mathematical clarity and mathematical depth is surprisingly low. Probability concepts have a strange and awkward appearance in quantum mechanics, as if they had been brought within the framework of the theory only as an afterthought and with apology for their inclusion.” (P. Suppes, 1963). Gill suggests that this is still the case in 1998.