The railroads of the world are to-day worth from twenty-five to thirty thousand million dollars. This probably represents one-tenth of the total wealth of civilized nations, and one-quarter, if not one-third, of their invested capital. It is doubtful whether the aggregate plant used in all manufacturing industries can equal it in value. The capital engaged in banking is but a trifle beside it. The world's whole stock of money of every kind—gold, silver, and paper—would purchase only a third of its railroads.
Yet these facts by no means measure the whole importance of the railroad in the modern industrial system. The business methods of to-day are in one sense the direct result of improved means of transportation. The railroad enables the large establishment to reach the markets of the world with its products; it enables the large city to receive its food-supplies, if necessary, from a distance of hundreds or thousands of miles. And while it thus favors the concentration of capital, it is in itself an extreme type of this concentration. Almost every distinctive feature of modern business, whether good or bad, finds in railroad history at once its chief cause and its fullest development.
George Stephenson.
As befits a nineteenth century institution, the railroad dates from 1801. In that year Benjamin Outram built in the suburbs of London a short line of horse railroad—or tramroad, as it was named in honor of the inventor. Other works of the same kind followed in almost every succeeding year. They were recognized as a decided convenience, but nothing more. It was hard to imagine that a revolution in the world's transportation methods could grow out of this beginning. Least of all could such a result be foreseen in England, whose admirable canal system seemed likely to defy competition for centuries to come. And yet, curiously enough, it was a man wholly identified with canal business who first foresaw the future importance of the railroad. The Duke of Bridgewater had built canals when they were regarded as a hazardous speculation; but they proved a success, and in the early years of the century he was reaping a rich reward for his foresight. One of his fellow-shareholders took occasion to congratulate the Duke on the fact that their property was now the surest monopoly in the land, and was startled by the reply, "I see mischief in these—tramroads." The prophecy is all the more striking as coming from an enemy. Like Balaam, the Duke of Bridgewater had a pecuniary interest in cursing, but was so good a prophet that he had to tell the truth in spite of himself, even though his curse was thereby turned into a blessing.
It is hardly necessary to tell in detail how this prediction was realized. Thanks to the skill and perseverance of George Stephenson, the difficulties in the use of steam as a mode of propulsion were rapidly overcome. What was a doubtful experiment as late as 1815 had become an accomplished fact in 1830. The successful working of the Liverpool & Manchester Railway gave an impulse to similar enterprises all over the world. In 1835 there were 1,600 miles of railroad in operation—more than half of it in the United States. In 1845 the length of the world's railroads had increased to more than 10,000 miles; in 1855 it was 41,000 miles; in 1865, 90,000; in 1875, 185,000; in 1885, over 300,000.
There were perhaps a few men who foresaw this growth; there were almost none who foresaw the changes in organization and business methods with which it was attended. People at first thought of the railroad as merely an improved highway, which should charge tolls like a turnpike or canal, and on which the public should run cars of its own, independent of the railroad company itself. In many cases, especially in England, long sheets of tolls were published, based on the model of canal charters, and naming rates under which the use of the road-bed should be free to all. This plan soon proved impracticable. If independent owners tried to run trains over the same line, it involved a danger of collision and a loss of economy. The former evil could perhaps be avoided; the latter could not. The advantages of unity of management were so great that a road running its own trains could do a much larger business at lower rates than if ownership and carriage were kept separate. The old plan was as impracticable as it would be for a manufacturing company to own the buildings and engines, while each workman owned the particular piece of machinery which he handled. Almost all the technical advantages of the new methods would be lost for lack of system. The railroad company, to serve the public well, could not remain in the position of a turnpike or canal company, but must itself do the work of carriage.
This was not all. The same economy which resulted from the union of road and rolling-stock under one management was still further subserved by the consolidation of connecting lines. This change did not come about so suddenly as the other. Half a century had elapsed before it was fully carried out. At first there was no need of it. The early railroads were chiefly built for local traffic, and especially for the carriage of local passengers. They were like the horse railroads of the present day in the simplicity of their organization and the shortness of their lines. England in 1847 had chartered 700 companies, with an average authorized length of hardly fifteen miles each. The line from Albany to Buffalo and Niagara Falls was in the hands of a dozen independent concerns. These were but types of what existed all over the world. As through traffic, and especially through freight traffic, grew in importance, this state of things became intolerable. Frequent transshipment was at once an expense to the railroad and a burden to the public. Even when this could be avoided, there was a multiplication of offices and a loss of responsibility. The system of ownership and management had to adapt itself to the technical necessities of the business. The change was not the result of legislation; nor was it, except in a limited sense, the work of men like Vanderbilt or Scott. It occurred in all parts of the world at about the same time. It was the result of business necessity, strong enough to shape legislation, and to find administrative leaders who could meet its demands.