It was at this stage of the campaign that Napoleon is thought to have made the crowning mistake of his later years. He halted his victorious columns, and signed the armistice of Pleiswitz (June 4, 1813).
Austria had, since her defeats in 1809, fully recovered her strength. Her armies reorganized, her people animated by a patriotic spirit which had been intensified by promises of constitutional reforms, she had come unhurt out of the war of 1812, and was now determined to recover her lost provinces and her position as an independent power of the first class. With Russia and France both severely crippled by the late struggle, Austria realized her advantage too well to allow the opportunity to pass. Either from Napoleon or the Allies the position lost in 1809 must be recovered. With this end in view, Metternich negotiated with all parties,—Prussia, England, France, and Russia. The amount of lying this able and eminent Christian did at this critical time would probably have taxed the conscience of even such veterans in deception as Fouché and Talleyrand.
Whether Napoleon could have won the friendship of Austria by frankly surrendering to her demands for the restitution of her lost territory, must always remain a matter of doubt. Inasmuch as the Austrian army was not quite ready to take the field, and her treasury was empty, and she had no complaint against Napoleon, excepting that she had made an unprovoked attack upon him in 1809 and had been thoroughly whipped, the probability is that a prompt concession of her demands would have gained her neutrality in the war of 1813. But this is by no means certain. When we remember the strength of dynastic prejudices, the influence of British money, the rising tide of German nationality and of hatred of Napoleon, the intense antagonism to French principles, the activity of royalist and clerical intrigue—it is difficult to escape the conclusion that had Napoleon yielded up what he had taken from Austria, he could have stopped at nothing short of a full surrender all along the line. And had he returned to France shorn of all that French blood had won, the storm of indignation there would have driven him from the throne. Napoleon himself expressed substantially this view at St. Helena; it may have been sound. Why, then; did he grant the truce? What did he mean by saying, after he had signed it, “If the Allies do not sincerely wish for peace, this armistice may prove our ruin”? No one can say. There are facts which appear to prove conclusively that he ardently wished for an honorable peace. Other facts seem to indicate that he was playing for time, that he never did mean to give up anything, and that he was beaten in a grand game of duplicity, where, intending to deceive, he was duped.
CHAPTER XXXVIII
The guiding hand of Austrian diplomacy at this time being Metternich’s, and that astute person having left behind him certain Memoirs which his family have arranged and published, it may be fairly presumed that any revelation of Metternich’s own perfidy made in these Memoirs can be credited.
According to his own story, Metternich sought an interview with the Czar (June 17, 1813) and urged him to trust implicitly to the Austrian mediation which had been tendered to the belligerents. Alexander had his misgivings, and inquired:—
“What will become of our cause if Napoleon accepts the mediation?”
Metternich replied:—
“If he declines, the truce will come to an end, and you will find us among the number of your allies; if he accepts, the negotiations will most certainly show that Napoleon is neither wise nor just, and then the result will be the same. In any case, we shall have gained time to bring up our armies for combined attack.”